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ABSTRACT
Essays on Business Cycles and Stabilization Policy
by
Christoph E. Boehm
Chair: Christopher L. House
This dissertation is a collection of essays on fiscal policy, monetary policy and the inter-
national transmission of business cycle shocks. Chapter 1 highlights the importance of
distinguishing durable and nondurable goods when conducting countercyclical fiscal policy.
It shows that the fiscal multiplier for purchases of durable goods is much smaller than the
multiplier for nondurable goods. Standard models predict small durables multipliers be-
cause private sector purchases of durable goods are highly intertemporally substitutable and
therefore easily crowded out. Empirical estimates based on U.S. data confirm this result. In
aggregate time series data output rises by about 50 cents less if the government purchases
1$ of durable rather than nondurable goods. Industry-level estimates also point to smaller
durable goods multipliers. The findings of this chapter suggest that infrastructure spending
which is frequently part of fiscal stimulus packages is relatively ineffective at raising aggregate
demand.
Chapter 2, joint with Christopher L. House, shifts focus to monetary policy and analyzes
the optimal Taylor rule in a standard New Keynesian model. If the central bank can observe
xiii
the output gap and inflation without error, then it is typically optimal to respond infinitely
strongly to observed deviations from the central banks targets. If it observes inflation and
the output gap with error, the central bank will temper its responses so as not to impart
unnecessary volatility to the economy. If the Taylor rule is expressed in terms of estimated
output and inflation then it is optimal to respond infinitely strongly to estimated deviations
from the targets. Under such a Taylor rule the estimates of inflation and the output gap
should be perfectly negatively correlated. In the data, inflation and the output gap are
weakly correlated, suggesting that the central bank is systematically underreacting.
Chapter 3, joint with Aaron Flaaen and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar, studies the cross-country
transmission of shocks. Using the 2011 To¯hoku earthquake as a natural experiment, the
study shows that firms reliant on Japanese intermediates experienced significant drops in
production after the disruption. These findings imply that supply chains are sufficiently
inflexible to play an important role in the international transmission of shocks.
xiv
CHAPTER I
Government Spending and Durable Goods
1.1 Introduction
When the government raises spending by one dollar, GDP changes by an amount that
is generally not one dollar. The difference arises from the fact that households and firms
change their behavior when the government intervenes—a phenomenon known as crowding
in or out. It is well understood that the private sector response depends on whether the
fiscal intervention is temporary or permanent (Baxter and King 1993). Recent research has
suggested that the response can also depend on whether the economy’s factors of production
are underutilized (e.g. Michaillat 2014) and whether the central bank accommodates the
change in spending (e.g. Christiano et al. 2011, Woodford 2011, and Rendahl 2014).
In this paper I argue that the composition of government spending matters for the size
of the fiscal multiplier. I show that in a two sector model purchases of durable goods have
a much smaller multiplier than purchases of nondurable goods. I then estimate multipliers
separately for spending in durables and nondurables industries. While, on average, a dollar
of spending on durable goods raises industry gross output by less than 30 cents, gross output
rises more than one-for-one if the government buys nondurable goods. These findings suggest
that infrastructure spending has very small affects on aggregate demand.
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The demand for nondurable goods differs fundamentally from the demand for new durables.
Whereas nondurable goods and services are immediately consumed, durable goods such as
cars, appliances or structures have service lives of many years. If the price of a durable good
rises temporarily, households can rely on the existing stock and postpone new purchases
until prices revert to lower levels. All else equal, a longer service life leads to a greater
intertemporal substitutability of purchases.
Intertemporal substitutability is key for the fiscal multiplier because it determines how
much private sector spending is crowded out. If the government temporarily raises spending
and drives up prices, households delay new purchases until the fiscal expansion ends. The
higher the intertemporal elasticity of substitution the larger the degree of crowding out. It
follows that multipliers for durable goods with high intertemporal elasticities of substitu-
tion are smaller than multipliers for nondurable goods with low intertemporal elasticities of
substitution.
In standard models the difference between durable and nondurable multipliers is large.
When the service life is calibrated to realistic levels, the durables multiplier is often less than
one third of the nondurables multiplier. I also show that the durables multiplier approaches
zero as the service life of the durable good becomes large. The prediction that durables
multipliers are smaller than nondurables multipliers holds for both New Keynesian and
neoclassical models.
Research by Woodford (2011), Christiano et al. (2011), and Farhi and Werning (2012),
among others, has emphasized that the size of the fiscal multiplier is highly sensitive to
the monetary policy response. Interestingly, the durables multiplier often depends less on
monetary policy than the nondurables multiplier. Because purchases of durables crowd out
private sector spending, equilibrium quantities and prices move little relative to the case in
which the government purchases nondurable goods. With output and prices barely changed,
the monetary policy response matters less. In the special case in which the service life of
2
durables becomes large, the allocation is independent of monetary policy for a large class of
rules.
I estimate fiscal multipliers separately for durable and nondurable goods, beginning with
evidence based on U.S. national accounts data. In simple regressions which take U.S. military
spending as exogenous (Hall 2009 and Barro and Redlick 2011) the nondurables multiplier
exceeds the durables multiplier by about 0.5. Consistent with theory, government purchases
of durable goods are associated with declines in private sector investment and purchases of
durable goods.
I subsequently turn to an analysis at the industry level. In particular, I assemble a new
dataset from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database and two databases covering
the universe of U.S. military prime contracts. The merged dataset contains industry-level
outcomes such as gross output, value added, and employment together with military spending
on goods in each 4-digit SIC manufacturing industry.
As predicted by the theory, industries that produce durable goods respond much less
to fiscal expansions than industries that produce nondurable goods. Using an identifica-
tion strategy closely related to Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Nekarda and Ramey (2011), and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), I first estimate impulse response functions. I then con-
struct industry-level multipliers from the estimated impulse response functions separately
for durable and nondurable goods. The multipliers for all five measures of economic ac-
tivity I consider—gross output, value added, cost of materials, energy expenditures, and
employment—are smaller if spending takes place in durable goods industries.
This paper is related to a large literature on the effects of government spending. Hall
(2009) shows in a simple static model with a single nondurable good that the fiscal multiplier
is decreasing in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In his model the multiplier
tends to zero as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution approaches infinity. I show that
the same result holds approximately for short-run multipliers of long-lived durable goods.
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Consistent with this result, House (2009) argues that among the options that households
face in response to greater government spending, reducing investment is more attractive than
reducing consumption or raising the supply of labor.
Most of the literature on fiscal multipliers does not distinguish between purchases of
durable and nondurable goods. Exceptions include Perotti (2004) and Pappa (2009a,b)
who study the effects of government consumption and investment using structural vector
autoregressions. Their findings are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that government
consumption is associated with greater multipliers than government investment.1 Paying
particular attention to anticipation effects and timing Leduc and Wilson (2013) study the
effects of public infrastructure spending. They find a very large short-term multiplier in
recessions and an insignificant short-term multiplier in expansions.2
A number of studies have suggested that the fiscal multiplier is larger during economic
downturns than in times of peak economic activity (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012,
2013, Bachmann and Sims 2012, and Michaillat 2014).3 By far the most commonly cited
reason for such state dependence is that the presence of slack: If factors of production are
underutilized there is less crowding out of private sector spending, leading to a larger fiscal
multiplier. Since durable goods industries exhibit high volatility over the business cycle,
one may conjecture that the state dependence hypothesis applies particularly to spending
on durable goods. Yet, when I allow for state dependence in the estimation of the durable
goods multiplier, I find no indication for greater effectiveness when spending occurs in times
of economic slack.4
1See in particular tables 4 to 6 in Perotti (2004), the “typical” state-level employment responses in figure
3 in Pappa (2009a) and table 1 in Pappa (2009b).
2Other papers that distinguish different government interventions include Finn (1998), and Pereira
(2000). Aschauer (1989) studies the effect of public expenditure on productivity.
3The evidence on state dependence of fiscal multipliers is not uncontroversial. Owyang et al. (2013) find
that the multiplier in recessions is large in Canada, but not in the U.S.
4In fact, Berger and Vavra (2014) argue that the durable goods fiscal multiplier may be smaller in
recessions than during expansions.
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Although I cast my analysis largely in terms of consumer durables, I note that the
demand for investment goods such as machines, ships or structures is also highly elastic
(House and Shapiro 2008). In the empirical part of this paper, I will refer to all long-lived
goods as durable goods, regardless of whether they are consumer durables or investment
goods. Because services are immediately consumed, they are best understood as nondurable
goods in the context of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I lay out a simple
theory predicting that the multiplier for durables is small relative to that of nondurable
goods. I then turn to the empirical analysis in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4 I analyze an
extension of the model in which the interest rate is pinned at the zero lower bound. Section
1.5 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical analysis
I next present a New Keynesian two sector model to study the effectiveness of government
spending on durable and nondurable goods. After describing the model, I demonstrate that
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of durable goods purchases is much larger than
that of nondurable goods purchases. I then show that their high intertemporal substitutabil-
ity renders the durable goods multiplier small.
1.2.1 Model description
The model is designed to mirror the empirical setting I face below: There is a large
number of (4-digit SIC) industries. Some of these industries produce durable goods, others
produce nondurable goods. I am interested in the effect on GDP when the government
increases spending in a typical durable or a typical nondurable goods industry.
To keep the framework tractable, I only model two sectors, a small sector X and a large
5
sector Z. The small sector represents a typical 4-digit SIC manufacturing industry that is
subjected to a government spending shock. Depending on the choice of the depreciation rate
δD, the small sector produces either durable or nondurable goods for final consumption. The
large sector Z represents the aggregate of all remaining industries. It produces goods which
can alternately be used for final nondurable consumption C, for investment into capital of
the two sectors, IZ and IX , or for intermediate goods MX used in the production of good
X. For simplicity, there is no government spending on goods in the Z sector. Notice that Z
is a hybrid sector, producing both nondurable goods (C and MX) and durable investment
goods (IZ and IX).
1.2.1.1 Representative household
The representative household maximizes life-time utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u (Ct, DH,t) + Γt − v (NX,t, NZ,t)]
subject to the nominal budget constraint
PX,tXH,t + PZ,t (Ct + IX,t + IZ,t) +Bt + Tt
= WX,tNX,t +WZ,tNZ,t +RX,tKX,t−1 +RZ,tKZ,t−1 +Bt−1 (1 + it−1) + Πt, (1.1)
the accumulation equations
DH,t = XH,t + (1− δD)DH,t−1, Kj,t = Ij,t + (1− δK)Kj,t−1, j ∈ {Z,X} , (1.2)
and a no-Ponzi game condition.
Utility is derived from three components. The first component, u, reflects the benefit
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derived from the consumption of the nondurable good Ct and the good DH,t. When δD = 1,
DH,t = XH,t is a nondurable good. For δD < 1, DH,t is the household’s stock of durable
goods, while XH,t are new purchases. The second component, Γt, represents the household’s
utility derived from government purchases. I assume that Γ enters additively separable
so that government spending is neither a substitute nor a complement for private sector
spending. Finally, the third term is the household’s disutility from supplying labor to the two
sectors. Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives, I assume that 1) uC , uD, vX , vZ > 0,
2) uCC , uDD < 0, 3) vXX , vZZ > 0, and 4) that Inada-type conditions hold.
The remaining notation is chosen as follows. PX,t and PZ,t denote the prices in the X
and the Z sector. Wages are analogously denoted by WX,t and WZ,t. Each sector has its
own capital stock KX,t and KZ,t, earning rental rates RX,t and RZ,t. The representative
household can hold risk-free nominal bonds, Bt, paying interest rate it. Πt are profits and
Tt is a lump-sum tax.
1.2.1.2 Firms
Both sectors have a representative aggregating firm and a unit continuum of differentiated
firms. The aggregating firms assemble the differentiated varieties into CES bundles
Xt =
 1∫
0
xt (s)
ε−1
ε ds

ε
ε−1
, Zt =
 1∫
0
zt (s)
ε−1
ε ds

ε
ε−1
. (1.3)
Optimal behavior in competitive markets implies the demand functions
xt (s) = Xt
(
px,t (s)
PX,t
)−ε
, zt (s) = Zt
(
pz,t (s)
PZ,t
)−ε
(1.4)
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where px,t (s) and pz,t (s) denote the prices of a generic variety s in each sector and PX,t and
PZ,t are given by
PX,t =
 1∫
0
(px,t (s))
1−ε ds

1
1−ε
, PZ,t =
 1∫
0
(pz,t (s))
1−ε ds

1
1−ε
. (1.5)
A differentiated firm in sector X produces variety s using production function
xt (s) =
[
(kx,t (s))
α (nx,t (s))
1−α]χ [mx,t (s)]1−χ . (1.6)
The firm rents capital kx,t (s) at rate RX,t and employs labor nx,t (s) at wage WX,t. Addi-
tionally, production requires an intermediate mx,t (s) from the large sector. Parameter χ is
the cost share of capital and labor and (1− χ) is that of intermediates. Cost minimization
in competitive factor markets yields the firm’s conditional factor demand functions and an
expression for its marginal costs MCX,t.
Firms set prices as in Calvo (1983). Let θX denote the probability that a firm in sector
X cannot adjust its price. Let further λ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
constraint (1.1). Then the monopolistically competitive firm chooses the reset price p∗X,t to
maximize objective
Et
∞∑
j=0
(θXβ)
j λt+j
λt
[
p∗X,txt+j −MCX,t+jxt+j
]
subject to the sequence of demand functions (the first equation in 1.4) and its marginal costs
MCX,t+j. The optimal reset price is
p∗X,t =
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
j=0 (θXβ)
j λt+jXt+j (PX,t+j)
εMCX,t+j
Et
∑∞
j=0 (θXβ)
j λt+jXt+j (PX,t+j)
ε .
Monopolistic competitors in the large sector behave similarly. The only difference is that
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they do not require an intermediate input. Their production function is simply zt (s) =
(kz,t (s))
α (nz,t (s))
1−α, and capital and labor are paid the rental rate RZ,t and the wage WZ,t.
Price rigidity in sector Z is parameterized by θZ . Notice that I assume that productivity in
both sectors is unaffected by government spending.
1.2.1.3 Market clearing, government, accounting, and monetary policy
Market clearing in sectors Z and X requires
Zt = Ct + IX,t + IZ,t +MX,t and Xt = XH,t +XG,t (1.7)
where MX,t =
∫ 1
0
mx,t (s) ds is the total of intermediates demanded by the X sector and XG
is government spending on good X. The labor and capital market clearing conditions are
given by
NX,t =
1∫
0
nx,t (s) ds, NZ,t =
1∫
0
nz,t (s) ds (1.8)
and
KX,t−1 =
1∫
0
kx,t (s) ds, KZ,t−1 =
1∫
0
kz,t (s) ds. (1.9)
Since the economy is closed and the government always balances its budget (Tt = PX,tXG,t),
bonds are in zero net supply, Bt = 0.
5 I assume that government purchases in sector X
follow the AR(1) process
XG,t = (1− %X)XG + %XXG,t−1 + εG,t. (1.10)
Variables without time subscripts, such as XG, denote steady state values.
5Since Ricardian equivalence holds in this model, the balanced budget assumption is not restrictive.
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GDP in constant prices is
Yt = PXXt − PZMX,t + PZZt. (1.11)
The GDP deflator and inflation are then
Pt =
PX,tXt + PZ,tZt − PZ,tMX,t
PXXt + PZZt − PZMX,t and pit = (Pt − Pt−1) /Pt−1. (1.12)
I initially assume that the monetary authority follows a fairly general rule of the form
it = ι
({it−s−1, Pt−s, PX,t−s, PZ,t−s, Yt−s, Xt−s, Zt−s}∞s=0) . (1.13)
where ι is any function of the given arguments. This completes the description of the model.
I summarize all equations in Appendix A.1.1.
1.2.2 The demand for durable and nondurable goods
I next compare the demand for durable and nondurable goods. I first demonstrate that
the low intertemporal elasticity of substitution of nondurables implies a very inelastic demand
curve at a given point in time. I then show that the demand for durables has a much higher
demand elasticity, reflecting the high substitutability of durables purchases over time.
Denote by γ the Lagrange multiplier on the accumulation equation of durable goods
(the first equation in 1.2) and recall that λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the nominal budget
constraint (1.1). Hence, γ is the shadow value of good X, expressed in utils, and λ represents
the marginal utility of one dollar. Optimal behavior of the representative household (section
1.2.1.1) then implies that
γt = uD (Ct, DH,t) + β (1− δD)Et [γt+1] (1.14)
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and
PX,t = λ
−1
t γt. (1.15)
As equation (1.14) shows, the shadow value of good X equals a flow component uD plus
a continuation value. Solving this equation forward and combining the result with (1.15)
yields
PX,t = λ
−1
t Et
∞∑
s=0
[β (1− δD)]s uD (Ct+s, DH,t+s) . (1.16)
This expression can be interpreted as the household’s (inverse) demand function for X. It
is helpful to first discuss the special case in which δD = 1.
1.2.2.1 Nondurable goods
If δD = 1, the small sector produces a nondurable good, DH,t = XH,t, and equation (1.16)
reduces to the familiar expression
PX,t = λ
−1
t uD (Ct, XH,t) . (1.17)
Next, define the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of DH as σD = − uD(C,DH)DHuDD(C,DH) . The
linear approximation of equation (1.17) then implies that, ceteris paribus, a one percent
change in XH,t reduces PX,t by σ
−1
D percent. Hence, a low intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution σD implies that the demand curve for nondurable goods is inelastic.
Estimates of elasticity σD vary and are somewhat controversial. A recent study by Cashin
and Unayama (2012) which explicitly distinguishes nondurable from storable and durable
goods estimates a value 0.21, similar to Hall ’s (1988) estimates. Such a low value suggests
that consumption barely responds to changes in intertemporal prices or, equivalently, that
the demand curve for nondurables is very steep. Even if σD is set to unity, a popular choice
in the literature, the demand for nondurables is much less elastic than that for durables.
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1.2.2.2 Durable goods
Due to the dynamic nature of the model, an analogous elasticity for durable goods (δD <
1) is difficult to obtain. Instead, I will argue on the basis of equation (1.16) that in a limiting
case the shadow value of the durable good γt is approximately constant. If γt is constant, the
demand for Xt is perfectly elastic (see equation 1.15). The limiting approximation assumes
that β approaches unity, δD approaches zero and that all disturbances are short-lived —
a reasonable assumption for temporary fiscal expansions. Of course, many durable goods
do not have depreciation rates near zero. For instance, the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) estimates the service life of furniture at 14 years.6 Yet, the approximation provides
the correct intuition that the demand elasticity rises with greater durability and it remains
quite accurate for realistic calibrations of δD. I provide details on the numerical accuracy of
this approximation below.
To see why γt is approximately constant for long-lived durables, first notice that the
consumer derives utility from the stock of the durable good DH,t, not current purchases
XH,t. Because durables with long service lives have large stock to flow ratios (in steady state
DH/XH = 1/δD), even large changes in XH,t cause only relatively small percentage changes
in DH,t.
Second, if the household is sufficiently patient (β close to unity) and the durable long-
lived (δD close to zero), the shadow value γt depends on utility flows far in the future. In
stationary environments with short-lived shocks these future terms are barely affected since
the economy quickly reverts back to its steady state. Any changes to the first few terms
in the sum of equation (1.16) are dwarfed by the future terms which remain approximately
unchanged. Hence, as β approaches unity and δD approaches zero, the shadow value γt
becomes unresponsive to temporary shocks and the demand for XH,t perfectly elastic.
7
6For the BEA’s estimates of service lives, see Bureau of Economic Analysis (undated).
7A similar argument is made in Barsky et al. (2007).
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Intuitively, the household smoothes consumption of both nondurable and durable goods.
But since utility is derived from the stock the consumer is willing to tolerate much larger
variation in durables purchases than in nondurables purchases. It is optimal to purchase
durables only at favorable prices and to draw down the stock whenever prices are temporarily
high. Mankiw (1985), Adda and Cooper (2000), Erceg and Levin (2006), Mian and Sufi
(2012) and Hausman (2015) all provide evidence for large intertemporal substitutability of
durable goods purchases.
1.2.3 Implications for fiscal policy
The demand elasticity is crucial for the size of the fiscal multiplier because it determines
the degree to which private sector spending is crowded out. The basic intuition can then be
illustrated in a demand and supply diagram.
Suppose the government raises spending and shifts out the demand curve. If the supply
curve is upward-sloping, the resulting price increase reduces private sector spending. Greater
demand elasticities lead to greater crowding-out. In the limiting case with horizontal demand
curve, all private sector spending is crowded out and the fiscal expansion has no effect. Figure
1.1 illustrates the effect of government spending in a sector with inelastic demand (Panel A)
and elastic demand (Panel B). The supply curve and the fiscal expansion are the same in
both sectors.
Before turning to a more formal analysis of fiscal policy I briefly define sector-level ana-
logues of the aggregate fiscal multiplier dY/ dG. These sectoral multipliers help link the
theoretical analysis that follows to the empirical evidence in Section 1.3.
In the model described above, gross output in constant prices in sector X is GOX,t =
PXXt and value added is V AX,t = PXXt − PZMX,t. Also denote government purchases of
good X in constant prices by GX,t = PXXG,t. Then the gross output and value added mul-
tipliers for sector X are defined as dGOX,t/ dGX,t and dV AX,t/ dGX,t. Since I will estimate
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these multipliers in Section 1.3, it is of interest how these sector-level multipliers map into
the policy relevant aggregate multiplier. When discussing the results below I pay particular
attention to this relationship.
I next turn to two limiting approximations which allow me to solve for durable and
nondurable multipliers analytically. The approximations require assumptions similar to those
made above: I assume that β approaches unity and that the depreciation rate of capital δK
tends to zero. The economy is then shocked with a short-lived increase in government
purchases, XG, in the small sector. To preserve space I limit myself to the discussion of
these results and provide details on the derivations in Appendix A.1.2.
1.2.3.1 Spending on durable goods
I first consider the case in which the small sector produces highly durable goods.
Approximation result 1. Suppose δK and δD are arbitrarily close to zero and β is arbi-
trarily close to 1. Then, for a short-lived increase in spending, it is approximately true that
(1) ∆XH,t ≈ −∆XG,t, (2) the price PX,t remains unchanged, (3) the sectoral multipliers for
gross output and value added are zero,
dGOX,t
dGX,t
≈ dV AX,t
dGX,t
≈ 0, and (4) the aggregate multiplier
is zero, dYt
dGX,t
≈ 0.
Here ∆ denotes the absolute deviation of a variable from steady state. Notice first that
this result only requires the stated parametric assumptions. In particular, the result holds
regardless of the functional forms of u and v and regardless of whether the X sector requires
intermediates for production. The result is also independent of the degree of price stickiness
(as long as prices are not perfectly sticky), the relative sizes of the two sectors, and the
precise specification of the monetary policy rule (equation 1.13).
Part (1) of the result states that every dollar spent by the government crowds out one
dollar of private sector spending. If prices are not perfectly sticky, the small sector’s supply
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curve is upward-sloping. Hence, a greater quantity would lead to a higher equilibrium price.
In this limiting approximation, however, the private sector’s demand for durable goods is
perfectly elastic and any price increase would result in complete withdrawal from the market.
Clearly, this cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Instead, the equilibrium quantity and
price in the small sector both remain unchanged. This requires that private sector demand
contracts dollar for dollar with greater government spending.
Since the equilibrium quantity in the small sector is unaffected by the fiscal expansion,
the sectoral multipliers must be zero. It turns out that in this limiting case the aggregate
multiplier is zero as well. The explanation of this result has three components. First, as
noted above, the fiscal expansion has no effect on the small sector’s output and therefore
leaves factor demands unchanged. It follows that the household’s labor and capital income
remain the same and that there are no spillovers to the large sector through the demand
for intermediate inputs. The second effect concerns the government’s financing of the rise
in spending. Because the expansion is by assumption brief, its effect on life-time income
through taxation is very small. In fact, the approximation procedure treats the change in
life-time income as negligible. It then follows that households neither change their labor
supply nor their overall consumption demand. Finally, notice that both prices PX and PZ
remain unchanged. Hence greater government spending does not raise inflation or output
and no adjustment is required for the nominal interest rate.
An important corollary of this approximation result is that fiscal multipliers need not
be large at the zero lower bound (ZLB). As, among others, Christiano et al. (2011) and
Woodford (2011) show, the multiplier is large whenever the fiscal expansion leads to inflation,
and these inflationary forces are not offset by a higher policy rate. At the ZLB, higher
inflation reduces the real rate, stimulating private consumption and therefore resulting in
a large fiscal multiplier. However, when the government purchases highly durable goods,
private spending is crowded out and inflation barely rises. The mechanism of greater demand
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leading to greater inflation and greater inflation leading to even greater demand is therefore
not triggered. As a result, the durables multiplier remains low.
While the multipliers for long-lived durable goods are small at the ZLB, this is not always
true for durable goods with intermediate service lives. I return to this issue in Section 1.4
in which I provide a quantitative analysis of durables multipliers at the ZLB.
1.2.3.2 Spending on nondurable goods
I next turn to the case in which the small sector produces a nondurable good.
Approximation result 2. Suppose δD = 1, δK is arbitrarily close to zero and β is arbi-
trarily close to 1. Suppose further that prices are fully flexible, and that uCD = vXZ = 0.
Lastly, there is an additional technical assumption of little economic relevance which I dis-
cuss in Appendix A.1.2. Then a short-lived increase in spending yields a gross output sectoral
multiplier equal to
dGOX,t
dGX,t
≈
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1 − (α + η−1X )
σD
(
α + η−1X
)
XH
X
+
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1 − (α + η−1X )
and approximately equal sectoral value added and aggregate multipliers
dV AX,t
dGX,t
≈ dYt
dGX,t
≈ 1− α
σD
(
α + η−1X
)
XH
X
+
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1 − (α + η−1X ) .
Here, ηX =
vX(NZ ,NX)
NXvXX(NZ ,NX)
. The relative price PX,t/PZ,t rises in response to greater spending.
When the small sector produces a nondurable good, all three multipliers are positive.
More precisely, they are bounded between zero and one, a feature common in neoclassical
environments. Additionally, the sectoral value added multiplier and the aggregate multiplier
are again approximately equal, implying that sectoral multipliers are of direct policy interest.
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I next discuss how various parameters affect the multipliers. The main property that
this paper emphasizes is the multipliers’ dependence on the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution σD. The greater σD the smaller the multipliers. As σD approaches infinity all three
multipliers tend to zero, the same value that multipliers of highly durable goods take.
To understand the role of the remaining parameters, I consider two polar cases. Suppose
first that no intermediates are required for production (χ = 1). Then it is easy to show that
all three multipliers approximately equal
1− α
1− α + σD
(
α + η−1X
)
XH
X
.
This formula is identical to that in Hall (2009, p. 199). It illustrates clearly that the
multiplier is increasing in the labor supply elasticity, ηX , and decreasing in the capital share,
α, reflecting the fact that capital is a fixed factor in the short run.
I next turn to the opposite case in which χ→ 0 so that the small sector almost exclusively
uses intermediates in production. It then follows that the sectoral multiplier for gross output,
dGOX,t
dGX,t
, approaches unity while the sectoral multiplier for value added and the aggregate
multiplier tend to zero. What is the intuition behind these results?
A gross output multiplier of unity implies that the small sector expands one-for-one with
greater government demand. Since additional output is almost exclusively produced from
intermediates, it is clear that value added in the small sector remains close to zero. It can
also be shown that
∆MX,t ≈ − (∆IX,t + ∆IZ,t) ,
so that purchases of intermediates crowd out investment in the large hybrid sector dollar
for dollar. Hence, while the small sector expands one-for-one, this expansion has no effect
on production in the large sector and total value added (GDP) remains unchanged. We
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therefore encounter a second instance in which the crowding out of durable goods with
large intertemporal elasticity of substitution—in this case investment goods—implies a low
multiplier.
Although this finding is certainly extreme and crucially relies on the assumption that
the large sector’s output can be used for investment, the approximation clearly illustrates
how sectoral linkages affect fiscal multipliers: If government purchases, either directly or
indirectly through intermediate input linkages, raise the demand for durable goods, they
largely crowd out private sector demand. If, in contrast, government purchases are targeted
at nondurable goods, there is less crowding out and the multipliers are larger.
1.2.4 Numerical results
I next use an exact (linear) solution of the model to confirm that the durables multiplier
is relatively small. Before proceeding, however, I modify the model slightly. In order to
avoid the extreme crowding out effects that greater intermediate purchases cause in the
large hybrid sector, I introduce investment adjustment costs. These adjustment costs reflect
the fact that some intermediates are nondurable in nature and therefore have a less elastic
demand function than those intermediates that are durable.
1.2.4.1 Calibration
The length of a period is a quarter and households discount the future with discount
factor β = 0.99. The flow utility function is given by
u (Ct, DH,t) =
(
1− 1
σ
)−1([
ω (Ct)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− ω) (DH,t)
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
)1− 1
σ
. (1.18)
Consistent with the estimates in Hall (1988) and Cashin and Unayama (2012), I select an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ of 0.25. In the baseline calibration, I further assume
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that the elasticity of substitution ρ between C and DH is (arbitrarily close to) 1. I explore
alternative values in robustness exercises. The preference weight ω is chosen so that value
added in the small sector is one hundredth of total value added.
I assume that the disutility of labor is given by
v (NX,t, NZ,t) = ϕX
(NX,t)
1+ 1
η
1 + 1
η
+ ϕZ
(NZ,t)
1+ 1
η
1 + 1
η
.
This specification implies that labor is immobile across sectors, an assumption I also relax
in robustness exercises. I set the labor supply elasticity η to unity. This value is broadly
consistent with recent suggestions in the literature Kimball and Shapiro 2008, Hall 2009,
and Chetty et al. 2011).8
Turning to the production side of the model, I choose α = 1/3 as is standard in the
literature. Consistent with an intermediate input share of roughly 55 percent in the 2007
Make and Use Tables, I calibrate χ to 0.45. Further, I set ε to 6, implying a steady state
mark-up of 20 percent. In my choice of the the price stickiness parameters θX and θZ , I
follow Gal´ı (2008) and assume that both equal 2/3. The depreciation rates of both types
of capital are set to 0.025, implying approximately a 10 percent annual depreciation rate. I
show results for various alternative values of δD, including δD = 1 so that the small sector
produces a nondurable good.
In steady state, the government purchases one fifth of the output in the small sector. I
calibrate the persistence %X of the spending process (1.10) to 0.75. This value implies that
the fiscal expansion largely dissipates after eight quarters, mimicking the spending trajectory
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.9 The monetary authority follows a simple
Taylor rule, that is, I replace the general rule (1.13) by it = β
−1 − 1 + φpipit + φY Y˜t. Here,
8Once ω and the remaining parameters are fixed, the values of ϕX and ϕZ do not affect equilibrium
dynamics.
9The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 78 percent of total spending had occurred by September
2011 (see https://www.cbo.gov/publication/42682).
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the tilde denotes percent deviation from steady state. In the baseline calibration I set
φpi = 1.1 and φY = 0. Notice that this policy rule satisfies the Taylor principle, ensuring
equilibrium determinacy as shown in Bullard and Mitra (2002). I consider a more hawkish
parameterization of the Taylor rule in Appendix A.1.3.
Finally, I assume that capital investment at time t is subject to adjustment costs of the
form
Kj,t−1
ζK
2
(
Ij,t
Kj,t−1
− δK
)2
, j ∈ {X,Z}.
In the baseline calibration, summarized in Table 1.1, ζK is set to 20. This value is slightly
higher than the 17 chosen by Christiano et al. (2011) who base their calibration on Eberly
et al. (2008).
1.2.4.2 Simulation results
I next turn to the question how the economy’s reaction to a government spending shock
depends on the depreciation rate δD. I consider four different cases. First, I set δD = 1 so
that the small sector produces nondurables. Second, I set δD = 0.083, a value consistent with
a 3 year service life. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (undated) estimates for example the
service lives of tires and software at 3 years. Third, I select a value of δD = 0.018. This value
corresponds to a service life of 14 years (e.g. furniture). Lastly, I consider a very long-lived
durable. According to the BEA, new 1-to-4-unit structures have service lives of 80 years,
implying a quarterly depreciation rate of approximately δD = 0.003. Figure 1.2 shows the
impulse response functions of a 100 unit increase of government spending in the X sector.
Panel A displays the fiscal expansion in the public sector and Panel B shows the private
sector response. If the small sector produces a nondurable good, private sector spending
barely changes. Since there is very little crowding out, production expands almost one-for-
one with public spending. This is shown in Panel C. The aggregate multiplier is near 0.75
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(Panel D) and the gross multiplier in the X sector is close to unity (Panel E). If, in contrast,
the small sector produces durable goods, the multipliers are much smaller.
The lower the depreciation rate the more private sector spending is crowded out. When
the X sector produces a moderately durable good with a 3 year service life (δD = 0.083),
private sector spending falls substantially more after the spending shock. All multipliers,
gross output, value added, and aggregate, fall to roughly two thirds of the nondurable goods
multiplier. For a service life of 14 years, the multipliers fall to about 1/3 of the nondurables
multiplier. As the depreciation rate further approaches zero the multipliers gradually shrink
to zero. The model therefore predicts that infrastructure investment which crowds out
private sector construction has a very small fiscal multiplier of roughly 0.1.
These impulse response functions corroborate the results presented earlier: The demand
for durable goods is highly elastic and easily crowded out. However, they yield one additional
insight. Because all real variables of the model are stationary, they return to their steady
state values in the long run. This model feature implies that any demand that is temporarily
crowded out has to be made up in the long run as households replenish their stock of
durables. In fact, Panel B shows that households’ purchases of the durable goods rise above
zero roughly 10 quarters after the shock.
An implication of this delayed demand boost is that the multipliers of durable goods
begin to rise about 4 quarters after the shock. From the viewpoint of stabilization policy, it
is an unfortunate fact that private demand picks up only after the fiscal expansion ends and
the pressure on prices recedes. For short-lived spending shocks the economy will never enjoy
increased government and private sector demand at the same time. I report the impulse
response functions of the price in sector X and the nominal interest rate in Figure A.1 in
Appendix A.1.4.
I finally turn to the question of what sectoral multipliers teach us about aggregate multi-
pliers. In the limiting approximations above, crowding out of capital investment was perfect
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and, as a result, the aggregate multipliers were equal to the sectoral value-added multipli-
ers. However, when the depreciation rate of capital is higher and investment is subject to
adjustment costs, as in the calibrations shown here, crowding out is imperfect. The aggre-
gate multiplier is now greater than the sectoral value added multiplier. In fact, for all four
calibrations shown in Figure 1.2, the aggregate multipliers lie above the sectoral value added
multipliers and are quite similar to or somewhat below the gross output multipliers. As I
show in Appendix A.1.3, the rule of thumb that the aggregate multipliers are slightly smaller
than the sectoral gross output multipliers is robust for a number of alternative calibrations.
1.3 Empirical evidence
The main objective in this section is to test whether the data support the hypothesis
that the durables multiplier is smaller than the nondurables multiplier. I begin the analysis
using national accounts data and find that the evidence supports the hypothesis. I then turn
to an analysis at the industry level and again find evidence for smaller multipliers of durable
goods purchases.
1.3.1 Evidence based on aggregate data
For the analysis of aggregate data, I adopt a specification similar to Hall (2009) and
Barro and Redlick (2011), namely
Yt − Yt−1
Y Tt−1
= α + µX
GX,t −GX,t−1
Y Tt−1
+ µC
GC,t −GC,t−1
Y Tt−1
+ νRNt + εt+1. (1.19)
In this equation Yt is GDP, Y
T
t is trend GDP, GX,t is military spending on durable goods,
GC,t is military spending on nondurable goods, and RNt is Ramey ’s (2011) defense news
variable. Ramey’s news variable is constructed from narrative records and measures the
present value of new military spending at the time of announcement. The variable mostly
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captures defense spending 3 to 5 years into the future and is expressed as a fraction of GDP.
I control for the announcement of future spending to isolate the effect of actual spending
on durable and nondurable goods. According to standard theory, the announcement of
greater future spending reduces households’ life-time wealth and increases their labor supply.
ν is therefore expected to be positive. The main reason for including this control is that
announcements of future spending could be correlated with one of the spending variables but
not the other. If, for example, the public learns about a military buildup at the same time
as first investments into equipment are made, the estimate of µX would be biased upward
without the control for news on future spending. Note that when µX and µC are estimated
based on specification (1.19), these “multipliers” are purged of announcement effects and
thus understate the total effect of military spending.10
Consistent estimation of the multipliers µX and µC requires the commonly made assump-
tion that the state of the business cycle does not affect whether the U.S. engages in military
buildup (e.g. Ramey and Shapiro 1998, Hall 2009). I use annual national accounts data for
the estimation. Details are available in Appendix A.2.1.
Table 1.2 shows the results. The output multipliers are quite different for durable and
nondurable goods. For the sample from 1929 to 2014 the estimate of µC is 0.49. When
World War II is excluded, the multiplier rises to 0.83. In contrast, the estimates of µX are
close to zero or negative, supporting the theoretical predictions that durables multipliers are
smaller than nondurables multipliers. Yet, the standard errors are too large to reject the
null hypothesis that µC equals µX . As expected, the estimates of ν are positive.
I next replace GDP in the numerator on the left hand side of equation (1.19) with a
number of other variables to estimate how government spending on durable and nondurable
goods crowds out private sector spending. These are consumption, investment, consumption
10Based on the argument in Barro and Redlick (2011) the total size of the durables and nondurables
multipliers should roughly be µX + 4 · ν and µC + 4 · ν.
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of nondurables and services, investment plus durable goods consumption, and net exports.
It is striking how consistently the coefficient on nondurables is estimated to be essentially
zero. Hence, there is little, if any, crowding out when the government purchases nondurable
goods. There is, however, crowding out when the government purchases durable goods. For
the sample from 1929 to 2014 the estimate of µX is significantly negative for all four measures
of private consumption and investment. The coefficients are near negative one for investment
and investment plus durables consumption, suggesting that there is almost perfect crowding
out. It is less clear how the negative coefficient on durables spending in the consumption
equation should be interpreted. When consumption is limited to nondurables and services,
the estimates of µX move slightly towards zero. Although this suggests that there is indeed
more crowding out of durables consumption, the estimates of µX remain negative.
The model in section 1.2 suggests that the durables multiplier is small because the private
sector substitutes intertemporally when the government raises spending. An alternative
explanation is that the private sector substitutes towards imported goods. If this was the
case, greater government spending should be accompanied by lower net exports and a smaller
drop in investment. The last line in Table 1.2 shows that the response of net exports is
negligibly small. Hence, the data do not support the alternative hypothesis that the durables
multiplier is small because of substitution towards foreign goods.
From 1972 onwards, the BEA provides a more detailed breakdown of military spending.
Evidence based on this data again suggests that fiscal policy is less effective when the govern-
ment purchases durable goods. I discuss data, estimation strategy and results in Appendix
A.2.2 and next turn to evidence based on industry-level data.
1.3.2 Evidence based on industry-level data
In this section I estimate fiscal multipliers at the industry level: How much does indus-
try output rise if the government spends 1$ on goods in this industry? Moving towards
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less aggregate data has the benefit of substantially raising the available data and therefore
statistical power. As I will discuss below, this analysis has the additional advantage of re-
laxing the identifying assumptions. Yet, there is a mild cost: The policy relevant aggregate
multipliers generally differ somewhat from the estimated industry-level multipliers. Since I
established a close connection between these two types of multipliers in section 1.2, I view
these costs as relatively small.
1.3.2.1 Data
The empirical analysis at the industry level is based primarily on two data sources, the
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database and the military prime contract files. The
NBER-CES database contains annual data on, among other things, gross output, value
added, cost of materials, expenditures on energy, and employment, along with various de-
flators. It ranges from 1958 to 2009 and covers all manufacturing industries. The database
is constructed mainly from the Annual Survey of Manufactures and the Census of Manufac-
tures, but complemented with additional information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Federal Reserve Board. A detailed description of
this database is provided by Bartelsman and Gray (1996) and Becker et al. (2013).
The military prime contract files include information on all military prime contracts with
values above the minimum threshold of $10,000 up to 1983 and $25,000 thereafter. They
can be downloaded for the period from 1966 to 2003 from the U.S. National Archives. I
complement the prime contract files with data from USAspending.gov, a government website
dedicated to promoting transparency of federal spending. The data from USAspending.gov
is available from 2000 onwards. A comparison of the two data sources for the overlapping
years from 2000 to 2003 reveals only negligible differences. The analysis below is based on
all contracts that are awarded to firms in the United States.
Unfortunately, the data on defense spending is not easily matched to different industries.
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While the NBER-CES database is available for both SIC- and NAICS-based industry defini-
tions, the military prime contract files contain SIC codes only for the relatively brief period
from 1989 to 2000 and NAICS codes from 2000 onwards. Instead, military purchases are
classified according to the Federal Procurement Data System which assigns a unique Product
Service Code (PSC) or Federal Supply Code (FSC) to each contract since 1966.
To obtain military spending at the industry level I construct a concordance from the
FSC/PSC classification to 4-digit SIC codes. The concordance is based on the military
prime contract files from 1989 to 2000 which contain both, FSC/PSC and SIC codes. Details
on the construction of this concordance as well as further information on the data and the
FSC/PSC classification system are available in Appendix A.3.1. Because the FSC/PSC
system underwent a major revision in 1979, the concordance is only valid thereafter. This
leaves me with a sample of annual data from 1979 to 2009. I adopt the SIC classification of
durable and nondurable goods.
Due to concerns about measurement error (see below) and because one would not expect
that small changes in military spending give rise to measurable changes in economic activity,
I limit the sample to industries in which the military purchases at least 1 percent of gross
output, on average. Examples of dropped industries include Greeting Cards (SIC 2771)
and Women’s Footwear (SIC 3144). I also drop industries with little private sector demand.
These industries are problematic for testing the hypothesis of smaller multipliers for spending
on durable goods because with little private sector demand to begin with, there is little room
for crowding out. In the complete absence of private sector demand, the theory discussed
above does not apply and the sectoral multiplier should be unity regardless of whether
the sector produces durable or nondurable goods. I therefore drop industries with average
values of military purchases per industry gross output of greater than 0.35.11 Examples here
include Tanks and Tank Components (SIC 3795) and Ammunition, except for Small Arms
11Other thresholds leave the results essentially unchanged.
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(SIC 3483). The final sample comprises 35 nondurables and 76 durables industries. I list all
industries in the sample in Appendix A.3.2.
1.3.2.2 Empirical strategy
Specification
I first estimate impulse response functions using O`scar Jorda`’s (2005) local projection
method and then construct multipliers from the estimated impulse response functions. The
baseline specification is
Yi,t+h − Y Ti,t−1
V ATi,t−1
= αh
Gi,t −GTi,t−1
V ATi,t−1
+
2∑
k=1
βkh
Yi,t−k − Y Ti,t−k−1
V ATi,t−k−1
+
2∑
k=1
γkh
Gi,t−k −GTi,t−k−1
V ATi,t−k−1
+ δi,h + ζt,h + εi,t+h, (1.20)
for h = 0, 1, ..., 4. In this equation Yi,t is a generic variable of interest of industry i at time
t, Gi,t is defense spending, and V Ai,t is value added. The superscript T indicates that the
variable in question is an HP-filtered trend.
I estimate equation (1.20) separately for durable and nondurable goods industries to
obtain the objects of interest {αh}4h=0. These parameters represent the impulse response
coefficients for the impact year, h = 0, and four subsequent years. The specification controls
for two lags of the deviations of the dependent variable and defense spending from trend, as
well as time and industry fixed effects δi,h and ζt,h.
The time fixed effects play a key role in specification (1.20). They soak up disturbances
that affect all industries symmetrically, notably monetary policy shocks and certain tax
policy changes. Additionally, the time fixed effects control for announcements of greater
future spending, at least to the extend that all sectors are affected equally. Notice that
since I estimate equation (1.20) separately for durable and nondurable goods industries all
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coefficients are allowed to differ by industry type.
A potential concern with specification (1.20) is that the impulse response coefficients
{αh}4h=0 depend on the smoothness of the trends required for constructing the left and right-
hand side variables. To err on the safe side I extract very smooth trends with a smoothing
parameter of 1600 for annual data. I also test the robustness of my results for alternative
values of this parameter.
Identification
As Nekarda and Ramey (2011) discuss in detail, an industry-level analysis of government
spending may suffer from an endogeneity problem. Technological progress in a particular
industry can lead both to greater sales to the private sector and to increased defense spending
as the military upgrades its equipment. The bias resulting from the estimation of (1.20) by
OLS would inflate the impulse response coefficients above their true levels.
On the other hand, measurement error in defense spending may bias the coefficients
towards zero. Measurement error is a concern for the following reason. In the military prime
contract files, every contract is assigned a single FSC/PSC code. The documentation of the
files reveals occasional difficulties of the procurement staff to select a single code, as some
contracts include purchases of different types of goods.12 Although the staff is instructed
to assign the FSC/PSC code whose description best fits the contract, it is likely that the
limitation to one code per contract induces measurement error. A second source of error is
the use of the concordance to map FSC/PSC codes to SIC industry definitions.
To avoid or reduce these biases I construct a Bartik-type instrument from total defense
spending, i.e. spending summed over all manufacturing industries (Bartik 1991). More
12For example, guns, up to 30mm (FSC 1005) and guns, over 30mm up to 75mm (FSC 1010) are two
separate categories. It is conceivable that purchases of both types of guns were part of the same contract.
28
precisely, I construct the variable
1
5
1983∑
s=1979
Gi,s/GOi,s
Gs/GOs
· Gt −G
T
t−1
V ATt−1
. (1.21)
The first term in this expression is a five-year average of the industry-specific military spend-
ing share divided by the aggregate military spending share. It scales the aggregate military
spending series (the second term) so as to generate industry-specific variation. The idea is
that those industries in which the military purchases a greater fraction of output, on aver-
age, also experience greater changes in spending in response to aggregate military buildups
or drawdowns.13 Because all military spending variables on the right-hand side of baseline
specification (1.20) are potentially endogenous, I use (1.21) and its two lags as instruments.
Two assumptions are required for (1.21) to satisfy the exclusion restriction. First, and
recalling that specification (1.20) contains time fixed effects, the relative performance of
industries does not affect whether the U.S. government engages in an aggregate military
buildup. This assumption rules out a reverse causality problem of the type discussed above.
Second, it is not the case that aggregate military spending changes other determinants of
industry-level output after controlling for the right-hand side variables of specification (1.20).
As noted above, monetary and tax policy as well as a nationwide draft do not pose a threat to
identification because the effects should be roughly symmetric within durable or nondurables
industries and will therefore be soaked up by the time fixed effect. A concern would arise,
however, if the cyclicality in the absence of military spending was greater in industries which
receive greater fractions of government spending. While this condition is inherently not
testable, it is reassuring to note that the average standard deviation of value added growth
in industries which receive below and above median military spending are very similar.
I next turn to the first stage of the estimation. Table 1.3 summarizes the Angrist-Pischke
13Nekarda and Ramey (2011) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) use similar approaches to construct
instruments.
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F-statistics of excluded instruments and their p-values when the dependent variable is value
added for the time horizons from h = 0, ..., 4. The smallest F-statistic in Table 1.3 takes
the value 15, implying that the instruments are strong. In principle, the first stage for
specification (1.20) is different for every dependent variable Yi,t (due to the lags on the right-
hand side). In practice, however, the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics are virtually identical. I
therefore only report the details for value added.
1.3.2.3 Results
Figure 1.3 shows the estimated impulse response functions for the baseline sample. A
unit increase in military spending leads to additional spending in subsequent years (Panel
A). The impulse response functions for both types of industries begin to fall in year five and
return to zero 6 to 7 years after the shock (see Figure A.2, Appendix A.3.3). Hence, the
spending increase is more persistent than a typical stimulus program such as the ARRA.
I show in Appendix A.1.3 that the model predicts a difference of factor two between the
nondurables and the durables multiplier for shocks with this persistence.
Panel B shows the dynamic responses of gross output associated with these spending
paths. Consistent with the hypothesis of greater crowding out in durable goods industries,
the effect of military spending on gross output is quite small. In contrast, nondurables
industries expand substantially.
Panel C displays the responses of value added. In both types of industries value added
rises significantly above zero and, again, the dynamic response for durables industries lies
below that for nondurables industries. Additionally, in nondurables industries the rise in
valued added is accompanied by increased purchases of materials (Panel D), although the
standard errors are fairly large. By contrast, the costs of materials change little in durables
industries.14 Panel E shows the impulse response functions of energy expenditures. Unfor-
14Value added and cost of materials roughly sum to gross output.
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tunately, the standard errors are too large to allow for a conclusive statistical comparison.
Finally, Panel F shows the employment responses. Consistent with theory, employment rises
substantially more in nondurable goods industries.15
For the interpretation of the impulse responses in the impact period note that military
spending by industry is constructed by aggregating the value of all contracts in a given year.
I use the date on which the contract is signed for this aggregation. My dataset has no
information on the date of actual payments. Panels B to F all suggest that there is little
effect at the time the contract is signed, but only in subsequent years.
Taken together, nondurable goods industries respond strongly to increased defense spend-
ing while the reaction of durable goods industries is quite moderate. These findings are
consistent with the theory described above, suggesting that indeed there is little crowding
out in nondurable goods industries but substantial crowding out in durables industries.
I next compute the sectoral multipliers as the cumulative change in the outcome variable
divided by the cumulative change in spending. Based on the model from the previous
section and taking into account that military buildups typically have greater persistence
than stabilizing interventions, I expect that the durables multiplier has about half the size
of the nondurables multiplier.
Table 1.4 summarizes the estimated multipliers for time horizons of 1 to 3 years after the
shock. The table confirms that multipliers for all five variables, gross output, value added,
cost of materials, energy expenditures, and employment are uniformly larger in nondurable
goods sectors. Notice that the employment multiplier is expressed as employees per year
per $1 million dollar of spending. While most multipliers in Table 1.4 take empirically
plausible sizes and are broadly in line with theoretical predictions, the gross output and
cost of materials multipliers for nondurables are quite large. A likely explanation for this is
that measurement problems give rise to upward biases. If firms in a particular industry use
15I report estimates of impulse response functions for prices in Appendix A.3.5.
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inputs from other firms in the same industry, shipments and cost of materials will be counted
multiple times. The Use Tables of various years suggest that 10 percent is a conservative
estimate of the share of intra-industry shipments. Under this assumption, one dollar of final
sales is counted 1/ (1− 0.1) ≈ 1.11 times. A similar problem arises from intra-firm, inter-
plant shipments.16 For this reason it is preferable to compare industries on the basis of value
added or employment.17
Robustness
I next discuss the robustness of these results. All estimates are reported in Appendix
A.3.4.
One possible concern is that is that anticipation of future spending leads to asymmetric
effects across industries which are not fully captured by time the fixed effects. To address
this issue I add Ramey ’s 2011 defense news variable interacted with industry indicators to
specification (1.20). The resulting multipliers are almost identical to those in the baseline
specification (Table A.7). A second concern may be that the time fixed effects do not fully
control for monetary policy. The reason is that the interest sensitivity increases with the
length of the service lives, and these vary across industries. When controlling for the real
interest rate interacted with industry indicators, however, the results barely change (Table
A.8).
I next explore how the results depend on how the trend of the variables is extracted. For
the baseline results I used an HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. The estimates
for the alternative smoothing parameters of 400 and 6000 are shown in Tables A.9 and A.10.
For smaller values of the smoothing parameters the multipliers decrease slightly. Yet, there is
not a single case in which a nondurables multiplier falls below the value of the corresponding
16Atalay et al. (2014) report that 16 percent of shipments occur within the firm.
17See Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012), for instance, for estimates of employment multipliers.
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durables multiplier.
Finally, I estimate durables multipliers at the 3-digit SIC level.18 This wider industry
definition captures that spending on goods in one 4-digit industry may drive up prices of
factors that are used in other 4-digit industries under the same 3-digit umbrella. As a result,
one would expect larger crowding-out effects. Indeed, the durables multipliers at the 3-digit
level are very close to zero (Table A.11).
1.3.2.4 The state of the business cycle
Several studies have argued that the fiscal multiplier is larger in slumps than in booms
(e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, 2013, Michaillat 2014). To see whether this form
of state dependence applies to the durable goods multiplier, I estimate impulse response
functions separately for slack and nonslack periods (which I somewhat imprecisely refer to
as recessions and expansions). I adopt a specification similar to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013),
Yi,t+h − Y Ti,t−1
V ATi,t−1
= αRhFi,t−1
Gi,t −GTi,t−1
V ATi,t−1
+ αEh (1− Fi,t−1)
Gi,t −GTi,t−1
V ATi,t−1
+
2∑
k=1
βRh,kFi,t−1
Yi,t−k − Y Ti,t−k−1
V ATi,t−k−1
+
2∑
k=1
βEh,k (1− Fi,t−1)
Yi,t−k − Y Ti,t−k−1
V ATi,t−k−1
+
2∑
k=1
γRh,kFi,t−1
Gi,t−k −GTi,t−k−1
V ATi,t−k−1
+
2∑
k=1
γEh,k (1− Fi,t−1)
Gi,t−k −GTi,t−k−1
V ATi,t−k−1
+ηhFi,t−1 + δi,h + ζt,h + εi,t+h. (1.22)
In this equation
Fi,t =
exp
(
−κ · V ACi,t
)
1 + exp
(
−κ · V ACi,t
) , κ > 0,
18The sample size for nondurables industries is too small to obtain informative estimates.
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and V ACi,t denotes the demeaned and standardized cycle component of value added in sector
i. I use the one-sided HP-filter from Stock and Watson (1999) with a smoothing parameter
of 1600 to extract the cycle component.1920 Fi,t measures the “degree” to which industry i’s
value added is below trend (in recession). It varies between zero and one and takes greater
values whenever the industry’s value added is low. Hence, the empirical model (1.22) permits
estimation of impulse response functions separately for recessions (Fi,t = 1) and expansions
(Fi,t = 0). These impulse response functions are given by {αRh }4h=0 and {αEh }4h=0. Parameter
κ is set to 1.5 which implies that the economy spends about 20 percent of the time in
recessions, a value consistent with U.S. business cycle facts. For more details see Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013). Notice, that I include Fi,t−1 as a control variable. By doing
so, I allow the left-hand side variable to directly depend on the state of the economy. To
address endogeneity concerns, I construct instruments by multiplying (1.21) with Fi,t−1 and
1− Fi,t−1. The instruments are strong as the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics in Table show.
Figure 1.4 shows the impulse response functions starting with military spending in Panel
A. A spending shock in recessions is followed by somewhat lower subsequent spending than
a shock in expansions. There is little evidence for greater multipliers in recessions. The
impulse response functions for gross output (Panel B), value added (Panel C), and cost of
materials (Panel D) are initially negative in recessions and only gradually rise above zero. In
expansions, these variables are positive at first and then return to values near zero. There is
little information in the dynamic responses of energy expenditures (Panel E). Employment
increases slightly after a fiscal shock in recessions, but after three years the impulse response
function falls below the response in expansions (Panel F).
Table 1.5 shows the associated multipliers. They are often negative in recessions. Since
the standard errors are large, this analysis cannot rule out that the durables fiscal multiplier
19I would like to thank Valerie Ramey and Simon Gilchrist for pointing out to me that it is critical to use
a one-sided filter in this specification.
20Meyer-Gohde (2010) provides an implementation of the one-sided HP-filter by Stock and Watson (1999).
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depends on the state of the economy. Yet, it is unlikely that the degree of state dependence
is sufficiently strong to render the durable goods multiplier “large” in recessions.21
1.4 The zero lower bound
In this section I return to theory and analyze the sizes of durables and nondurables
multipliers in an economy in which the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest
rate binds. As I showed in Section 1.2.3.1, for very low depreciation rates the multiplier for
durable goods is small regardless of the monetary policy response. For moderate depreciation
rates, however, the multiplier can be larger when the ZLB binds.
To study government spending at the ZLB, I modify the model from Section 1.2 in two
ways. First, I replace the monetary policy rule (1.13) with
it = max{0, β−1 − 1 + φpipit + φY Y˜t},
where φpi = 1.1 and φY = 0. Second, I assume that the discount factor follows the AR(1)
process
βt = (1− %β) β + %ββt−1 + εβ,t. (1.23)
The remaining model equations and the calibration remain unchanged.
I consider the following scenario. Prior to time 0, the economy is subject to a positive
discount factor shock so that the ZLB begins to bind. The government then raises spending
on X by 100 (artificial) quantity units at time 0. I choose the persistence of the discount
factor shock %β to imply that the ZLB continues to bind for 4, 8, and 16 quarters beginning
at time 0. The persistence of the spending shock is as in the baseline calibration, %X = 0.75.
I assume that the government spending shock is sufficiently small to never lift the economy
21Berger and Vavra (2014) argue that the durable goods fiscal multiplier is smaller in recessions than in
expansions.
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out of the ZLB regime. The fiscal multiplier is then computed from the incremental output
response to the shock in government spending.22
Figure 1.5 shows the multipliers together with the impulse response functions of the price
level P . When the ZLB binds for 4 quarters (Panels A and B), the multiplier for nondurable
goods is slightly below 2. The multiplier is smaller when the government purchases goods
with greater durability. For durables with 10 year service lives the multiplier is below unity
and for durables with 80 year service lives the multiplier is below 0.3. Hence, for a short
period of 4 quarters at the ZLB the ordering of multipliers remains unchanged, but they are
larger than when the central bank offsets the expansion by raising the interest rate.
At the ZLB greater government spending raises inflation and thereby lowers real interest
rates. Lower real rates, in turn, crowd in private sector spending. Hence, to understand
the size of the fiscal multiplier at the ZLB, it is crucial to understand the inflation response
to government spending—and this inflation response is quite different for durable and non-
durable goods. As can be seen in Panel B, government spending on nondurable goods raises
inflation substantially more than spending on durable goods. Additionally, the impulse re-
sponse for nondurable goods displays a slightly hump-shaped pattern with initial inflation
and subsequent mild deflation as the government reduces spending. When good X is durable,
inflation continues to rise for much longer, reflecting the fact that households rebuild their
durables stock as soon as government demand falls.
For the fiscal multiplier to be large, inflation must be high when the interest rate is fixed
at the ZLB. Conversely, deflation at the ZLB has strong contractionary effects. Panels C and
D show the multiplier and the price path when the ZLB binds for 8 quarters. The multiplier
for the moderately durable good with a service life of 10 years is now above one and the
nondurables multiplier is near 3.
22More precisely, the impulse response functions are computed as the difference between the response with
the fiscal policy shock and that without the fiscal policy shock. The resulting price dynamics are therefore
entirely caused by the spending and not the discount factor shock.
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The multiplier for nondurables falls when the ZLB binds for 16 quarters (Panel E). The
reason is that prices are falling while the economy is at the ZLB. In fact, when the ZLB binds
for 16 quarters, the multiplier for nondurables falls below that for moderately durable goods
with δD = 0.025. The catch-up of private sector spending prevents inflation from falling
as much as it does when the government purchases nondurable goods. For the long-lived
durable the multiplier remains below one.
In summary, the multiplier remains relatively small at the ZLB when the good in question
is sufficiently durable. Yet, for goods with intermediate durability the multiplier can be above
one if the ZLB binds sufficiently long.
1.5 Conclusion
Both neoclassical and New Keynesian models predict that the fiscal multiplier for tem-
porary increases in spending is much smaller when the government buys durable rather than
nondurable goods. I show that empirical evidence confirms this prediction. In U.S. aggre-
gate data the fiscal multiplier is about 0.5 smaller if the government purchases durable rather
than nondurable goods. At the industry level, spending in durables industries also leads to
substantially smaller increases in economic activity than spending in nondurables industries.
These results raise significant concerns about the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus that is
targeted towards infrastructure. As many other stimulus programs, the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act contained provisions to raise spending on highly durable goods such
as highway infrastructure, high-speed rail corridors, railroads, airports, and broadband.23
More generally, it has been suggested to assemble a pool of “shovel-ready projects” to be
implemented when the economy next plunges into recession. The findings in this paper
23This information is taken from http://www.recovery.gov/arra/Transparency/fundingoverview/
Pages/fundingbreakdown.aspx. Since the website is not operated anymore, I accessed a cached version
(from 01/04/2014) via https://archive.org/.
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suggest that such policies are unlikely to have substantial effects on aggregate demand.
This paper also provides guidance for future research on fiscal policy. The large difference
in the sizes of durables and nondurables multipliers imply that future work should distinguish
between these types of spending. Since the composition of spending matters, estimates of
multipliers for total spending suffer from an external validity problem. If the composition of
spending changes, the multiplier changes as well.
Finally, it is likely that other product dimensions matter. As a general rule, industries
with more elastic supply curves and less elastic demand curves should have larger fiscal
multipliers. Price stickiness, factor mobility, and tradability are just three properties likely
to be associated with the elasticities of demand or supply.
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Table 1.1: Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
η 1 Labor supply elasticity
σ 0.25 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ρ 0.9999 Elasticity of substitution between goods in the X and the Z sector
α 1/3 Capital share
χ 0.45 1− χ is the cost share of intermediates
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution in aggregator
θX , θZ 2/3 Price stickiness
δK 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
XH/X 0.80 Fraction of private sector spending in steady state
ω 0.9693 Preference weight on consumption of Z sector goods
%X 0.75 Persistence of fiscal policy shock
φpi 1.1 Taylor rule response coefficient on inflation
φY 0 Taylor rule response coefficient on output
ζK 20 Capital adjustment costs
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Table 1.2: Estimates of durable and nondurable goods multipliers
Sample
1929-2014 1947-2014
Dependent variable µX µC ν µX µC ν
Output 0.04 0.49 0.065 -1.19 0.83 0.041
(0.32) (0.08) (0.011) (2.24) (0.43) (0.007)
Private consumption -0.63 0.02 0.024 -1.13 0.14 0.012
(0.20) (0.04) (0.008) (1.03) (0.20) (0.003)
Private investment -0.89 0.00 0.032 -1.12 0.09 0.028
(0.26) (0.05) (0.004) (0.93) (0.18) (0.003)
Private consumption of -0.54 0.03 0.022 -0.95 0.17 0.009
nondurables and services (0.16) (0.04) (0.006) (0.95) (0.19) (0.003)
Private investment plus -0.98 0.00 0.034 -1.30 0.07 0.030
private durables consumption (0.33) (0.06) (0.005) (1.01) (0.20) (0.003)
Net exports 0.00 -0.05 -0.002 -0.23 0.01 -0.007
(0.08) (0.01) (0.003) (0.32) (0.08) (0.001)
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates of µX , µC , and ν as defined in equation (1.19).
Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.3: First stages
First stages for nondurable goods industries
First stage dep. variable Horizon h 0 1 2 3 4
AP F-statistic 21.3 30.5 38.6 46.3 39.2
Gi,t−GTi,t−1
V ATi,t−1
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44
AP F-statistic 15.0 17.6 22.5 21.9 22.0
Gi,t−1−GTi,t−2
V ATi,t−2
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43
AP F-statistic 41.1 54.8 54.8 54.5 62.9
Gi,t−2−GTi,t−3
V ATi,t−3
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44
Observations 967 932 897 862 827
First stages for durable goods industries
First stage dep. variable Horizon h 0 1 2 3 4
AP F-statistic 225.5 249.3 353.9 402.8 271.2
Gi,t−GTi,t−1
V ATi,t−1
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.54
AP F-statistic 225.8 280.4 282.8 229.2 162.8
Gi,t−1−GTi,t−2
V ATi,t−2
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.55
AP F-statistic 339.4 375.0 456.4 349.6 342.2
Gi,t−2−GTi,t−3
V ATi,t−3
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.56
Observations 2115 2039 1963 1887 1811
Notes: The table shows the first stages of the 2SLS estimator of specification (1.20) when the dependent
variable is value added. For all other dependent variables, the F-statistics are virtually identical. The
instruments are (1.21) and its two lags. AP F-statistic stands for Angrist-Pischke F-statistic of excluded
instruments and the subsequent lines show the associated p-values.
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Table 1.4: Industry-level fiscal multipliers
Durable goods multipliers
Years after shock 1 2 3
Gross output 0.25 0.24 0.51
[−0.56, 1.14] [−0.46, 1.18] [−0.22, 1.52]
Value added 0.35 0.36 0.57
[−0.07, 0.75] [0.00, 0.77] [0.19, 1.02]
Cost of materials -0.01 -0.06 -0.03
[−0.54, 0.68] [−0.52, 0.66] [−0.45, 0.76]
Energy expenditures 0.007 0.005 0.007
[−0.005, 0.013] [−0.004, 0.011] [−0.002, 0.014]
Employment 1.76 3.17 5.83
(employees per year per $1m) [−3.86, 4.24] [−1.24, 6.19] [1.51, 9.29]
Nondurable goods multipliers
Years after shock 1 2 3
Gross output 2.63 2.72 3.21
[0.47, 5.47] [0.12, 5.45] [0.46, 6.60]
Value added 0.99 0.96 1.28
[0.05, 2.58] [−0.27, 2.33] [0.00, 2.88]
Cost of materials 1.64 1.57 1.90
[−0.58, 4.68] [−1.04, 4.51] [−0.88, 5.54]
Energy expenditures 0.056 0.060 0.047
[−0.014, 0.114] [−0.011, 0.140] [−0.021, 0.110]
Employment 16.01 15.87 18.22
(employees per year per $1m) [5.26, 33.64] [1.47, 31.21] [3.19, 33.32]
Notes: The table reports the cumulative multipliers for various outcome variables. Multipliers for gross
output, value added, cost of materials, and energy expenditures have the usual interpretation of one
additional dollar in the outcome variable per additional dollar of military spending. The multiplier
for employment is expressed as the number of employees per year per $1 million of military spending.
80 percent confidence intervals are reported in square brackets. They are calculated using a blocks-
of-blocks bootstrap (see Berkowitz et al. (1999) and the references cited therein) with 2000 bootstrap
samples.
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Table 1.5: Industry-level multipliers for durable goods in recessions and expansions
Recession multipliers
Years after shock 1 2 3
Gross output -2.82 -1.82 -0.87
[−8.04, 0.81] [−6.42, 1.05] [−3.83, 3.26]
Value added -1.10 -0.59 -0.08
[−3.15, 0.41] [−2.65, 0.59] [−2.26, 1.38]
Cost of materials -0.87 -0.32 0.15
[−3.17, 1.33] [−2.36, 1.66] [−2.36, 2.73]
Energy expenditures -0.009 -0.004 0.009
[−0.052, 0.027] [−0.037, 0.032] [−0.052, 0.053]
Employment 5.33 6.70 10.53
(employees per year per $1m) [−10.38, 23.64] [−6.16, 26.53] [−16.82, 31.20]
Expansion multipliers
Years after shock 1 2 3
Gross output 1.79 1.15 0.82
[−0.60, 3.81] [−0.93, 3.14] [−1.36, 2.76]
Value added 0.96 0.67 0.67
[−0.27, 2.02] [−0.27, 1.74] [−0.44, 1.67]
Cost of materials 0.21 -0.32 -0.63
[−1.78, 1.79] [−1.87, 1.34] [−1.90, 1.20]
Energy expenditures 0.019 0.011 0.007
[−0.016, 0.042] [−0.015, 0.030] [−0.020, 0.022]
Employment -1.63 0.10 3.93
(employees per year per $1m) [−17.75, 5.46] [−13.70, 5.94] [−9.25, 9.45]
Notes: The table reports the cumulative multipliers for various outcome variables. Multipliers for gross
output, value added, cost of materials, and energy expenditures have the usual interpretation of one
additional dollar in the outcome variable per additional dollar of military spending. The multiplier
for employment is expressed as the number of employees per year per $1 million of military spending.
80 percent confidence intervals are reported in square brackets. They are calculated using a blocks-
of-blocks bootstrap (see Berkowitz et al. (1999) and the references cited therein) with 2000 bootstrap
samples.
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Figure 1.1: Crowding out of private sector spending.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse response functions for a government spending shock
Notes: The figure plots impulse response functions for various calibrations. Panels A to C
are expressed in absolute deviations from steady state. The impulse is a 100 unit increase of
government spending in sector X.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse response functions for durable and nondurable goods
Notes: The figure plots impulse response functions for the baseline sample estimated using specification
(1.20). See text for a description of the baseline sample. The shock is a unit increase of government
spending above trend, normalized by the industry’s value added. For production employment the impulse
is a $1 million increase in military spending and the response is expressed as the number of additional
employees. Shaded regions mark 80 percent confidence bands based on standard errors that are clustered
at the industry level.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse response functions for durable goods in recessions and expansions
Notes: The figure plots impulse response functions for the durable goods industries of the baseline sample
estimated using specification (1.22). See Section 1.3 for a description of the baseline sample. The shock is a
unit increase of government spending above trend, normalized by the sector’s value added. For employment
the impulse is a $1 million increase in military spending and the response is expressed as the number of
additional employees. Shaded regions mark 80 percent confidence bands based on standard errors that are
clustered at the industry level.
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Figure 1.5: Model impulse response functions
Notes: The figure fiscal multipliers and impulse response functions for various depreciation rates.
Prior to time 0, the household’s discount factor is first shocked so that the ZLB begins to bind. The
persistence of the shock is chosen to imply that the ZLB binds for 4, 8, and 16 quarters beginning at
time 0. At time 0 the government raises spending on X by 100 basis points. The impulse response
functions for prices are expressed in relative deviations from steady state and the units are basis
points.
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CHAPTER II
Optimal Taylor Rules in New Keynesian Models
with Christopher L. House
2.1 Introduction
Taylor rules are simple linear relationships between a central bank’s choice of a target
interest rate, observed output (or the “output gap”) and observed inflation (Taylor 1993).
Suitably parameterized, they are reasonable descriptions of how actual central banks set
interest rates. In addition, monetary policy is often discussed by journalists, researchers
and central bankers themselves in terms that fit comfortably into a Taylor rule framework.
For example, whether the federal funds rate should be increased or decreased is typically
discussed in terms of whether inflation is relatively too high or whether GDP (or employment)
is too low. A central banker who fights inflation aggressively can be modeled as following a
Taylor rule with a large coefficient on inflation. A central banker who reacts more strongly
to output would have a relatively higher coefficient on the output gap, and so forth.
While Taylor rules are useful descriptions of actual policy and common components of
many prominent New Keynesian models, it is well-known that optimal monetary policy is
rarely given by a Taylor rule. Instead, optimal policy depends in complicated ways on the
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underlying state variables and is often history dependent (see Woodford 1999). By confining
attention to current inflation and the current output gap, a Taylor rule is unnecessarily
restrictive.1 Nevertheless, given the underlying model, it is a meaningful question to ask
what the optimal parameterization of a Taylor rule is. Addressing this question is the goal
of this paper. We anticipate that much of what we have to say will not come as a surprise
to researchers at the frontier of New Keynesian economics. Indeed, we suspect that many
of our results exist as folk wisdom among New Keynesian researchers. (If you are Mike
Woodford or Jordi Gal´ı, you can stop reading now). Instead, our intended audience consists
of consumers of New Keynesian economics — researchers who often use macroeconomic
models with sticky prices and want to draw on established results from the New Keynesian
literature (we include ourselves in this group).
In this paper, we consider the nature of the optimal Taylor rule in the basic New Keyne-
sian model. That is, we assume the monetary authority is committed to using a Taylor rule,
and ask what coefficients maximize the central bank’s objective function. When the output
gap and inflation are observed without error, it is typically best to adopt infinitely aggressive
responses to output and inflation i.e., the optimal coefficients on inflation and output are
arbitrarily large. If the only shocks to the economy are shocks to the efficient rate of output
(“demand shocks”), then any Taylor rule which responds infinitely strongly to either output
or inflation (or both) will maximize welfare. If the only shocks perturbing the economy are
shocks to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (“cost-push shocks”), then there exists a contin-
uum of optimal coefficients for the Taylor rule. If the output gap and inflation are observed
with error, then the Taylor coefficients are finite. As the variance of measurement error
grows, the optimal coefficients fall and the central bank reacts less to measured inflation and
the output gap. We extend our analysis to the case in which the Taylor rule is expressed in
terms of estimated output and estimated inflation. In this extension, the central bank solves
1See Svensson (2003) for a more general criticism of Taylor rules.
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a signal extraction problem to estimate the output gap and inflation and sets the interest
rate as a function of these estimates. Under such a policy rule, the optimal responses to
estimated inflation and the estimated gap are again infinite. Because filtered estimates are
typically revised gradually over time, a central bank that responds to estimates of inflation
and output will often appear to be adhering to a form of interest rate smoothing. Indeed,
there are special cases in which a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing can duplicate the
policy of responding to estimated inflation and the output gap.
Under an optimal Taylor rule, estimated deviations of output and inflation from their tar-
gets should be strongly negatively correlated. Intuitively, the optimal Taylor rule eliminates
the effects of estimated demand shocks on inflation and the output gap. At the optimum,
only variation due to estimated cost-push shocks should remain, implying that estimated in-
flation and output should move in opposite directions. Actual data on estimates of inflation
and the gap are not strongly correlated, suggesting that the central bank is not reacting to
demand shocks as aggressively as it should.
Our work is related to a large literature on optimal monetary policy and instrument
rules. The contributions of Giannoni and Woodford (2003a,b) , Woodford (2003, Ch. 7) and
Giannoni (2010, 2012) are closest to our work. Unlike us, Giannoni and Woodford (2003b)
assume that the central bank has an explicit preference for smooth interest rates. Our paper
highlights the role played by measurement error in tempering the central bank’s optimal
reaction to changes in the measured output gap and inflation. This type of measurement
error has been termed data uncertainty by some researchers to distinguish it from other
sources of policy uncertainty (such as parameter and model uncertainty, see Dennis (2005)
and the references cited therein). Orphanides (2001, 2003) shows that real-time measures
of inflation and the output gap are sufficiently noisy to justify relatively small Taylor rule
coefficients. Rudebusch (2001), Smets (2002) and Billi (2012) all conclude that measurement
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error naturally encourages central banks to adopt less aggressive policy reaction rules.2
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on signal extraction and optimal mon-
etary policy. Aoki (2003) considers optimal monetary policy with signal extraction in an
environment similar to ours. There are several differences between Aoki’s work and ours.
First, unlike our model, Aoki’s does not have shocks to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
and thus the so-called divine coincidence holds. If the central bank successfully stabilizes
prices, it simultaneously eliminates the output gap. Second, while Aoki discusses optimal
policy under discretion, we restrict attention to the optimal Taylor rule a form of commit-
ment. Third, when formulating the signal extraction problem, Aoki assumes that the central
bank learns the true values of output and inflation with a one period lag. In our formulation,
these values are never revealed. Methodologically, we draw heavily on results in Svensson
and Woodford (2003, 2004). Although they do not consider restricted instrument rules such
as the Taylor rule, several of their findings continue to hold in our setting.
2.2 Baseline Model And Policy Objective
Our analysis is based on simple variations of the standard New Keynesian framework
consisting of a Phillips Curve and the New Keynesian IS curve. These log-linear aggregate
relationships are typically derived under the assumption that firms infrequently adjust prices
according to the Calvo (1983) mechanism.3 (See Gal´ı (2008) or Woodford (2003) for standard
treatments of this derivation.)
2Both Rudebusch (2001) and Smets (2002) numerically analyze optimal policy based on estimated New
Keynesian systems. Billi (2012) numerically analyzes optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates. Both Billi and Smets assume that the central bank wants to minimize interest rate
variation in addition to variation in output and inflation. See Taylor (2001) for additional work on optimal
monetary policy rules.
3The standard New Keynesian model abstracts from investment in physical capital and durable goods.
While this assumption is common, it has important consequences for the analysis of the model and for
optimal policy. See Barsky et al. (2003, 2007) and Barsky et al. (2014) for a more detailed discussion of the
consequences of this assumption.
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The Phillips curve relates inflation, pit, to the output gap,yt, expected future inflation,
and a cost-push shock,ut,
pit = κyt + βEt[pit+1] + ut (2.1)
where κ > 0 is the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment. The presence of the cost-
push shock implies a trade-off between the stabilization of the output gap and inflation
(e.g. Gertler et al. (1999)). Woodford (2003, Ch. 6) shows how the cost-push shock can be
motivated from first principles.
The New Keynesian IS curve is given by
yt = Et[yt+1]− 1
σ
(it − ρ− ret − Et[pit+1]) . (2.2)
Here ρ + ret is the efficient rate of interest the interest rate consistent with the level
of output that would prevail under perfect price flexibility in the absence of all other dis-
tortions. We express this rate as the sum of the rate of time preference ρ and a shock ret
which is centered at zero to simplify the exposition of later results. Below we often (some-
what imprecisely) refer to ret as the efficient rate. The remaining terms are it, the nominal
interest rate, and σ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (equivalently, the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution).
The efficient rate shock and the cost-push shock are assumed to follow the AR(1) pro-
cesses
ret+1 = %rr
e
t + ε
r
t+1, %r ∈ [0, 1) , (2.3)
ut+1 = %uut + ε
u
t+1. %u ∈ [0, 1) . (2.4)
We close the model by assuming that the monetary authority commits to a Taylor rule,
it = ρ+ φpipi
m
t + φyy
m
t . (TR1)
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Importantly, we distinguish between the actual output gap and the output gap observed by
the monetary authority, and similarly between actual inflation and measured inflation. The
central bank can respond only to measured output and inflation, so in (TR1) pimt and y
m
t
denote measured inflation and the measured output gap. Using the analogy in Bernanke
(2004), measurement error creates a foggy windshield through which the monetary authority
sees the economy.
Orphanides (2001) suggests that modeling measurement error as additive is a reasonable
approximation of reality. We follow Orphanides and assume that measured inflation and the
measured output gap are pimt = pit + m
pi
t and y
m
t = yt + m
y
t , where m
pi
t and m
y
t denote the
respective measurement errors. Both types of measurement error follow AR(1) processes
mpit+1 = %mpim
pi
t + ε
mpi
t+1, %mpi ∈ [0, 1) , (2.5)
myt+1 = %mym
y
t + ε
my
t+1, %my ∈ [0, 1) . (2.6)
Unless stated otherwise, all error terms in the efficient rate, the cost-push shock and the
measurement error processes are assumed to be uncorrelated.
A comprehensive literature has examined equilibrium determinacy in the New Keynesian
model when monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. We will not dwell on this issue further
and simply note that the well-known condition for a unique equilibrium is
κ (φpi − 1) + (1− β)φy > 0 (2.7)
for the baseline model discussed in Section 4.4 This condition is assumed to hold at all times
unless otherwise stated.
4The argument in Bullard and Mitra (2002) continues to hold in our setting.
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We assume that the central bank wishes to minimize an expected discounted sum of
weighted squared inflation and the output gap
(1− β)E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
αpi2t + y
2
t
)]
= E
[
αpi2t + y
2
t
]
. (2.8)
Here, α denotes the relative weight that the central bank places on inflation and E [.] is
the unconditional expectations operator. An objective of this form can be derived as a
quadratic approximation of the representative consumer’s utility function (see Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003)). The optimal policy problem is then to choose
φy and φpi to minimize (2.8) subject to (2.1), (2.2) and (TR1).
2.3 Equilibrium in the Baseline Model
Our framework is sufficiently simple to solve for the equilibrium analytically. Inflation and
the output gap are linear functions of the four exogenous state variables ret ,ut,m
pi
t , andm
y
t .
Applying the method of undetermined coefficients yields expressions for the behavior of
inflation and the output gap. We characterize the model’s solution in the following lemma.
Proofs of all results are in the appendix.
Lemma 1: Under the assumptions in Section 2.2, the unique competitive equilibrium of the
model is given by the equations
pit =
κ
Φr + φy (1− β%r) + κφpi r
e
t +
φy + (1− %u)σ
Φu + φy (1− β%u) + κφpiut
− κφpi
Φmpi + φy (1− β%mpi) + κφpim
pi
t −
κφy
Φmy + φt (1− β%my) + κφpim
y
t ,
(2.9)
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yt =
1− β%r
Φr + φy (1− β%r) + κφpi r
e
t +
%u − φpi
Φu + φy (1− β%u) + κφpiut
− (1− β%mpi)φpi
Φmpi + φy (1− β%mpi) + κφpim
pi
t −
(1− β%my)φy
Φmy + φt (1− β%my) + κφpim
y
t ,
(2.10)
where Φj = σ (1− %j) (1− β%j)− κ%j, j ∈ {r, u,mpi,my},are constants that are indepen-
dent of monetary policy.
Examining the coefficients in (2.9) and (2.10) provides simple intuition about how mon-
etary policy influences the economy. First, notice that the coefficients on the efficient rate
shock (ret ) are positive in both (2.9) and (2.10) (all of the denominators in (2.9) and (2.10)
are positive). Thus, an increase in the efficient rate (an aggregate demand shock) increases
inflation and the output gap. Moreover, the Taylor rule coefficients φy and φpi appear only
in the denominators of the coefficients on the efficient rate shock, so strong responses by the
central bank dampen fluctuations caused by shocks to the efficient rate.
Now consider the coefficients on the cost-push disturbances (ut). Assuming that φy is
positive and φpi > %u, cost-push shocks reduce output and raise inflation. Strong reactions
to output (i.e., large values of φy) imply that the economy can enjoy reduced output gap
volatility only at the expense of higher inflation volatility. Unlike shocks to the efficient
rate of interest, cost-push shocks clearly entail a trade-off between inflation and output
stabilization.
Finally, measurement error of either type impacts equilibrium inflation and the output
gap negatively. The interpretation of this relationship is natural. For example, a positive
innovation to mtpi makes inflation appear higher than actual inflation. In response, the central
bank raises interest rates causing both output and inflation to fall. Similar reasoning applies
to measurement error in the output gap.
With Lemma 1 in hand, we now turn our attention to the central bank’s optimal choices
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of φy and φpi.
2.4 Optimal Taylor Rules in the Baseline Model
The optimal Taylor rule coefficients, φ∗y and φ
∗
pi, minimize the central bank’s objective
(2.8) subject to the equilibrium conditions (2.9) and (2.10). To build intuition, we begin
by considering four special cases. All of these special cases share the property that both
inflation and the output gap are observed without error.
Special Case 1: Only shocks to the efficient rate of interest. Assume that the only shocks
to the economy are shocks to the efficient rate of interest, rt. In this case, equations (2.9)
and (2.10) simplify to
pit =
κ
Φr + φy (1− β%r) + κφpi r
e
t ,
yt =
1− R
Φr + φy (1− β%r) + κφpi r
e
t .
Clearly, it is optimal for the central bank to respond infinitely strongly to deviations in
either inflation or the output gap (or both). This is the well-known divine coincidence
case in which it is possible for the central bank to kill two birds with one stone by simply
eliminating inflation variability (see e.g., Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007)).
Special Case 2: Only Cost-Push Shocks. Optimal monetary policy is not so simple when
there are shocks to the Phillips curve. Suppose the only shocks to the economy are cost-push
shocks. The central bank can no longer eliminate both inflation and output variability and
instead must choose whether to endure large swings in inflation to reduce the variation in
output or vice versa. The best choice will depend on the underlying parameters of the model,
particularly the relative weight α that the central bank attaches to inflation variability in its
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objective (2.8). In this case, (2.9) and (2.10) collapse to
pit =
φy + (1− %u)σ
Φu + φy (1− β%u) + κφpiut,
yt =
%u − φpi
Φu + φy (1− β%u) + κφpiut.
The optimal Taylor coefficients are given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1:
(i) If the only shocks to the model are cost-push shocks, then the optimal policy requires
that the Taylor rule coefficients φ∗y and φ
∗
pi lie on the affine manifold
φ∗pi = %u +
ακσ (1− %u)
1− β%u +
ακ
1− β%uφ
∗
y. (2.11)
(ii) For any φ∗y and φ
∗
pi satisfying (2.11), the equilibrium satisfies
pit =
1− β%u
ακ2 + (1− β%u)2
ut, yt = − ακ
ακ2 + (1− β%u)2
ut.
Any combination of coefficients on line (2.11) is equally desirable. Moreover, the equilib-
rium paths for output and inflation do not depend on the exact coefficient values, provided
that they are on the manifold.
To understand the intuition for this result, consider a positive innovation to ut. By itself,
the cost-push shock puts upward pressure on inflation and downward pressure on output.
The central bank then faces a dilemma: any interest rate response which closes one of the
gaps, widens the other. If the bank cuts the interest rate to raise output, inflation rises. If
the bank fights inflation instead, it must endure even lower production in the short term.
Suppose the bank decides to raise interest rates. Suppose further that it has chosen a
pair of coefficients (φ∗y, φ
∗
pi ) which satisfy (2.11) and imply the desired increase in interest
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rates. According to Proposition 1, the same interest rate response can be achieved by many
different Taylor rules. If the central bank instead opts for a stronger response to inflation
(a higher φpi) the nominal interest rate will increase a bit more. To re-establish the prior
interest rate change, the central bank can adopt a stronger response to output. The higher
φy implies a lower interest rate because cost-push shocks lower output whenever they raise
inflation. Equation (2.11) simply gives all pairs of coefficients that result in the same interest
rate.
Special Case 3: Shocks to both the IS curve and the Phillips curve. We next combine the
previous two cases and consider (uncorrelated) shocks to both the IS-Curve (ret ) and the
Phillips Curve (ut). In Special Case 1, optimal policy required infinitely large Taylor Rule
coefficients. In Special Case 2, optimal policy required coefficients on the upward sloping line
(2.11). Not surprisingly, the optimal Taylor rule in this third case calls for arbitrarily large
coefficients which also satisfy (2.11). Equation (2.11) implies that the optimal ratio of φpi to
φy converges to ακ/ (1− β%u). This ratio is higher if the central bank places greater weight
on inflation or if the tradeoff between inflation and output (captured by the parameter κ) is
more favorable.
This policy will imply the same equilibrium paths as in Proposition 1: all of the dis-
turbances originating from variation in the efficient rate will be eliminated and only the
cost-push shocks affect output and inflation. Combining the two equations in Proposition 1
part (ii) yields
pit = −1− β%u
ακ
yt.
Hence, for the optimal Taylor rule, the observed output gap and inflation are perfectly
negatively correlated.5
5Note that under the optimal policy, estimation of a New Keynesian Phillips curve will be particularly
problematic. Typically, the structural shock ut is correlated with the regressors yt and Et[pit+1] but under
optimal policy, both regressors are functions only of ut and are therefore perfectly correlated with the error.
The optimal Taylor rule eliminates all variation other than variation associated with ut making the bias
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Special Case 4: Correlated shocks in the i.i.d. case. For Special Case 3 we assumed un-
correlated cost-push and demand shocks. Here we briefly consider the optimal Taylor rule
coefficients for transitory but correlated shocks. This case is relevant for later results and
also shows that properties of the optimal Taylor rule can be extended to allow for correlated
structural shocks.
Proposition 2: Suppose ret and ut are i.i.d. over time and have covariance Cov[r
e
t , ut].
The Taylor rule coefficients satisfying
φ∗pi = ακ
(
φ∗y + σ
)
+
(
1 + ακ2
) Cov[ret , ut]
V[ut]
(2.11’)
and φ∗y →∞ are optimal.
As before, the central bank must respond infinitely strongly to inflation and the output
gap. Additionally, the relationship between φ∗pi and φ
∗
y barely changes. To see this, notice that
(2.11’) simplifies to φ∗pi = ακ
(
φ∗y + σ
)
when %u is set to zero (the first term on the right hand
side of (2.11’)). Hence, shock correlation only introduces the term (1 + ακ2) Cov[ret , ut]/V[ut]
that was not present in the earlier condition. It is easy to verify that equilibrium outcomes
only depend on the limit of φ∗pi/φ
∗
y which is independent of the correlation of shocks. As
in special cases 2 and 3, the output gap and inflation are perfectly negatively correlated in
equilibrium.6
2.4.1 Monetary Policy in the Presence of Measurement Error
The simple New Keynesian framework captures many realistic features of monetary pol-
icy. The model embodies a tradeoff between inflation and output and suggests that the
central bank has a particular advantage in minimizing economic instabilities that arise from
particularly pronounced.
6Even though φy and φpi are infinite, the equilibrium interest rate will be finite. This can easily be seen
easily in the i.i.d. case using (TR1), (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11’).
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demand shocks (shocks to the IS-Curve). Despite these attractive features, the model does
not entail any costs to excessively strong reactions on the part of the central bank. In stark
contrast to the modest empirical estimates of actual Taylor rules (see Judd and Rudebusch
(1998), and more recently Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012)), optimal Taylor rule coefficients
are often infinite.
In this section, we consider the model in which the output gap and inflation are measured
with error. Measurement error is a natural candidate for why central banks do not respond
more to observed changes in GDP and inflation. This concern was emphasized by Friedman
(1953) who pointed out that activist policies might be destabilizing if policy actions were
not sufficiently correlated with the true targets of policy. From observing equations (2.9)
and (2.10) it is clear that, for any fixed coefficients φy and φpi, greater measurement error
reduces the correlation between the policy instrument and the targets and thus entails greater
unwanted variation in output and inflation. Indeed, it would seem that if measurement error
was sufficiently high, it would be optimal not to respond to observed variations in inflation
and output at all.7
When we allow for arbitrary variation in the efficient rate, the cost-push shock, and both
types of measurement error, an analytical solution of the optimal policy problem is generally
not feasible and so we instead use numerical methods to characterize the optimal Taylor
rule. To build intuition, however, we first consider another special case.
Proposition 3: Suppose all shocks are white noise, that is, %r = %u = %mpi = %my = 0.
Then the minimization of (2.8) subject to (2.9) and (2.10) yields the following optimal Taylor
7This might present a problem for equilibrium determinacy. It is well known that determinacy requires
that the central bank responds sufficiently strongly to inflation and output. If measurement error is large
however, the Fed might be caught between a rock and a hard place. It would be forced to choose between a
locally indeterminate equilibrium on the one hand and destabilization resulting from reactions to erroneous
signals on the other. Accurate measurement and state estimation are therefore at the heart of monetary
stabilization policy. We consider optimal state estimation on the part of the central bank below.
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rule coefficients
φ∗y =
1
σ
V[ret ]
V[myt ]
, (2.12)
φ∗pi =
κ
σ
(ακ2 + 1) V[myt ] + αV[ut]
(ακ2 + 1) V[mpit ] + V[ut]
V[ret ]
V[myt ]
+
ακσV[ut]
(ακ2 + 1) V[mpit ] + V[ut]
, (2.13)
where V [·] denotes the unconditional variance operator.
There are several striking features of the optimal Taylor rule in this setting. First, the op-
timal Taylor coefficients in this model are finite. The central bank avoids aggressive reactions
to measured inflation and output because it knows that its actions would cause excessive
fluctuations in actual output and inflation. As measurement error decreases, the Fed can
adopt more and more aggressive reactions to inflation and output. It is also worth noting
that only measurement error in the output gap is necessary for finite Taylor coefficients.
Assuming that V[ut] > 0, measurement error in inflation is neither necessary nor sufficient
for finite coefficients.
Second, the optimal choice of φ∗y depends neither on α, nor on κ, nor on V[ut]. Instead, φ
∗
y
depends only on the ratio of the variance of shocks to the efficient rate, V[ret ], to the variance
of measurement error in the output gap, V[myt ], together with the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, σ. The reader might find the result in (2.12) somewhat counterintuitive. If
risk aversion is relatively high then the household will strongly dislike output variability
and presumably prefer a stronger output reaction. In contrast, the actual best reaction is
decreasing in σ. The reason for this apparent contradiction is that we chose to specify the
IS shocks as shocks to the efficient rate of interest itself (as is common in the literature). If
we instead stated the shocks in terms of exogenous changes in the efficient growth rate of
output, we would have ret = σEt[∆yet+1] = −σyet (the second equality uses the assumption
that the autocorrelation of shocks is zero). In this case, the central bank’s choice of φ∗y can
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be written as
φ∗y = σ
V[yet ]
V[myt ]
which is increasing in σ.
The optimal response to measured inflation (equation (2.13)) is somewhat more complex.
We start with its more intuitive properties. First, as with φ∗y, a larger variance of the efficient
rate V[ret ] implies a stronger response to inflation. Second, greater measurement error in
inflation requires more attenuated responses. Third, one can show that ∂φ∗pi/∂α > 0 for
any choice of model parameters so a stronger preference for price stability always implies
stronger reactions to measured inflation.
The relationship of φ∗pi with the remaining parameters is less clear. To see how this
coefficient depends on the shock variances consider the following limiting cases. Suppose
first that cost-push shocks are dominant that is, consider the behavior of φ∗pi as V[ut]→∞.
In this case, the optimal reaction to inflation approaches
φ∗pi =
κα
σ
V[ret ]
V[myt ]
+ κασ = κασ
(
V[yet ] + V[m
y
t ]
V[myt ]
)
,
where we have again used the relationship ret = −yet . The inflation response is increasing in
the signal-to-noise ratio for the output gap, the weight the central bank places on inflation
stability, the slope of the IS curve and the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment. Notice
also that for large V[ut] neither φ
∗
y nor φ
∗
pi depend on measurement error in inflation.
Alternatively, consider the opposite extreme suppose there are no cost-push shocks at
all. In this case,
φ∗pi =
κ
σ
V[ret ]
V[myt ]
= κσ
V[yet ]
V[myt ]
.
Analogous to equation (2.12), the ratio of the variance of the efficient rate of output to that
of measured inflation governs the strength of the reaction. In particular, as V[ut] approaches
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zero, φ∗pi becomes independent of measurement error in the output gap. Finally, a larger
macroeconomic rate of price adjustment, κ, raises the policy response.
Much of the optimal monetary policy literature assumes a quadratic objective function
and linear constraints. In these settings the globally optimal policy exhibits certainty equiv-
alence. That is, the presence and nature of additive stochastic disturbances does not affect
optimal policy (see, e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)). However, when optimal policy is
restricted to a Taylor rule of the form (TR1), equations (2.9) and (2.10) show that the con-
straints are no longer linear in the choice variables. Hence, it is not surprising that certainty
equivalence breaks down in our setting. This result is consistent with earlier findings (see,
e.g. Smets (2002)).
2.4.2 Quantitative Analysis
We now analyze a calibrated version of the model to illustrate how the optimal Taylor rule
changes with plausible variations in the model parameters. The length of one time period is
a quarter. We assume logarithmic utility (σ = 1). The discount factor β is set to 0.99 and we
set the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment to κ = 0.34.8 We choose an autoregressive
parameter of the efficient rate %r equal to 0.9. This value is similar to calibrations of trend
stationary productivity shocks used in the real business cycle literature. Existing literature
provides less guidance for the persistence of the cost-push shocks %u. Admitting that this
choice is somewhat ad hoc we select a value of 0.5 as in one of the cases considered in Gal´ı
(2008, Ch. 5). The variances of the innovations to the efficient rate and the cost-push shocks
are chosen so that the annual unconditional variances of ret and ut equal unity.
Orphanides (2003) provides estimates for the measurement error processes. Based on his
calculations, measurement error in inflation is best approximated by a white noise process
8This value of can be derived from a Calvo model with a probability of price rigidity of 2/3 per quarter,
together with our calibrated value of β, a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 1.00 and a linear production
function.
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with a quarterly standard deviation of roughly 0.50. In contrast, measurement error in the
output gap is highly persistent with a quarterly autoregressive coefficient of about 0.95 and an
innovation standard deviation of 0.66 (also quarterly). Finally, we assume that the monetary
authority dislikes inflation and the output gap equally so α = 1. Table 2.1 summarizes the
baseline calibration.
The optimal policy coefficients, φ∗pi and φ
∗
y, maximize objective (2.8) subject to the Phillips
curve (2.1), the dynamic IS equation (2.2), and the Taylor rule (TR1). For the numerical
solutions, we additionally impose condition (2.7) to ensure that the equilibrium is locally
determinate. (This constraint never binds for the parameter values considered below.) For
the benchmark calibration, the central bank’s optimal Taylor rule has coefficients φ∗pi = 2.00
and φ∗y = 0.61.
9
We now examine how optimal policy depends on the model parameters. Figure 2.1 shows
the optimal Taylor Rule coefficients as we vary the persistences of the shock processes in the
neighborhood of the baseline calibration. To isolate the effect of shock persistence on policy,
we adjust the variance of the innovations to ensure that the unconditional variance of the
shocks is unchanged. In Figures 2.1 to 2.3, baseline parameter values are indicated by dotted
vertical lines. All other parameters are held fixed at the level of the baseline calibration.
As the persistence of the efficient rate increases, the optimal reactions to inflation and the
output gap both rise. In line with Rudebusch (2001), we interpret this finding as justifying
intervention in the case of more persistent shocks while less intervention is necessary if
the economy automatically and quickly reverts to its efficient allocation. However, this
intuition does not always hold. For instance, the persistence of cost-push shocks has little
influence on the optimal Taylor rule coefficients. Interestingly, persistent measurement error
in inflation increases the optimal Taylor rule coefficients while persistent measurement error
9Whenever we report numerical values for the coefficient on the output gap, we annualize it by multiplying
the quarterly value by four.
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in the output gap reduces the optimal response to the output gap (and leaves the inflation
coefficient almost unchanged).
Figure 2.2 shows how the optimal Taylor rule depends on the standard deviation of
shock innovations. The upper left panel shows the Taylor rule coefficients as we change the
volatility of the IS shocks. Not surprisingly (and incidentally, consistent with Proposition
3), a larger standard deviation of the efficient rate shocks raises φ∗pi and φ
∗
y. The upper right
panel considers changes in the standard deviation of cost-push shocks. Given our baseline
calibration, as the cost-push shocks become more volatile the reaction to the output gap
increases while the reaction to inflation falls. Intuitively, as the variance of cost-push shocks
increases, the model behaves more and more like the special case in which there are only
cost-push shocks. In that case, the optimal coefficients were restricted to the manifold (2.11).
At the same time, the logic of Proposition 3 suggests finite Taylor rule coefficients as long
as the output gap is observed with error. A combination of these two arguments seems to
imply that as the variance of cost-push shocks becomes greater, the coefficients will approach
a specific finite point on the line (2.11).
The bottom panels in Figure 2.2 show how the optimal Taylor rule depends on measure-
ment error. Not surprisingly, for both types of measurement error, greater data uncertainty
implies less active policy. It is worth noting that, at least for our baseline calibration,
measurement error in the output gap is much more influential than measurement error in
inflation. This is again consistent with the analytical result in Proposition 3.
Figure 2.3 depicts the optimal Taylor rule for alternative values of the weight on inflation
in the objective function (α) and the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment (κ). The left
panel illustrates the coefficients when we change the weight on inflation. As the preference
for price stability increases (a greater α), the central bank adopts a Taylor rule with a higher
reaction coefficient on inflation and a lower reaction coefficient on the output gap. The
panel on the right shows how the coefficients vary with the macroeconomic rate of price
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adjustment. While the relationship is not monotone over the range considered in the figure,
for relatively high values of κ, the central bank again chooses a stronger reaction to inflation
and a weaker reaction to the output gap.
2.5 Signal Extraction and Optimal Taylor Rules
To this point, we have assumed that the central bank directly responds to measured in-
flation pimt and the measured gap y
m
t . Alternatively, we could consider a modified Taylor
rule which stipulates that the central bank sets the interest rate as a function of estimated
inflation and the output gap. Among others, Orphanides (2001) has advocated this specifi-
cation. Drawing on the results of Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004), we consider signal
extraction and optimal Taylor rules in this section.10
In our model, agents in the private sector have full information. Their information set
includes all variables dated t or earlier and all model parameters. In contrast, the central
bank observes only measured inflation and the measured output gap. We assume that the
central bank uses the Kalman filter to construct estimates of the true values of the output
gap and the inflation rate. For a generic variable xt, we let xt|t denote the central bank’s
estimate of the variable given all of the information available at date t.11 Having solved the
signal extraction problem, the central bank sets the interest rate according to the modified
Taylor rule
it = ρ+ ψpipit|t + ψyyt|t. (TR2)
ψpi and ψy are the Taylor rule coefficients which operate on the estimates pit|t and yt|t. We
list this Taylor rule as (TR2) to distinguish it from the more conventional Taylor rule (TR1).
10A number of researchers have examined signal extraction problems of central banks. Further references
include Swanson (2000), Aoki (2003), and Smets (2002).
11Formally, the central bank’s information set is ICBt = {Θ, pimt−j , ymt−j : j ≥ 0} where Θ is a vector of all
model parameters. Then, for any variable xt, the central bank’s date t estimate is xt|t = E[xt|ICBt ]. The
observation equations are pimt = pit +m
pi
t and y
m
t = yt +m
y
t .
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The remaining model equations are unchanged.
2.5.1 Optimal Policy
We begin by characterizing the central bank’s estimates of inflation and the output gap
as a function of the estimated disturbances. Lemma 2 is analogous to Lemma 1 for the
model without noisy observations.
Lemma 2: The central bank’s estimates of inflation and the output gap satisfy
pit|t =
κ
Φr + ψy (1− β%r) + κψpi r
e
t|t +
ψy + (1− %u)σ
Φu + ψy (1− β%u) + κψpiut|t, (2.14)
yt|t =
1− β%r
Φr + ψy (1− β%r) + κψpi r
e
t|t +
%u − ψpi
Φu + ψy (1− β%u) + κψpiut|t, (2.15)
where Φr and Φu are defined as in Lemma 1.
The lemma shows that, with a suitable reinterpretation of the shocks, the equilibrium
paths of the filtered variables yt|t and pit|t obey the same equilibrium conditions as the actual
underlying variables yt and pit (see equations (2.9) and (2.10)).
We are now interested in finding the coefficients {ψ∗y, ψ∗pi} that minimize (2.8) subject
to (2.1) to (2.6), (TR2), and the central bank’s informational constraints. The following
proposition presents a result for the i.i.d. case in which we can obtain a closed-form solution.
Proposition 4: Suppose all shocks are contemporaneously uncorrelated with each other
and i.i.d over time. Then the coefficients {ψ∗y , ψ∗pi} satisfying
ψ∗pi = ακ
(
ψ∗y + σ
)
+
(
1 + ακ2
) Cov[ret|t, ut|t]
V
[
ut|t
] (11”)
and ψ∗y →∞ are optimal.
Proposition 4 shows that, there is an optimal Taylor rule in terms of filtered output yt|t
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and inflation pit|t which embodies the same properties as Proposition 2 (Special Case 4). As
in Special Case 4, the optimal Taylor rule coefficients are again infinitely large and ψ∗pi/ψ
∗
y
converges to ακ. Notice the following subtle difference: in Proposition 2, we assumed an
exogenous correlation between ret and ut. In contrast, the correlation between the estimates
ret|t and ut|t in Proposition 4 arises endogenously even though the underlying shocks r
e
t and
ut are uncorrelated.
The correlation between ret|t and ut|t comes from the central bank’s effort to infer the true
shocks. For example, suppose the central bank observes positive inflation and a negative
output gap. A negative supply shock (ut > 0) is a natural candidate for such observations.
Another possibility is the occurrence of a positive demand shock together with a negative
innovation to measurement error in the output gap. Because the central bank attaches
positive probability to many potential combinations of shocks, its estimates ret|t and ut|t will
typically be correlated. For the optimal Taylor rule, the induced correlation is immaterial.
Equations (2.14) and (2.15) with %u = %r = 0 imply that only the limit of ψ
∗
pi/ψ
∗
y affects the
central bank’s estimates of inflation and the output gap.
We next turn to the general case in which all shocks have arbitrary autocorrelation. The
analytical solution of the optimal policy problem is difficult so we use numerical methods to
characterize the optimal Taylor rule.
Figure 2.4 shows level curves of the central bank’s objective function when all parameters
are set to the values of our baseline calibration summarized in Table 2.1. As we have seen
in the i.i.d. case (Proposition 4), stronger responses to both expected inflation and the
expected output gap reduce the central bank’s loss function (2.8). This continues to be the
case when there are persistent innovations. Again, the optimal Taylor rule coefficients are
infinitely large.12
As the Taylor rule coefficients approach infinity, (2.14) and (2.15) imply that expected
12In all numerical cases we consider, the optimal Taylor rule coefficients approach infinity.
69
inflation and the expected output gap depend only on the estimated supply shock. In
particular, pit|t = Aut|t and yt|t = −But|t for some strictly positive constants A and B.
Eliminating ut|t immediately yields
yt|t = −BA−1pit|t.
The central bank acts to neutralize the effect of estimated demand shocks on pit|t and yt|t
so that under the optimal Taylor rule, only the effects of cost-push shocks (i.e., “supply
shocks”) remain. As a consequence, the central bank’s best estimates of current inflation
and output are perfectly negatively correlated.13
2.5.2 Does the Federal Reserve Follow an Optimal Taylor Rule?
If the central bank followed an optimal Taylor rule (TR2) and the model were correct,
then expected inflation and the expected output gap should be perfectly negatively corre-
lated. To see whether this prediction holds in the data, we examine the Fed’s real time
forecasts of current quarter inflation and the output gap. These forecasts are produced by
the Federal Reserve staff before every meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee and
made publicly available with a five year lag by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We
take the Fed’s contemporaneous estimate of Core CPI inflation as the empirical analogue of
pit|t.
Figure 2.5 plots the current-quarter forecasts of Core CPI inflation and the output gap
from 1987Q3 - 2007Q4. In the figure, ‘initial’ refers to the forecast of the output gap
produced for the first quarterly meeting and ‘revised’ refers to the forecast for the second
meeting. Panel A shows the unfiltered series. There is no obvious relationship between the
two series in the figure. The sample correlation between the initial output gap estimate and
13This result technically requires that the Taylor rule coefficients approach infinity at asymptotically the
same rate so that their ratio converges to a strictly positive and finite value at the optimum.
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the estimate of Core CPI inflation is -0.09 (the correlation changes to -0.1 if we use the
revised estimate). In contrast, under the optimal Taylor rule, the correlation between the
two series should be -1.00.
One concern with using the raw series to compute this correlation is that much of the
variation in inflation is due to a steady declining trend since the mid 1980’s. In Panel B, we
show HP-filtered time series for both the estimated output gap and estimated inflation. (We
use the standard quarterly smoothing parameter of 1600). In this figure, the estimates of
inflation and the output gap have a modest positive correlation. The correlation coefficient
is 0.35 for the initial output gap estimate and 0.29 for the revised estimate.
In neither case is the correlation close to the prediction of negative one. When interpreted
through the lens of our model it appears that the Fed is underreacting to its own estimates
of inflation and the gap.
2.5.3 Signal Extraction and Interest Rate Smoothing
There is a close connection between the Taylor rule given by (TR2) and interest rate
smoothing. Interest rate smoothing can be captured by a policy rule of the form
it = ρ+ φpipi
m
t + φyy
m
t + νit−1. (TR3)
In this specification the central bank sets the interest rate as a function of measured inflation,
measured output, and the lagged interest rate.14 The parameter ν governs the extent to
which the central bank anchors its current policy with the interest rate from the previous
quarter.
Taylor rules with interest rate smoothing are similar to Taylor rules based on filtered
output and inflation. In fact, there are special cases in which the two rules exactly coincide.
14See, for example, Sack and Wieland (2000), and Rudebusch (2006) for discussions of interest rate
smoothing.
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To see this, consider the model in the previous section given by equations (2.1) to (2.6) and
(TR2), in which the central bank observes pimt = pit + m
pi
t and y
m
t = yt + m
y
t and uses the
Kalman filter to estimate the output gap and inflation. Suppose further that there are no
cost-push shocks (V [ut] = 0) and that the persistence of the measurement error shocks is
zero (%my = %mpi = 0). For this special case, we have the following result.
Proposition 5: Given the assumptions above, for any Taylor rule (TR2) with coefficients
ψy and ψpi, there exist coefficients {φ˜y, φ˜pi, ν˜} such that the policy rule (TR3) generates the
same equilibrium paths for all variables.
Proposition 5 states that in the special case where there are no cost-push shocks and
measurement error is i.i.d., the Taylor rule in which the central bank responds to the esti-
mates yt|t and pit|t can be implemented exactly by a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing
of the form (TR3).15
While exact equivalence between interest rate smoothing and Taylor rules of the form
(TR2) requires strong assumptions, the spirit of Proposition 5 extends to very general set-
tings. As long as the central bank follows Taylor rule (TR2) and forms its estimates yt|t and
pit|t using the Kalman filter, the interest rate will change gradually because the estimates of
the output gap and inflation change gradually. In such a setting, an econometrician would
continue to conclude that lagged interest rates play an important role in shaping policy. To
demonstrate this claim quantitatively, we again consider the model consisting of equations
(2.1) to (2.6), the central bank’s informational constraints described above and Taylor rule
(TR2). When we estimate the interest rate smoothing rule (TR3) on data simulated from
this model using the benchmark calibration summarized in Table 2.1, we obtain a smoothing
parameter ν of about 0.7.
15Aoki (2003) reaches a similar conclusion in a setting where the central bank optimizes under discretion.
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2.6 Numerical Evaluation
Here we use a calibrated numerical model to quantitatively compare the policy rules
(TR1), (TR2), and (TR3). All numerical results are based on the calibration discussed in
Section 4 and summarized in Table 2.1. For each rule, we compute the optimal coefficients
and evaluate the value of the objective function as well as the variance of inflation and
output.
Table 2.2 reports the value of the objective function (equation (2.8)), as well as the
associated variance of inflation and the output gap for all three policy rules evaluated at
their optimal coefficients. For rules (TR1) and (TR3) the optimal coefficients are shown in
the bottom rows of the table. Not surprisingly, the simple Taylor rule in which the central
bank responds to measured inflation and measured output (equation (TR1)) is inferior to
both alternatives. For our baseline calibration, Taylor rule (TR2) outperforms the interest
rate smoothing rule (TR3) though we note that it is possible to construct cases in which
optimal interest rate smoothing outperforms Taylor rule (TR2).16
Figures 2.6 and 2.6 report impulse response functions for the four structural shocks
(ret , ut,m
y
t ,m
pi
t ). For each case, we consider a Taylor rule which is optimal given the specifi-
cation (TR1), (TR2) or (TR3) as indicated. The top panels of Figure 2.6 show the impulse
response functions of the output gap, inflation, and the interest rate to a shock to the efficient
rate ret (a “demand” shock). When the central bank follows the simple Taylor rule (TR1),
the output gap is remarkably close to zero. However, inflation jumps up substantially and
only slowly converges back to its steady state value of zero. The history dependent rules
16Consider a calibration in which all of the structural shocks have no persistence. In this case, the filtered
estimates pit|tandyt|t are functions of only current observationspimt and y
m
t . As a consequence, the optimized
value of the objective is the same for the simple Taylor rule (TR1) and for the Taylor rule with filtered data
(TR2). However, since a central bank following (TR3) can choose an additional parameter it must be able
to weakly improve on the restricted rules. The interest rate smoothing parameter allows the central bank
some ability to commit to future actions which is often a feature of the globally optimal policy. See, e.g., ?,
Woodford (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
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(TR2) and (TR3) are superior in this regard.
Impulse response functions for the cost-push shock are shown in the bottom panels of
Figure 2.6. On impact, the output gap is largest for the simple Taylor rule (TR1). No
further striking differences of the paths of output and inflation are revealed for the different
policy rules.
As in our baseline calibration, Orphanides (2003) estimated that measurement error in
the output gap is highly persistent. The top panels of Figure 2.7 show that this persistence
is reflected in the dynamic reaction to a noise shock. When the central bank solves a
signal extraction problem and sets the interest rate according to Taylor rule (TR2), it learns
gradually that the shock must have been measurement error. Although the output gap
and inflation drop immediately after the shock, optimal state estimation reveals relatively
quickly that the shock is likely noise and the central bank quickly guides the economy back
to steady state. When the central bank follows rules (TR1) or (TR3) instead, the persistence
of the measurement error shock causes the economy to go through a protracted period of
low inflation.
Not surprisingly, signal extraction is particularly important when measurement error is
persistent. Because our baseline calibration features no persistence for measurement error
in inflation, when the economy experiences such a shock, there are only slight differences in
output and inflation across the policies. This is shown in the bottom panels of Figure 2.7.
While the impact response of the output gap is largest for the simple Taylor rule (TR1),
the lack of history dependence implies a return to the steady state in a single period. Rules
(TR2) and (TR3) show a somewhat slower convergence rate.
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2.7 Conclusion
One of the Taylor rule’s most appealing features is its simplicity: the central bank’s
behavior is characterized by two parameters only. In this paper we analyze optimal Taylor
rules in standard New Keynesian models. In the absence of measurement error, activist
monetary policy is costless and the optimal Taylor rule coefficients are often infinite. When
inflation and output are measured with error, the optimal Taylor rule coefficients are finite. If
the central bank instead sets the interest rate as a function of estimated output and inflation
then the optimal coefficients on estimated inflation and the estimated gap are again infinite.
Optimal monetary policy in the model with signal extraction implies a strong negative
correlation between estimated inflation and estimated output. In contrast, data on the Fed-
eral Reserve’s estimates of current inflation and the output gap exhibit either zero correlation
or a modest positive correlation depending on whether or not they are filtered. This suggests
that the Fed is insufficiently aggressive in responding to deviations from its targets.
Signal extraction on the part of the central bank also introduces behavior which mimics
history dependence in monetary policy. Because the central bank’s beliefs about the state
of the economy are updated gradually, the interest rate also changes gradually and observed
policy actions will resemble interest rate smoothing even if the central bank is reacting only
to current estimates of inflation and the output gap.
The results in this paper are not meant to be the final word on optimal Taylor rules in
New Keynesian models but rather to provide a simple benchmark for optimal Taylor policy
rules in more realistic and complex economic models. Such models would likely include
wage rigidity in addition to price rigidity and would almost surely include durable consumer
and investment goods. While we anticipate that optimal Taylor rules will differ in more
articulated models, we also suspect that many of the properties we derived for the basic
New Keynesian model will carry over to more realistic environments.
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Table 2.1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
σ 1 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
θ 2/3 Poisson rate of price stickiness
η 1 Labor supply elasticity
(%r, %u, %mpi, %my) 0.9 ,0.5 ,0 ,0.95 Persistence of shock processes
SD[εr] 0.22 Standard deviation (SD) of innovation to efficient rate
SD[u] 0.43 SD of innovation to the cost-push shock
SD[εmpi] 0.50 SD of innovation to measurement error in inflation
SD[εmy] 0.66 SD of innovation to measurement error in the gap
α 1 Weight on inflation in the policy objective function
Table 2.2: Evaluation of Policy Rules
Standard Taylor Rule Taylor Rule with Interest Rate
(TR1) signal extraction (TR2) Smoothing(TR3)
Criterion (8) 1.56 1.03 1.16
V[y] 1.11 0.69 0.86
V[pi] 0.45 0.34 0.30
φ∗y 0.61 - 0.27
φ∗pi 2.00 - 0.42
ν∗ - - 1.08
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Figure 2.1: Parametric Variations in Shock Persistence
Notes: Each panel plots the optimal Taylor rule coefficients for inflation (heavy solid line) and
the output gap (heavy dashed line). The vertical dashed line indicates the parameter value in
the baseline calibration. For all cases, as the autoregressive coefficient changes, the innovation
variance is adjusted so as to hold constant the variance of the overall process. All other parameters
are held constant at the baseline level.
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Figure 2.2: Parametric Variations in Shock Variance
Notes: Each panel plots the optimal Taylor rule coefficients for inflation (heavy solid line) and
the output gap (heavy dashed line). The vertical dashed line indicates the parameter value in
the baseline calibration. All other parameters are held constant at the baseline level.
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Figure 2.3: Parametric Variations in Inflation Weight and Rate of Price Adjustment
Notes: Each panel plots the optimal Taylor rule coefficients for inflation (heavy solid line) and
the output gap (heavy dashed line). The vertical dashed line indicates the parameter value in
the baseline calibration. All other parameters are held constant at the baseline level.
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Figure 2.4: Level curves of the central bank’s loss function
Notes: The figure uses the baseline calibration summarized in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.5: Inflation and output gap estimates of the Fed
Notes: The graphs show the current-quarter estimates of Core CPI inflation and the
output gap. All series in Panel B are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
The Federal Open Market Committee meets twice per quarter and two estimates for the
output gap are available. Initial refers to the estimate for the first and revised to the
estimate for the second meeting.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions
Notes: All shocks are one standard deviation in size. The unit of the output gap is
percentage deviations from its steady state value of zero. The units of inflation and the
interest rate are annualized percentage points.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response Functions
Notes: All shocks are one standard deviation in size. The unit of the output gap is
percentage deviations from its steady state value of zero. The units of inflation and the
interest rate are annualized percentage points.
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CHAPTER III
Input Linkages and the Transmission of Shocks:
Firm-Level Evidence from the 2011 To¯hoku
Earthquake
with Aaron Flaaen and Nitya Pandalai Nayar
3.1 Introduction
The spillover effects of trade and financial linkages has been a preeminant topic in in-
ternational economics in recent decades. The large expansions in trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the past twenty years have generated much discussion on whether they
increase volatility (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012), increase comovement (Frankel and
Rose, 1998; Burstein et al., 2008) or lead to less diversified production and specialization
(Imbs , 2004). Identifying the micro-foundations underlying the role of these linkages in
the increased interdependence of national economies is challenging. Advanced economies
are highly connected, and most variables influenced by any candidate mechanism are often
correlated with other developments in the source and destination countries. There is often
little in the way of exogenous variation to isolate any particular mechanism from a host of
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confounding factors. Moreover, the requisite data to examine these issues at the necessary
detail and disaggregation have been, until recently, unavailable.
This paper provides empirical evidence for the cross-country transmission of shocks via
the rigid production linkages of multinational firms. The principal mechanism at work is
not new; the idea of input-output linkages as a key channel through which shocks propagate
through the economy dates back to at least Leontief (1936) or Hirschmann (1958). Two
advances in this paper permit a new quantitative evaluation of the nature and magnitude
of these linkages. First, we utilize a novel dataset that, for the first time, links restricted
U.S. Census Bureau microdata to firms’ international ownership structure. This information
permits a forensic focus on particular firms and their underlying behavior. Second, we
utilize the March 2011 To¯hoku earthquake and tsunami as a natural experiment of a large
and exogenous shock disrupting the production linkages originating from Japan.
We study the role of imported intermediate inputs in the transmission of this shock to
the United States economy. Because disruptions to imports of final goods would be unlikely
to affect U.S. production, we develop a new methodology for isolating firm-level imports of
intermediate inputs. We show that the U.S. affiliates of Japanese multinationals are the most
natural source of this transmission, due to their high exposure to imported intermediates
from Japan. The scope for shocks to these imported inputs to pass through and affect the
firm’s U.S. production depends on how substitutable they are with inputs from alternative
sources. In other words, the role of imported inputs in the transmission of shocks is governed
by the elasticity of substitution with respect to domestic factors of production.
We estimate this elasticity using the relative magnitudes of high frequency input and
output shipments in the months following the To¯hoku earthquake/tsunami. This proceeds
in two steps. First, reduced form estimates corresponding to Japanese multinational affiliates
on average show that output falls, without a lag, by a comparable magnitude to the drop
in imports. These results suggest a near-zero elasticity of imported inputs. Second, we
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structurally estimate a firm-level production function that allows for substitution across
different types of inputs. The structural estimation procedure we use is uniquely tailored to
the experiment. In an initial period prior to the To¯hoku disruption, we infer information on
the firm’s productivity and optimal input mix. Then, applying this production function to
the period of the disruption, we estimate the elasticity parameters based on how changes in
the firm’s input mix translate into changes in output.
This estimation strategy has a number of attractive features. Most importantly, it relies
on very few assumptions. Direct estimation of the production function circumvents the many
difficulties associated with specifying a firm’s optimization problem in the period after the
shock. Second, it yields transparent parameter identification. This is an advantage over
traditional estimation strategies as it does not suffer from omitted variables and endogeneity
concerns arising from correlated shocks. Third, it allows for the estimation across different
subgroups of firms.
The structural estimates are broadly in agreement with the results from our reduced form
exercise. For Japanese multinationals, the elasticity of substitution across material inputs
is 0.2 and the elasticity between material inputs and a capital/labor aggregate is 0.03. For
non-Japanese firms using inputs from Japan, the estimates of the elasticity of substitution
across material inputs are somewhat higher at 0.42 to 0.62. While the high cost share and
particularly low elasticity for Japanese affiliates explains their predominant contribution to
the direct transmission of this shock to the U.S., the elasticity estimates for non-Japanese
firms are still substantially lower than typical estimates used in the literature. We argue
that the substantial share of intra-firm intermediate trade implies greater complementarities
in aggregate trade than is currently recognized.
There are a number of important implications for such low values of the elasticity of
substitution. This parameter appears in various forms in a wide span of models involving
the exchange of goods across countries. As discussed by Backus et al. (1994) and Heathcote
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and Perri (2002) among others, this parameter is critically important for the behavior of
these models and their ability to match key patterns of the data. Prior estimates of this
parameter were based on highly aggregated data that naturally suffered from concerns about
endogeneity and issues of product composition.1 Reflecting the uncertainty of available
estimates for the elasticity of substitution, it is a common practice to evaluate the behavior
of these models along a wide range of parameter values.
It is well known that a low value for this parameter (interpreted as either substitution be-
tween imported and domestic goods in final consumption or as intermediates in production)
improves the fit of standard IRBC models along several important dimensions. In particular,
the elasticity of substitution plays a role in two highly robust failings of these models: i) a
terms of trade that is not nearly as variable as the data, and ii) a consumption comovement
that is significantly higher than that of output, whereas the data show the opposite relative
ranking.2
To understand the relationship between the elasticity and comovement, it is helpful to
recall that these models generate output comovement by inducing synchronization in fac-
tor supplies, a mechanism that by itself generally fails to produce the degree of comove-
ment seen in the data. Complementarities among inputs together with heterogeneous input
shocks will generate direct comovement in production, augmenting the output synchroniza-
tion based on factor movements. Burstein et al. (2008) show that a low production elasticity
of substitution between imported and domestic inputs reduces substitution following relative
price movements, and thereby increases business cycle synchronization.3 It is also relatively
straightforward to see how a lower elasticity increases volatility in the terms of trade. When
1For a very useful compendium of this research from this era, see Stern et al. (1976). More recently, work
by Halpern et al. (2011) and Goldberg et al. (2010) demonstrate that materials inputs from foreign countries
are imperfectly substitutable with domestic inputs for Hungary and India respectively.
2Due to the robust nature of these shortcomings, Backus et al. (1995) refer to them as the “price anomaly”
and “quantity anomaly” respectively.
3Although they do not estimate this parameter, the value they advocate (0.05) is indeed close to our
estimates.
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two inputs are highly complementary, deviations from the steady state mix are associated
with large changes in their relative prices. In the words of Heathcote and Perri (2002, page
621): “greater complementarity is associated with a larger return to relative scarcity.”
The estimates in this paper have implications for the role of trade in firm-level and aggre-
gate volatility. Other research has argued that firms can diversify risk arising from country
specific shocks by importing (Caselli et al. (2014)) or that firms with complex production
processes of several inputs are less volatile as each input matters less for production (Koren
and Tenreyro (2013)). On the other hand, there is a well-established fact that complemen-
tarities and multi-stage processing can lead to the amplification of shocks as in Jones (2011)
and Kremer (1993). We discuss the potential for measured amplification in our context in
Section 3.5.
This paper is also a contribution to the empirical evidence on the role of individual firms
in aggregate fluctuations, emanating from the work of Gabaix (2011). Other related evidence
comes from di Giovanni et al. (2014), who use French micro-data to demonstrate that firm-
level shocks contribute as much to aggregate volatility as sectoral and macroeconomic shocks
combined. The so-called granularity of the economy is very much evident in our exercise;
though the number of Japanese multinationals is small, they comprise a very large share
of total imports from Japan, and are arguably responsible for a measurable drop in U.S.
industrial production following the To¯hoku earthquake (see Figure 3.3).
The strong complementarity across material inputs implies that non-Japanese input use
falls nearly proportionately, thereby propagating the shock to other upstream (and down-
stream) firms in both the U.S. economy and abroad. Many suppliers were thus indirectly
exposed to the shock via linkages with Japanese affiliates that had i) high exposure to
Japanese inputs and ii) a rigid production function with respect to other inputs. Network
effects such as these can dramatically magnify the overall transmission of the shock (both
across countries and within). And while such effects are commonly understood to exist, this
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paper provides unique empirical evidence of the central mechanisms at work.
As is the case with most research based on an event-study, some care should be taken
in generalizing the results to other settings. Although we have already highlighted the
aggregate implications of the effects we estimate, one might worry that the composition
of Japanese trade or firms engaged in such trade is not representative of trade linkages
more broadly. We believe the results we obtain are informative beyond the context of this
particular episode for two reasons. First, the features of Japanese multinationals that are
underlying the transmission of this shock are common to all foreign multinational affiliates in
the United States.4 Second, estimates corresponding to all firms in our sample also exhibit
substantial complementarities, and as a whole these firms account for over 70 percent of
total U.S. manufacturing imports.
The next section describes the empirical strategy and data sources used in this paper,
section 3.3 presents reduced form evidence in support of a low production elasticity of im-
ported inputs for Japanese multinational affiliates. In Section 3.4, we expand the scope of
parameters we identify with a structural model of cross-country production linkages. We es-
timate the parameters of this model across several different subgroups. Section 3.5 discusses
the implications of these estimates, and details a number of checks and robustness exercises.
The final section offers concluding thoughts.
3.2 Empirical Strategy and Specification
This section outlines the empirical approach of using an event-study framework sur-
rounding the 2011 To¯hoku event to estimate the production elasticity of imported inputs.
We discuss the relevant details of this shock, document the aggregate effects, and then outline
the empirical specification for the firm-level analysis.
4Intra-firm trade accounts for a large majority of the trade of Japanese affiliates. More generally, the
intra-firm share of imported intermediates for all foreign affiliates in the U.S. is 71 percent.
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3.2.1 Background
The To¯hoku earthquake and tsunami took place off the coast of Northeast Japan on
March 11, 2011. It had a devastating impact on Japan, with estimates of almost twenty
thousand dead or missing (Schnell and Weinstein (2012)) and substantial destruction of
physical capital. The magnitude of the earthquake was recorded at 9.0 on the moment
magnitude scale (Mw), making it the fourth largest earthquake event recorded in the modern
era.5 Most of the damage and casualties were a result of the subsequent tsunami that
inundated entire towns and coastal fishing villages. The effects of the tsunami were especially
devastating in the Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures. The Japanese Meteorological
Agency published estimates of wave heights as high as 7-9m (23-29ft), while the Port and
Airport Research Institute (PARI) cite estimates of the maximum landfall height of between
7.9m and 13.3m (26-44ft).
Figure 3.1 shows the considerable impact of the To¯hoku event on the Japanese economy.
Japanese manufacturing production fell by roughly 15 percentage points between February
and March 2011, and did not return to trend levels until July. Much of the decline in economic
activity resulted from significant power outages that persisted for months following damage
to several power plants – most notably the Fukushima nuclear reactor.6 Further, at least six
Japanese ports (among them the Hachinohe, Sendai, Ishinomaki and Onahama) sustained
significant damage and were out of operation for more than a month, delaying shipments to
both foreign and domestic locations. It should be noted, however, that the largest Japanese
ports (Yokohama, Tokyo, Kobe) which account for the considerable majority of Japanese
5Since 1900, the three earthquakes of greater recorded magnitude are: the 1960 Great Chilean earthquake
(magnitude 9.5), the 1964 Good Friday earthquake in Prince William Sound, Alaska (magnitude 9.2); and
the 2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake (magnitude 9.2).
6For precautionary reasons, all nuclear power plants were immediately shut down following the earth-
quake, and remained largely offline until 2014 or later. Because the electricity infrastructure exists on two
separate grids (a 60Hz to the south and west, and 50Hz to the north and east), the reduction in power supply
in Northeast Japan was not easily remedied, and power outages persisted for months.
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trade, re-opened only days after the event.
As expected, the economic impact of the event was reflected in international trade statis-
tics, including exports to the United States. Figure 3.2 plots U.S. imports from Japan around
the period of the To¯hoku event, with imports from the rest of the world for comparison. The
large fall in imports occurs during the month of April 2011, reflecting the several weeks of
transit time for container vessels to cross the Pacific Ocean. The magnitude of this drop in
imports is roughly similar to that of Japanese manufacturing production: a 20 percentage
point drop from March to April, with a full recovery by July 2011.
More striking is the response of U.S. industrial production in the months following the
event. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that there is indeed a drop in U.S. manufacturing production
in the months following the Japanese earthquake. Although the magnitudes are obviously
much smaller — roughly a one percentage point drop in total manufacturing and almost two
percentage points in durable goods — the existence of a measurable effect is clear.7
Though tragic, the To¯hoku event provides a glimpse into the cross-country spillovers
following an exogenous supply shock. This natural experiment features many characteristics
that are advantageous for this type of study. It was large and hence measurable, unexpected,
and directly affected only one country. The shock was also short-lived, which rules out im-
mediate supplier restructuring and allows for an estimate of the elasticity for a given supply
chain.8 On the other hand, the short duration of the shock presents a challenge for mea-
surement as it limits the available datasets with information at the required frequency. We
utilize a novel firm-level dataset to uncover the mechanisms at work behind the transmission
of this shock.
7At the level of total U.S. GDP, both Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs revised 2nd quarter U.S.
estimates down by 50 basis points explicitly due to the events in Japan.
8It also rules out large balance sheet effects that would make differential credit conditions an operative
feature.
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3.2.2 Data
Several restricted-use Census Bureau datasets form the core of our firm-level analysis.
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) collects the employment, payroll, and major
industry of all establishments operating in the United States, and is maintained and updated
as described by Jarmin and Miranda (2002). Longitudinal linkages allow the researcher to
follow the establishment over time, and the annual Company Organization Survey (COS)
provides a mapping from establishments to firms. All of the analysis in this paper will be at
the firm-level.
The Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transactions Database (LFTTD), which links individual
trade transactions to firms operating in the United States. Assembled by a collaboration
between the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Customs Bureau, the LFTTD contains in-
formation on the destination (or source) country, quantity and value shipped, the transport
mode, and other details from point-of-trade administrative documents. Importantly for this
study, the LFTTD includes import and export trade transactions at a daily frequency, which
is easily aggregated to monthly-level trade flows. A number of important papers have utilized
this resource, such as Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2006).
We utilize two novel extensions to this set of Census data products. First, a new link
between a set of international corporate directories and the Business Register (BR) of the
Census Bureau provides information on the international affiliates of firms operating in the
United States. These directories provide information, for the first time, to identify those U.S.
affiliates part of a foreign parent company, as well as those U.S. firms with affiliate operations
abroad. This information is an important resource for identifying the characteristics of U.S.
firms affected by the To¯hoku event. For information on these directories and the linking
procedure used, please see Appendix C.2.1.
The second novel data resource is a system to classify firm-level import transactions as
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intermediate or final goods. Although intermediate input trade represents as much as two-
thirds of total trade (see Johnson and Noguera (2012)), the LFTTD does not classify a trade
transaction based on its intended use. To overcome this limitation, we use information on the
products produced by U.S. establishments in a given industry to identify the set of products
intended for final sale for that industry.9 The remaining products are presumably used
by establishments in that industry either as intermediate inputs or as capital investment.
Details on this classification procedure are available in Appendix C.2.2. In the aggregate,
this firm-level classification procedure yields estimates of the intermediate share of trade
that are consistent with prior estimates: 64 percent of manufacturing imports are classified
as “intermediates” in 2007.
Finally, we utilize geographic information on the severity of the earthquake/tsunami that
is compiled by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). By geocoding the Japanese addresses of
firms with U.S. operations, we construct an earthquake intensity measure for each Japanese
affiliate location. We then apply such information to the U.S. operations as a way to further
measure the sample of firms plausibly affected by the shock. Please see Appendix C.2.3.2
for details. Figure 3.4 shows the geographic distribution of one such USGS measure — the
modified mercalli index (MMI) — along with the geocoded affiliate locations.
The ideal dataset to evaluate the transmission of the To¯hoku event on U.S. firms would
consist of high frequency information on production, material inputs, and trade, separated
out by geographic and ownership criteria. Unfortunately, Census data on production and
material inputs at the firm-level is somewhat limited. The Annual Survey of Manufacturers
(ASM) contains such information, but at an annual frequency and only for a subset of
manufacturing firms. On the other hand, firm-level trade information is available at a nearly
daily frequency, and covers the universe of firms engaged in exporting/importing. For the
9Note that products intended for final sale for a given industry may still be used as intermediates for
other firms in a different industry. Alternatively, such “final goods” can be sold directly to consumers for
ultimate consumption.
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purposes of characterizing the shock to firm-level imports of intermediate goods, the LFTTD
(and supplements identified above) is ideal. There remain significant gaps in information on
a firm’s domestic input usage, a limitation we discuss in subsequent sections.
Because of the challenges of high-frequency information on firms’ U.S. production, we
utilize a proxy based on the LFTTD — namely the firm’s exports of goods to North America
(Canada and Mexico). The underlying assumption of this proxy is that all firms export a
fixed fraction of their U.S. output to neighboring countries in each period. The advantage
of this approach is the ability to capture the flow of goods at a specific point in time. There
are few barriers to North American trade, and transport time is relatively short. Moreover,
exporting is a common feature of these firms, of which exports to North America is by far
the largest component. The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that it conditions on a
positive trading relationship between firms in the U.S. and Canada/Mexico. We will assess
the quality of this measure as a proxy for output in section 3.5.3.1.10
3.2.3 Basic Theory
Before moving to our firm-level analysis, it is useful to describe the basic theoretical
structure of the features of firm-level production that we estimate. The transmission of
shocks within a firm’s production chain is governed by the flexibility of production with
respect to input sourcing. Rather than model these complex networks directly, the literature
typically summarizes this feature with the well-known elasticity of substitution within a
C.E.S. production function. Our identification of this elasticity will rely on the relative
impacts on output and imported inputs following the shock. To be concrete, consider the
10Another consideration with the use of this proxy is whether it more accurately reflects production or
sales, as the two are distinct in the presence of output inventories. In our case, this depends on whether the
inventories are held in the U.S. or Canada/Mexico. Without further evidence, we interpret the proxy to be
capturing some mix between production and sales. The structural estimation in section 3.4 will allow for
such a mix.
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C.E.S. production function
x =
[
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
(3.1)
where output consists of combining a domestic bundle of factors FD (e.g. capital and labor)
with a foreign imported input IM . The parameter µ reflects the relative weight on the
input IM in production, conditional on prices and a given elasticity value. Suppose the firm
purchases its inputs in competitive markets with prices pD and pM , respectively, and sells its
good at price px. Our approach in this section will be to estimate the parameter ψ governing
the degree of substitution between these inputs, using information on the output elasticity
with respect to imported inputs, ∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pMM
, in the months following the shock.
The first order conditions imply that
F ∗D
IM∗
=
1− µ
µ
(
pM
pD
)ψ
, (3.2)
where F ∗D and IM
∗ denote the optimal quantities of inputs. We would like to show the
theoretical foundations underlying the intuitive result that a one-for-one drop in output
with the fall in imported inputs implies an elasticity of zero. To do this, we make the
following assumptions, all of which we will relax to some degree in the estimation framework
in Section 3.4:
1. Imported inputs shipments are disrupted, such that the firm receives a suboptimally
low quantity of IM : IM < IM∗;
2. The firm is unable to adjust domestic inputs F ∗D or its price px after learning that it
receives IM ;
3. The firm does not shut down.
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Given these assumptions, the following result holds:
Result 1. Under assumptions 1) to 3):
∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pMIM
=
1
1 +
(
IM∗
IM
)ψ−1
ψ
(
1−µ
µ
)(
pM
pD
)ψ−1 ∈ (0, 1) (3.3)
for any ψ ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.1 for details.
An immediate implication of this result is that the output elasticity is unity only when
ψ approaches zero.11 In this case
(
IM∗
IM
)ψ−1
ψ → 0 (recall that IM < IM∗) and hence
limψ→0
∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pM IM
= 1. Hence, observing a one-for-one drop in the value of output with the
value of imported intermediates, we infer that ψ is close to zero. It is also straightforward to
show that conditional on a value for ψ ∈ (0,∞), the output elasticity in (3.3) is increasing
in the parameter µ. That is, conditional on a given drop in the imported input, a larger
weight on this input leads to a larger percent response in output.
Our use of the natural experiment is critical for observing the effects of suboptimal input
combinations (F ∗D, IM). To see this, suppose the firm could freely adjust FD after learning it
will receive IM < IM∗. Then, it would choose FD such that FDIM =
F ∗D
IM∗ and the firm would
contract one-for-one with the drop in imports. It is a well-known fact that constant returns
to scale production functions in competitive environments lead to indeterminate firm size.
This has the implication that:
∂ ln (pxx)
∂ ln (pMIM)
=
∂ ln (pxx)
∂ ln (pDFD)
=
∂ ln (pDFD)
∂ ln (pMIM)
= 1. (3.4)
11There is a second case which we do not examine, where ψ → ∞ and pM < pD and thus the firm only
uses IM . We discard this scenario because such a firm would not show up in our data (i.e. this case implies
zero U.S. employment).
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In this case it is not possible to learn anything about ψ from the joint behavior of output and
the value of intermediate inputs. We provide evidence below that firms did not significantly
adjust their domestic labor force following the disruption, so that a constant FD is indeed
a reasonable assumption in this simple framework. To be sure, there are a number of
alternative frameworks where such behavior would not hold. We discuss some of these in
Appendix A, and show that the mapping limψ→0
∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pM IM
= 1 is more general.
3.3 Reduced Form Evidence
This section will provide intuitive reduced-form evidence on the elasticity of substitution
corresponding to the U.S. affiliates of Japanese multinationals. We discuss our strategy for
understanding this elasticity via firm-behavior in the months following the To¯hoku event,
and then report the results.
3.3.1 Framework
Our analysis of the production function (3.1) above demonstrates that a natural measure
to evaluate the potential conduits of the To¯hoku shock to the United States would be the
degree of reliance on Japanese imported inputs. This is best expressed as the cost share of
inputs from Japan, and can be constructed in a Census year by taking a firm’s Japanese
imported inputs and dividing by all other inputs (which includes production worker wages
and salaries, the cost of materials, and the cost of new machinery expenditures). Exposure
to Japanese imported inputs is heavily concentrated among Japanese affiliates. In the year
2007, which is the closest available Census year, this cost share was nearly 22% on average
for Japanese affiliates (see Table 3.1), compared to just 1% for other firms. For more detail
on the heterogeneity across and within these firm groups, we construct a density estimate of
such an exposure measure for the Japanese affiliates and non-Japanese multinationals. The
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results, shown in Figure 3.5, show little overlap between these distributions: there are few
Japanese affiliates with low exposure to Japanese inputs, and few non-Japanese firms have
substantial exposure.12
We now estimate the relative impacts on imported inputs and output for the Japanese
affiliates as a group. To do this, we implement a dynamic treatment effects specification in
which a firm is defined as being treated if it is owned by a Japanese parent company.13 The
effect on these firms can be inferred from the differential impact of the variable of interest
relative to a control group, which soaks up common seasonal patterns and other demand-
driven factors in the U.S. market. While there are a number of competing methodologies
for this type of estimation, we use normalized propensity score re-weighting due to the
relatively favorable finite-sample properties as discussed in Busso et al. (2014), as well as for
its transparent intuition. Consistent estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated
requires the assumption of conditional independence: the treatment/control allocation is
independent of potential outcomes conditional on a set of variables. As the average Japanese
firm differs considerably from other firms in the data, we use other multinational firms
– both US and non-Japanese foreign- as our baseline control group prior to reweighting.
To compute the propensity scores for reweighting, we control for size and industry, which
ensures the control group has a similar industrial composition and size distribution as our
treated sample.14 Table 3.2 reports summary values for the sample, including statistics on
the balancing procedure using the normalized propensity score.
12The exposure measure used in Figure 3.5 is from 2010 and does not include the cost of domestic material
usage.
13We could have also used a threshold of Japanese input usage for the classification of treatment status.
Doing so yields estimates that are very similar, which is due to the patterns evident in Figure 3.5. We have
also tried conditioning on our geographic information (i.e. the firm-level Japanese MMI index) in defining
a Japanese firm as being treated. The results are largely unchanged from those we report here, and for the
sake of clarity we report results pertaining to the full sample.
14Using the predicted values (p) from the first stage regression, the inverse probability weights are 11−p
for the control group and 1p for the treated group. To normalize the weights such that the treated firms have
weights equal to one, we then multiply each set of weights by p.
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The magnitude of the shock for a representative Japanese multinational is captured by
the effect on total imported intermediate products at a monthly frequency.15 Including non-
Japanese imported intermediates is important for applying the control group as a counter-
factual, and the shares by source-country gives the necessary variation for identification: as
shown in Table 3.2 the share of imported inputs from Japan is 70% of the total for Japanese
firms and only 3.5% for non-Japanese multinationals. Let V Mi,t be the value of intermediate
imports of firm i in month t, after removing a firm-specific linear trend through March 2011.
We fit the following regression:
V Mi,t = αi +
9∑
p=−4
γpEp +
9∑
p=−4
βpEpJPNi,p + ui,t (3.5)
where αi are firm fixed-effects, γp are monthly fixed effects (with the indicator variables
Ep corresponding to the calendar-months surrounding the event), and ui,t is an error term.
The baseline sample will consist of January 2009 to December 2011. We denote March 2011
as t=0.
The βp coefficients are of primary interest. The JPNi,t is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm is owned by a Japanese parent company. Interacting these indicator variables
with each month of the panel allows for a time-varying effect of Japanese ownership on a
firm’s overall intermediate input imports, particularly during and after the To¯hoku event.
The βp coefficients will estimate the differential effect of the To¯hoku event on Japanese
multinational affiliates in the U.S., compared to the control group of non-Japanese firms. A
useful interpretation of the {EpJPNi,p} variables is as a set of instruments that captures the
exogeneity of imports during these months, reflecting the source-country share of imports
from Japan as evident in Table 3.2. To evaluate the differential impact on production for
Japanese firms, we simply replace the dependent variable in equation (3.5) with the firm’s
15We consider Japanese and non-Japanese intermediate imports separately in section 3.4.
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North American exports, denoted V NAi,t .
It is important to highlight that equation (3.5) is in levels. There are several reasons
for doing so, as opposed to using log differences or growth rates. First, allowing for the
presence of zeros is important when the data are at a monthly frequency, particularly given
the magnitude of the shock to imports for Japanese firms. The second reason is more
conceptual. Because we are interested in calculating the average effect of these firms that
represents (and can scale up to) the aggregate impact on the U.S. economy, it is appropriate
to weight the firms based on their relative size. The levels specification does exactly this: the
absolute deviations from trend will be greater for the bigger firms and hence will contribute
disproportionately to the coefficient estimates.16 In section 3.4, we evaluate this framework
with the results one would obtain when estimating the effect on a firm-by-firm basis.
In addition to the Conditional Independence Assumption highlighted earlier, the βp co-
efficients are valid estimates of the mean effect for Japanese affiliates only in so far as the
control group is not itself impacted by the shock. This Stable Unit Treatment Value As-
sumption (SUTVA) implies that general equilibrium effects or peer effects (e.g. strategic
interaction) do not meaningfully effect the estimates. The share of imported inputs from
Japan is low for the control group, and thus the shock is unlikely to have a measurable effect
on imported inputs as a whole. We discuss strategic interaction in section 3.5.3.4.
3.3.2 Results: Total Manufacturing Sector
The top panel of Figure 3.6 plots the βp coefficients from equation (3.5) for the months
surrounding the To¯hoku event. Relative to the control group, there is a large drop in total
intermediate input imports by Japanese firms in the months following the earthquake. The
drop in intermediate inputs bottoms out at 4 million USD in t = 3 (June 2011) and the
16See Appendix C.3.1 for more discussion, as well as results obtained using other specifications. Impor-
tantly, in a reduced sample abstracting from zeros, a weighted regression using percentage changes directly
yields estimates that are very close to those presented here.
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point estimates do not return back to the pre-shock trend until month t = 7 (October 2011).
More interesting are the results from panel B of Figure 3.6, which looks for evidence
of the production/sales impact of this shock on Japanese firms via their North American
exports. The differential time-path of N.A. exports also exhibits a substantial drop following
the To¯hoku event, hitting a trough of 2 million USD below baseline in t = 2 (May 2011). The
standard errors, which are clustered at the firm level, are themselves interesting. As made
clear via the 95-percent confidence bands on the point estimates of Figure 3.6, the standard
errors increase dramatically in the months following the shock, a feature we interpret to
reflect heterogeneous incidence and timing of the shocks (as well as the recoveries) for the
Japanese multinationals.
To gain a sense of the average percentage drops of these two data series for Japanese
multinationals as a group, we take the two plots of the differential dollar amounts from
Figure 3.6 and divide by the average pre-shock level for these firms (see Table 3.2). The
results, plotted jointly in Figure 3.7, show the fraction below pre-shock trend levels for these
firms, on average. There is a remarkable correlation between these two series – whereby
there is essentially a one-for-one drop in output for a given drop in intermediate imports.
Using the mapping from Result 1, these reduced form results suggest a production function
that is essentially Leontief in the imported input.
One potential concern with the interpretation of these results is separating out the inter-
mediate input channel with other channels, such as a direct “productivity shock” affecting
the U.S. operations of Japanese affiliates. Separating an ownership channel from an imported
input channel is difficult due to lack of substantial overlap we identified above: few Japanese
firms have low input exposure and few non-Japanese firms have high input exposure. In
appendix C.3.2 we present results using a binary response model to disentangle the defining
features of the import and output disruptions during this time.
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3.4 Structural Estimation of Cross Country Input Linkages
The relative movements of imported inputs and output of Japanese multinational firms
point to little substitutability of Japanese intermediate inputs. In this section we expand
our analysis by structurally estimating the production function of firms affected by the
To¯hoku shock. Unlike in the previous section, which used a set of instruments related to
the differential import share of intermediates coming from Japan, this estimation relies on
leveraging the high degree of exogenous variation in Japanese inputs coming from the To¯hoku
event, while also fully specifying the production function under study. This estimation
serves multiple purposes. First, it is reassuring to find elasticities that are consistent with
the heuristic evidence implied by our reduced-form results, when imposing a conventional
production function framework. Second, by imposing additional structure, we are able to
distinguish two elasticities: one between Japanese material inputs and other material inputs,
and another between an aggregate bundle of material inputs and domestic capital and labor.
Finally, by using an estimation procedure not relying on a control group we can obtain
separate estimates for Japanese and non-Japanese firms. The results corroborate the claim
that the supply chains of Japanese and non-Japanese exhibit different degrees of rigidity.
The estimation procedure will utilize information from two distinct periods: the six
months preceding and the six months following the March 11 event. The pre-period, which
we denote by τ − 1, yields information on the production function of the firm under profit-
maximizing conditions. In the post-period, denoted τ , we do not impose that the firm is
optimizing over its input use, due to the fact that shipments from Japan are to some extent
beyond the control of the firm.
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3.4.1 Framework
We assume that the firm’s technology in any period t is given by the nested CES aggregate
xi,t = φi
[
µ
1
ζ
i
(
Kαi,tL
1−α
i,t
) ζ−1
ζ + (1− µi)
1
ζ M
ζ−1
ζ
i,t
] ζ
ζ−1
, (3.6)
where
Mi,t =
(
ν
1
ω
i
(
m−Ji,t
)ω−1
ω + (1− νi)
1
ω
(
mJi,t
)ω−1
ω
) ω
ω−1
. (3.7)
In this production function xi,t, Ki,t, and Li,t denote the output, capital, and labor of firm
i. The variable Mi,t denotes an aggregate of intermediate inputs consisting of materials
sourced from Japan (mJi,t) and materials sourced from all places other than Japan (m
−J
i,t ),
including domestic materials. We are interested in estimating ω and ζ, which parameterize
the substitutability between Japanese and non-Japanese materials and that between the
capital-labor aggregate and the aggregate of intermediate inputs. The parameters µi and νi
are firm-specific weights and φi parameterizes the firm’s productivity, all of which we assume
are constant over the short time horizon we consider. Further, we assume that the firm is
monopolistically competitive and faces a CES demand function
pxi,t =
(
Yi,t
xi,t
) 1
ε
. (3.8)
As usual, Yi,t is the bundle used or consumed downstream and serves as a demand shifter
beyond the control of the firm.
3.4.1.1 Pre-Tsunami period
Period τ corresponds to the period April-September 2011, and τ−1 the period September
2010 - February 2011. We exclude the month of March 2011. In period τ−1 the firm operates
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in a standard environment, choosing capital, labor, and materials so as to maximize
pxi,τ−1xi,τ−1 − wτ−1Li,τ−1 −Rτ−1Ki,τ−1 − p−Ji,τ−1m−Ji,τ−1 − pJi,τ−1mJi,τ−1
subject to (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8). The firm takes all factor prices as given. Material prices
pJi,τ−1 and p
−J
i,τ−1 are firm-specific to indicate that different firms use different materials.
It is straightforward to show that this optimization problem implies
Ki,τ−1 =
α
1− α
wτ−1Li,τ−1
Rτ−1
, (3.9)
νi =
(
p−Ji,τ−1
)ω
m−Ji,τ−1(
pJi,τ−1
)ω
mJi,τ−1 +
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p−Ji,τ−1
)ω
m−Ji,τ−1
, (3.10)
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where
PMi,τ−1 =
[
νi
(
p−Ji,τ−1
)1−ω
+ (1− νi)
(
pJi,τ−1
)1−ω] 11−ω
.
We will use these relationships in the structural estimation that follows below.
3.4.1.2 Post-Tsunami period
At the beginning of period τ many firms’ production processes in Japan are disrupted.
Obtaining the desired amount of shipments of materials from Japan may either be pro-
hibitively expensive or simply impossible. Modeling firm behavior in this environment
therefore requires modifications to the previous setup. One possibility is to assume that
the quantity of materials that firms obtain from Japan is exogenous and that firms freely
choose non-Japanese materials, capital and labor. This option is unattractive for two rea-
sons. First, due to existing contracts it is unlikely that a firm is able to adjust the quantities
104
of non-Japanese materials, capital, and labor without costs in such a short time frame. One
remedy would be to add adjustment costs to the model. Although straightforward, this ap-
proach would require us to estimate additional parameters. Second, and more importantly,
the materials sourced from Japan (mJi,t) may not be exogenous for every firm. Some suppliers
in Japan may have been unaffected by the earthquake and tsunami such that materials could
be shipped as desired. Hence, using this approach would require us to distinguish between
firms whose supply chains are disrupted and those whose are not. That is, we would have
to classify firms based on an endogenous outcome.
For these reasons we prefer an alternative approach, namely to estimate the production
function without specifying the full optimization problem. We only assume that in period
τ , firms operate the same technologies given by (3.6) and (3.7), and that no firm adjusts its
capital stock such that Ki,τ = Ki,τ−1. Conditional on knowing the time-invariant features of
the production function (φi, µi, νi), we next describe an estimation procedure that allows us
to find the elasticity parameters most consistent with the observed input choices and output
evident in the data.
3.4.2 Estimation
Recall that we use North American exports as a proxy for a firm’s output pxi,txi,t, with
the underlying assumption that the former is proportional to the latter. We continue here
in the same spirit, though we now make this assumption explicit. Let V NAi,t be the value of
North American exports at time t and define
κi =
V NAi,τ−1
pxi,τ−1xi,τ−1
. (3.12)
In words, κi is the fraction of firm i’s shipments exported to Canada and Mexico in the six
months preceding the tsunami. We next make two assumptions that allow us to construct
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an estimation equation. First, we assume that a relationship analogous to (3.12) continues
to hold in period τ , except for a log-additive error ui,τ . That is,
lnV NAi,τ = lnκip
x
i,τxi,τ + ui,τ . (3.13)
The second assumption is that E [ui,τ |Xi] = 0 where Xi is a vector of all right-hand-side
variables. Setting the conditional mean of ui,τ to zero is a standard exogeneity assumption
requiring that, loosely speaking, the error is uncorrelated with all right-hand-side variables.
It rules out, for example, that in response to a fall in Japanese intermediate imports firms
export a fraction of their shipments to Canada and Mexico that systematically differs from κi.
We provide evidence in section 3.5.3.1 that demonstrates that this is a reasonable assumption.
Using equation (3.6) we can rewrite (3.13) as
ln
(
V NAi,τ
)
= ln (κiφi) + ln
(
pxi,τ
[
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1
ζ
i
(
Kαi,τL
1−α
i,τ
) ζ−1
ζ + (1− µi)
1
ζ (Mi,τ )
ζ−1
ζ
] ζ
ζ−1
)
+ui,τ . (3.14)
Values for νi and µi are obtained from equations (3.10) and (3.11).
17 Using (3.12), the
intercept can be constructed from the previous period
κiφi =
V NAi,τ−1
pxi,τ−1
[
µ
1
ζ
i
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Kαi,τ−1L
1−α
i,τ−1
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ζ + (1− µi)
1
ζ (Mi,τ−1)
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ζ
] ζ
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.
Notice that κi and φi are not separately identified. Under standard assumptions, we can
consistently estimate equation (3.14) using, e.g., nonlinear least squares. The only parame-
ters to calibrate are the rental rate of capital Rτ and the capital share in the capital/labor
aggregate α. We estimate the two elasticities, ζ and ω. Notice that ω appears in the interme-
diate aggregate Mi,τ as shown in equation (3.7). The estimates (ζˆ, ωˆ) solve min{ζ,ω}
N∑
i=1
(ui,τ )
2.
17After constructing µi according to equation (3.11) we average by industry to reduce the level of noise.
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Why do we restrict the sample to the year surrounding the To¯hoku event? To understand
this, recall that the principal difficulty of estimating production functions lies in unobserved
inputs and productivity. Since both are unobserved by the econometrician, they are absorbed
into the error term. However, because they are known to the firm, other input choices depend
on them. Hence, right-hand-side variables and the error term will generally be correlated,
rendering estimates inconsistent.18
By restricting the sample period to a single year, the assumption of constant firm pro-
ductivity seems appropriate. If productivity is constant, it cannot be correlated with the
error term, thereby ruling out one of the concerns.19 The fact that the To¯hoku event was an
unexpected shock negates much of the concern about endogeneity arising from unobserved
inputs. To see why, consider the case when the firm anticipates a supply chain disruption
in a future period. Firm adjustment of unobserved inputs in expectation of this shock will
impact input choices – leading to an endogeneity problem where inputs are correlated with
the shock. Put simply, the unexpected nature of the To¯hoku event works towards equalizing
the information sets between the econometrician and the firm because factor choices are not
affected prior to the shock being realized.20
Before turning to the data we briefly discuss the intuition of parameter identification.
Unlike other approaches to estimating elasticities of substitution (e.g. Feenstra et al. (2014)),
our method does not rely on the response of relative values to a change in relative prices.21
In fact, in an econometric sense, our approach treats all inputs as independent variables.
A simple example illustrates how the parameters are identified. Consider the production
18This problem is discussed in greater detail in, for example, Ackerberg et al. (2006).
19Of course, the size and exogeneity of the shock also helps with this concern: any idiosyncratic produc-
tivity movements during this time are surely subsumed by the earthquake/tsunami.
20An unobserved input that could remain operative in our case is that of factor utilization. Since the
scope for substantial adjustment along this dimension seems quite limited, we remain confident that our
estimates would be robust to the inclusion of this missing ingredient.
21Given that we observe little systematic variation in prices (see section 3.5.3.4), we believe that our
approach is more appropriate in this setting.
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function (3.6) and suppose that, for a particular firm, the initial period yields a value of
(1− µ) = 0.4. The elasticity ζ determines how deviations from this measure of the optimal
input mix between the intermediate aggregate Mi,τ and the capital labor aggregate translate
into measured output. Thus, if we observe comparatively fewer intermediates Mi,τ , reflecting
a different mix of inputs than that given by 0.4, we obtain an elasticity estimate for ζ that
best matches the response in output. Because the estimates for µ, ν, and κiφi are themselves
functions of the elasticities, this procedure must iterate across the parameter space to find
the estimate most consistent with the data. Similar reasoning applies for the identification of
the ω elasticity based on relative movements in Japanese materials, non-Japanese materials,
and output. The estimates we obtain are the best fit across the firms in each sample.
3.4.3 Connecting Model and Data
Estimation of the model requires data on employment, Japanese and non-Japanese ma-
terial inputs, as well as on exports to North America and output prices for periods τ − 1
and τ . Since data on firm-specific capital stocks are hard to obtain and likely noisy, we use
equation (3.9) to construct it from firm payroll and a semi-annual rental rate of 7 percent
for period τ − 1.22 Recall that the capital stock is not adjusted over this time horizon so
that Ki,τ = Ki,τ−1. The parameter α is calibrated to 1/3.23
Quarterly employment information comes from the Business Register, which we adjust
to reflect the average value over the 6 month periods we study, as they do not align with
the quarters defined within a calendar year.24 As discussed in earlier sections, the LFTTD
contains firm-level data of Japanese imports and North American exports. For non-Japanese
22This comes from assuming a real interest rate of 4 percent, combined with an annual depreciation rate
of 10 percent, and then adjusting for a semi-annual frequency. The estimates are insensitive to alternative
values of the rental rate.
23In principle it is possible to construct a firm-specific value for α, using value-added information available
in a census year. We are currently exploring the feasibility of this option.
24Specifically: Lτ−1 = 16Emp2010Q3 +
1
2Emp2010Q4 +
1
3Emp2011Q1 and Lτ =
1
2Emp2011Q2 +
1
2Emp2011Q3.
108
material inputs, we would ideally combine the non-Japanese imported materials with infor-
mation on domestic material usage for these firms. As information on domestic material
inputs is not available in Census data at this frequency, we utilize information on the to-
tal material expenditures from the Census of Manufacturers (CM) to construct a firm-level
scaling factor to gross up non-Japanese intermediate imports. Put differently, we impute
non-Japanese material inputs from non-Japanese input imports. For each firm, we construct
the scaling factor as
PMi Mi − pJimJi
p−Ji m
−J
i
(3.15)
from the latest CM year. Because the closest available CM year is 2007 in our data, there
is some concern about missing or outdated information for this factor. We mitigate this
by using industry-specific means for missing values, and winsorizing large outliers at the
90th/10th percentiles.
Regarding information on prices, the LFTTD records the value and quantity of each
trade transaction (at the HS10 level), and thus it is possible to construct the associated
price, or “unit-value” of each shipment directly.25 Aggregating up these shipments into a
firm-month observation is complicated, of course, by the differing quantity units. Lacking
any better alternative, we simply average the transaction prices using the dollar value of
each transaction as weights.
Finally, we restrict the sample of firms to those that have regular imports from Japan and
non-Japan over the periods we study, as well as regular North American exports.26 While
this substantially limits the number of firms in each sample, the shares of trade represented
by these firms in each category remains very high (see Table 3.3).
We obtain standard errors using bootstrap methods, which also allow us to account for the
25Those transactions with missing or imputed quantity information are dropped. Future efforts will
evaluate whether it is possible to recover the quantity values from prior transaction details.
26Specifically, we drop any firm that has more than 3 months of zeros for any of these values, over the
period τ − 1 or the period τ .
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uncertainty implied by the imputation of non-Japanese material inputs. We draw randomly
with replacement from our set of firms to construct 5000 different bootstrap samples. For
each of these samples, the non-Japanese materials share is imputed as described above before
the estimation proceeds.
3.4.4 Summary of Results
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 3.3. The elasticity between material
inputs for Japanese affiliates is 0.2, while the elasticity between the aggregate material input
and capital/labor is 0.03. Together, these estimates are indeed consistent with the reduced-
form evidence for the (ψ) elasticity from section 3.3.2. The relative magnitudes are also
intuitive: while Japanese imported inputs are strong complements with other material inputs
— consistent with the high share of intra-firm transactions comprising this trade — there is
even less scope for substitution between material inputs and domestic capital/labor.
The estimation procedure also allows us to estimate these elasticities for two samples of
non-Japanese firms: non-Japanese multinationals and non-multinational firms. While the
estimates for the ζ elasticity are indeed very close for these other samples, the elasticity
estimates corresponding to material inputs are higher, at 0.6 and 0.4 respectively. The lower
share of intra-firm imports from Japan for the non-Japanese multinationals aligns with the
argument that this type of trade is the key source of non-substitutability in the short-run.
On the other hand, the low estimates for non-multinational firms, which have essentially
zero intra-firm imports, may point to other mechanisms at work beyond the role of intra-
firm trade. More generally, however, the estimates for these parameters are all significantly
lower than what is commonly assumed (typically unity or higher) in the literature.
Although the number of firms included in this estimation is small (550 firms in total
across the three subgroups) , they account for a large share of economic activity in the
United States. Looking at their combined share of total trade, these firms account for over
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80% of Japanese intermediate imports, 68% of non-Japanese intermediate imports, and well
over 50% of North American exports. Such high concentration of trade among relatively few
firms is consistent with other studies using this data (see Bernard et al. (2007)).
3.5 Discussion
The structural estimates of the model are broadly in agreement with the evidence in
section 3.3.2: imported inputs are strong complements with other inputs in the production
function. The rigidity of the production function for multinational firms in particular is likely
due to i) the high degree of intra-firm trade in what is presumably highly specialized inputs,
and ii) .27 Our results have a number of important implications for how economists should
think about multinational firms in general, as well as aggregate topics such as volatility and
business cycle co-movement.
3.5.1 Aggregation
Before relating our estimates to macroeconomic topics, it is important to discuss aggre-
gation. Indeed, in any study utilizing micro-level estimates to inform macro-level objects
of interest, the details of aggregation and heterogeneity are of critical importance. Work
by Imbs and Me´jean (2011) argues that imposing homogeneity across sectors when estimat-
ing consumption elasticities can be overly restrictive, creating a heterogeneity bias which
can be quantitatively large. In our case one could discuss aggregation along various dimen-
sions: across products, industries, firms, and so on. We examine the effects of product-level
aggregation in section 3.5.3.3 below.
A primary concern is how to translate the results from the firm-level subsamples into
estimates that would pertain to macro-oriented models. As a first step, the final column
27The vertical integration of production across countries, within the firm, has shown to be a key driver
of the decline in joint ventures (see Desai et al. (2004)).
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in Table 3.3 shows the elasticity estimates when aggregating across all firms in the sample.
The results are consistent with the estimates by subgroup, suggesting substantial comple-
mentarities across inputs. All estimates in Table 3.3, however, correspond to the average
across firms in each group, and do not take into account heterogeneity in firm size within
the groups. It is relatively straightforward to modify our estimation procedure to weight
firms according to their relative size.28 We report the results from this modified estimation
in Panel B of Table 3.4. When comparing the results to those in Table 3.3, it is evident
that the weighted estimates are not substantially different than the unweighted estimates.
Although the samples of firms comprising these estimates do not amount to the total manu-
facturing sector of the United States, they do account for the considerable majority of U.S.
trade.
3.5.2 Implications
The rigid production networks of foreign-owned multinationals will have direct conse-
quences on the destination (host) economy. Previous literature has hypothesized that input
linkages could generate business-cycle comovement, but supportive empirical evidence has
been difficult to find. This paper can be seen as a first step in establishing empirical evidence
for a causal relationship between trade, multinational firms, and business cycle comovement.
In a companion paper (Boehm et al. (2014)), we evaluate the quantitative importance of such
complementarities of imported inputs by multinational affiliates. When separately account-
ing for intermediate input trade by multinationals and traditional trade in final goods, the
model distinguishes between the production elasticity of imported inputs and the traditional
“Armington” elasticity used to bundle together international goods for consumption. The
complementarities in import linkages by multinationals increases value-added comovement
28Since the appropriate measure of size in our context is output, we follow our convention and use the
relative amounts of North American exports in the period before the shock as the weights.
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in the model by 11 percentage points relative to a benchmark without such firms.
This model shares similarities with several other existing models, particularly Burstein
et al. (2008). A key advantage of Boehm et al. (2014), however, is a tight link to Census data
for matching other features of multinationals and trade. Johnson (2014) also looks at the role
of vertical linkages on comovement, but applies greater input-output structure on the model.
Such features will generate increases in value-added comovement in his model, the magni-
tude of which becomes significant only when the elasticity of substitution among inputs is
sufficiently low. Other work also identifies multinationals as a key source of the transmission
of shocks: Cravino and Levchenko (2014) demonstrates that foreign multinational affiliates
can account for about 10 percent of aggregate productivity shocks.29
The low value for ω indicates the presence of spillovers beyond the immediate effect from
Japan. That is, imports from non-Japanese locations are lower as a result of the shock in
Japan30, and we would presume this applies to suppliers within the United States as well.
Specifically, upstream suppliers (in countries other than Japan as well as within the U.S.)
were affected indirectly due to the exposure of Japanese affiliates to the shock combined with
the rigidity of their production with respect to those inputs. Downstream suppliers that rely
on the inputs from the disrupted firms would likewise be adversely affected. The presence
of such spillovers combined with the large network of input linkages can indeed magnify the
total effect of the transmission of the shock to the U.S. market. Such effects are also evident
in a related paper, Carvalho et al. (2014), which finds large spillovers in both upstream and
downstream firms in Japan following the 2011 earthquake.
Another branch of literature on the diversification of risk has studied whether firms using
complex production structures with several intermediates could be less volatile (Koren and
29Of course, shocks can be passed through to affiliates through other means as well. See Peek and
Rosengren (1997) and Peek and Rosengren (2000) for the case of U.S. affiliates from Japan.
30To confirm this, see Figure ??, which replicates the results in Figures 3.6 (Panel A) and 3.7, but only
for non-Japanese imports.
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Tenreyro (2013)). Kurz and Senses (2013) establish that firms with substantial imports
and exports have lower employment volatility than domestic firms in the medium to long
term, which they attribute partly to the diversification of risk.31 The key result in this
paper points to a possibly overlooked fact: the extent of the benefits from diversification
depends heavily on the substitutability of inputs. Conditional on a given number of inputs
used in production, a firm will likely experience greater volatility if each input is key to
the production process and inputs are subject to heterogeneous shocks.32 Conceptually, an
increase in the use of imported inputs should not be viewed necessarily as diversification. A
fragmentation of production can lead to an increased supply chain risk that is an important
counterweight to whatever efficiencies such complex input sourcing might afford, particularly
when the production elasticities are low.
The rigid production networks of multinational firms also influences our understanding
of why firms segment production across country borders. In a related paper, Flaaen (2013a)
shows that despite the presence of substantial and complex import linkages with the source
country (consistent with a vertical framework of FDI), the motive for multinational produc-
tion appears to be to serve the domestic market (consistent with the horizontal framework of
FDI). The result could be called “horizontal FDI with production sharing.”33 The evidence
for strong complementarities in this production sharing, however, presents a puzzle. Why
does the firm replicate only select portions of the supply chain, considering the penalties for
disruptions and mismatched inputs are so great? It is perhaps the case that the segments of
the production chain that remain in the source country have a location-specific component
31An interesting result from Kurz and Senses (2013) is that firms that only import are actually more
volatile than the domestic-only benchmark.
32Pravin and Levchenko (2014) outline theoretical results showing that for a given elasticity value (in
their case, Leontief), volatility in output per worker should be actually decreasing in the number of inputs
used.
33Ramondo et al. (2014) is another recent example arguing for a more nuanced interpretation of multina-
tional production.
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that is not easily transferable when the firm moves production abroad.34 Understanding the
dynamics behind these sourcing decisions is an area in need of further research.35
3.5.3 Robustness and Extensions
3.5.3.1 Mis-measurement of Firm Production
A natural concern with our analysis is the use of N.A. exports as a proxy for firm-level
production. Perhaps it is the case that shipments abroad fall disproportionately more than
domestic shipments following a shock to production. If this were the case, the N.A. exports
would indeed be a poor proxy for production, and its usefulness in evaluating a production
elasticity substantially compromised.
To evaluate this concern, we narrow our study to the automotive sector, which has data
on production, sales, and inventory at a monthly frequency. Using the Ward’s electronic
databank, which reproduces the published series in the annual Automotive Yearbook, we
obtain plant-level information on production, and model-line information on inventory, sales,
and incentives.36 The baseline specification is the same as in equation (3.5), where the
dependent variable is now Qjit: production of plant j of firm i in month t. The Japanese
multinational firms are, in this case, those automakers with plants located within North
America but whose parent company is headquartered in Japan.37
Figure 3.8 shows the results, where we once again divide by pre-shock levels to gain a
sense of the percentage effects of these changes. Relative to their U.S. counterparts, Japanese
automakers in the United States experienced large drops in production following the To¯hoku
34The model of knowledge sharing in Keller and Yeaple (2013) is one attempt to analyze the dynamics
between such transfers being accomplished in embodied (intra-firm trade) or disembodied (direct commu-
nication) form. Alternatively, domestic content requirements may provide incentives to produce specified
inputs in one location over another.
35For a recent example of how such investment and sourcing decisions can alter a country’s comparative
advantage over time, see Alviarez (2014).
36Appendix C.3.7 details further features of this data and explains how the sample was constructed.
37These firms are Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru.
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event. Production bottomed out in May of 2011 — two months after the event — at almost
60 percent below trend. 38 The point estimates return to a level near zero in September
of 2011, implying that the shock affected production for nearly 6 months.39 We interpret
these results to be largely supportive of the results obtained using the exports-based proxy
for production. The percentage drops in the two series are remarkably similar: a trough of
59% at t = 2 in the automotive data vs 53% at t = 2 using the proxy. We conclude that,
at least for this exercise, the proxy appears to be providing valuable information on a firm’s
U.S. production behavior.40
3.5.3.2 Intermediate Input Inventories
Inventories are another obvious feature that should influence the relationship between
input shipments, production, and the elasticity of substitution. In particular, inventories of
intermediate inputs allow the firm to absorb unforeseen shocks to input deliveries without
an impact on the production process.41 As it relates to the production elasticity, however,
the presence of these inventories should serve to diminish or delay the production impact,
thereby increasing the elasticity relative to what it would be without such inventories.
In fact, it is striking the extent to which we do not see any evidence for the role of
38The average monthly plant-level production at these firms during December 2010 through February
2011 was about 12,200 units a month. The magnitude of the drop in May was -7200 units.
39We describe additional results on the behavior of inventories, sales, incentives, and production in Japan
in an appendix.
40In addition, one might be concerned that the N.A. exports series may be contaminated with Japanese
imports whose country of ultimate destination is Canada/Mexico (a.k.a “in-transit shipments” – imports to
Canada/Mexico via U.S.). These shipments should not be picked up in the reporting systems underlying
the LFTTD. According to section 30.2(d)(1) of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, “In-transit shipments
of goods from one foreign country to another where such goods do not enter the consumption channels
of the United States are excluded from filing the Electronic Export Information (EEI).” Additionally, the
Army Corps of Engineers has suspended the requirement to file the Form 7513, Shippers Export Declaration
(SED) for In-transit Goods leaving the United States via vessel. Finally, the corroborating results from
section 3.5.3.1 should also serve to allay such concerns.
41The existence of final good inventories, on the other hand, makes a distinction between the production
and sales of a particular product. Here, the presence of final good inventories implies that the firm can
continue to sell from existing inventory stocks even while production is temporarily affected.
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intermediate input inventories in the production impacts of Figure 3.6 (Panel B) or Figure
3.8. The effect on production appears to be almost immediate, indicating that the stock of
inventories of imported intermediates is low (less than one month’s supply) for these firms.
We obtain a rough sense of the degree of inventory holdings from the Census of Man-
ufacturers micro-data. Combining information on the beginning period stock of materials
inventories with the annual usage of materials, we calculate the average monthly supply of
inventories for each firm.42 Panel A of Table 3.1 calculates the production-weighted averages
over a select set of firm groups.43 We see that on average, Japanese multinationals hold a
little over 3-weeks supply of intermediate inputs as inventory. This is slightly less than non-
multinational firms, a fact that aligns with the oft-cited “lean” production processes made
famous by Japanese firms in previous decades. Though these data are for the year 2007,
there is little reason to believe these relative magnitudes have changed substantially over a
period of a few years. For completeness, Panel A of Table 3.1 also reports the corresponding
estimates for output inventories.44
Low inventory holdings combined with an inelastic production function suggests that
firms are willing to tolerate some degree of expected volatility in their production. Either
the costs of holding inventories or diversifying sources of supply are sufficiently high, or firms
believe the probability of disruption is low. In either case, these lean production strategies
carry a greater potential for the propagation of shocks across countries, perhaps affecting
firms with limited knowledge of their indirect exposure through complicated production
chains.
42Unfortunately, the CM data does not report imported materials inventory separately.
43These numbers are broadly similar, though somewhat lower than other estimates in the literature. See
Ramey (1989) for one example.
44At first glance, the average monthly supply of these output inventories looks surprisingly low. On the
other hand, it is probably the case that inventories are held jointly by the manufacturer and wholesale/retail
establishments Thus, considering the inventories of manufacturers alone could potentially under-represent
the “true” level of output inventories available for smoothing out production disturbances.
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3.5.3.3 Multi-Products and Sub-Optimal Mix
In the frameworks used in sections 3.3.1 and 3.4, we consider the aggregate bundles of
imported intermediates, abstracting away from product-level detail. In reality, the firms
in our dataset often import many distinct intermediate inputs from Japan. The structure
of a CES production function implies that if each of these within-country inputs was non-
substitutable with one another (a further, nested Leontief structure), the production impact
of a disruption in the supply of just one input could be amplified relative to the value of that
input.45 We evaluate this possibility below.
This is particularly true given the heterogeneous impact of the To¯hoku event across
Japan (see Figure 3.4). This could translate into considerable dispersion in the impact on
the products imported by a particular U.S. firm or Japanese affiliate. With product-level
shocks, considering the effect on the aggregate import bundle amounts to assuming either
1) perfect substitutability among products, or 2) that the firm maintains an optimal within-
country product mix at all times.
To be concrete, it may be more accurate to view the Mt in equation (3.1) as a further
C.E.S. function of multiple products. Thus, we can define the proper measurement of this
variable as
V Mi,t = P
M
i,t
(
N∑
n=1
η
1
χ
n (m
J
n,i,t)
χ−1
χ
) χ
χ−1
, (3.16)
where now V Mi,t is the value based on a combination of N distinct products, with weights ηn
and elasticity χ.
Product-level heterogeneity in the production impact of the shock combined with im-
perfect coordination among input suppliers implies that the aggregate (measured) import
bundle for a particular firm may turn out to be suboptimal. In this case, we are measuring
V̂ Mi,t =
∑N
n=1(p
m
n,tmn,t) ≥ V Mi,t . And the lower the elasticity of substitution among products,
45This point has been made in somewhat differing contexts, by Kremer (1993) and Jones (2011).
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the more severe the disconnect between the measured imports and the “effective” imports
— that which is actually useful in downstream production.
A suboptimal product mix indicates that measured imports (V̂ Mi,t) are greater than the
effective imports (V Mi,t ). As a result the measured output response to the import shock will
be larger than otherwise, resulting in a downward “bias” in the elasticity estimates from
section 3.3.1 and 3.4.46 Such an effect is decreasing in the product-level elasticity parameter
χ, as complementarity itself is the driving force between differences in V̂ Mi,t and V
M
i,t . In
addition, the effect is also increasing in the degree of deviation from the optimal product
mix.
Does this exert a quantitatively large effect on our point estimates? Given the emphasis
on low inventories and lean production processes in downstream operations, one might expect
that across-product adjustment would take place before sending the inputs abroad. To
analyze this empirically, we analyze whether there are significant deviations in the product
composition of Japanese imports during the months following the To¯hoku event. To do this,
we construct a measure of the distance of a firm’s import bundle from a benchmark, which
we will interpret to be the optimal bundle. Let t = s∗ be such a benchmark date. Then,
using the product-level information in the LFTTD data we construct for each firm i, the
share of total imports from Japan for a given product code n. Defining this share to be sn,i,t,
we then construct the average product-level distance from optimum DOi,t as:
DOi,t =
1
N i
N i∑
n=1
(|sn,i,t − sn,i,s∗|) (3.17)
where N i is the total number of products imported by firm i. We define the period s∗
to be the months of April-June of 2010, and then evaluate DOi at a monthly frequency,
with particular interest in the months following the To¯hoku event. While there may be
46Because the source of this downward pressure on the estimate for ψ (or ω) is itself a very low product-
level elasticity, it is unclear whether this should be considered a bias in the traditional sense.
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natural movements in the bundle of products imported from Japan, evidence for substantial
coordination failure in product composition or heterogeneity in product-level shocks would
come from any abnormal jumps in this index in the months of the disruption. One can
calculate this at various levels of product aggregation (i.e. HS4, HS6, HS8, HS10), though
we report results using the HS6 level.47
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 3.9. We plot the average DOi across
Japanese firms for each month (the figure shows a 3-month moving average) during the
period 2009-2011. Mechanically, this measure should be relatively close to zero in the months
consisting of the benchmark (April-June 2010). While there is a secular rise in this measure
on either side of this benchmark period, there do not appear to be any large jumps in the
months directly following the To¯hoku event. More interesting, perhaps, are the considerably
larger values for this measure during early 2009, which might reflect the effects of the trade
collapse associated with the Great Recession. We interpret Figure 3.9 as evidence that the
potential for suboptimal mix across products from Japan does not pose a serious problem
to our measurement in previous sections.
3.5.3.4 Other Considerations
Strategic Behavior: Another possibility that could affect the interpretation of the re-
sults from Figure 3.7 might be strategic behavior, particularly on the part of the competitors
of Japanese firms in the United States. These firms could raise production or prices following
the negative supply shock affecting their competitors, which would serve to bias downward
the βp coefficients from the equation with X
NA
i,t as the dependent variable.
48 To evaluate this
47The level of aggregation we use attempts to balance concerns along two dimensions. With less product
aggregation (i.e. HS10 level), one might be concerned with the inherent lumpiness of product-level firm
imports. More product aggregation, on the other hand, could mask important product differences within a
particular product grouping.
48Specifically, in equation (3.5) the γp’s would be higher than would be expected without the shock, and
hence the βp’s artificially low.
120
possibility, we turn once again to the automotive data. Here, we can look directly at the
production of non-Japanese automakers in the months directly following the To¯hoku event.
Appendix Figure A1 plots the relative production of these firms, using time-series variation
only. There appears to be no quantitatively meaningful responses in the months following
March 2011. This should not come as a surprise given capacity constraints and utilization
adjustment costs, particularly given the short time horizon. We provide evidence on the role
of prices next.
Prices: Traditionally, estimating the elasticity of substitution is accomplished via price
and quantity data for products over extended periods of time. For the short horizon we
consider in this paper, there are several reasons why prices may not have the scope to ad-
just. Many supplier relationships negotiate prices for longer periods of time than one or
two months. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Table 3.2 demonstrates that the large
majority of imported intermediate inputs are intra-firm. The observed prices of these trans-
actions are transfer-prices (within firm) and not likely to change reflecting any short-term
disturbance. However, because the LFTTD contains both quantity and price information,
we can confirm whether or not prices remained relatively stable during this period. The
results in Appendix Table C.6 confirm that there are few significant price movements on im-
port or export transactions for either Japanese or non-Japanese multinationals surrounding
the To¯hoku event.49
Domestic Inputs: It is also possible to evaluate the response of domestic inputs di-
rectly, using the limited information we have on quarterly firm-level employment and payroll
information, taken from the Census Bureau’s Business Register (BR).50 We consider the
evidence in Appendix C.3.5 and find no significant effects on either employment or payroll
49Further details on the construction of the data underlying the analysis of unit values is available in
Appendix C.3.6.
50The BR itself receives quarterly payroll and employment information for business and organizational
employers from the IRS: Form 941, the Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return. For more information on
the BR (formerly the SSEL), see Walker (1997).
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for Japanese firms in the quarter(s) following the shock (see Table C.5). Of course, there are
a number of reasons — principally labor adjustment costs — why one would expect little, if
any, impacts on employment following this short-lived shock. Press releases dispatched by
the Japanese automakers during this time indicated that no layoffs would occur. Rather, the
firms indicated that they would use the production stoppages for employee skill and safety
training.
3.5.4 External Validity
Finally, we discuss the external validity of this result. The exogenous variation we use to
identify this elasticity is tied to a particular event in time, making generalization subject to
some caveats. On the other hand, there are few, if any, estimates of this parameter in the
existing literature. The critical question is whether the mechanisms underlying the elasticity
estimates are operative beyond the circumstances surrounding this event study.
The pattern of strong intermediate input linkages with the source country is not restricted
to Japanese affiliates only. As shown in Flaaen (2013b), over 45 percent of the imports for
all foreign multinational affiliates are sourced from the country of the parent firm. The cost
share of imported intermediates from the source country is 0.12 for all foreign affiliates, which
is lower than the 0.22 for Japanese affiliates but still much larger than the representative
importing firm in the United States. The cost share of all imported inputs is actually quite
close: 35 percent for Japanese affiliates vs 32 percent for all foreign affiliates.
A related concern is whether the estimates for Japanese affiliates are driven solely by
the automotive sector. The ideal check would be to run industry-by-industry subgroup es-
timates for the elasticities, thereby generating heterogeneity that could be assessed relative
to expectations. Unfortunately, the small number of firms applicable for this analysis, com-
bined with disclosure requirements associated with the Census Bureau data usage, prevents
this degree of detail. Instead, we address this concern by splitting the sample into a motor
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vehicle and non-motor vehicle subsample. We do this for the Japanese multinationals as well
as the total sample of all firms. The results for these four subsamples are reported in Panel
C of Table 3.4. Using the published data from the B.E.A., the automotive sector is a large
but not overwhelming percentage of total Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the U.S. The
entire motor vehicle sector as a whole comprises significantly less than half of value-added
(roughly 40 percent) for the Japanese manufacturing affiliates.
When viewed in light of the substantial fraction of intra-firm imports comprising multi-
national affiliate trade, the low elasticity of substitution should not come as a surprise. One
would not expect close substitutes for the sort of specialized products reflecting firm-specific
knowledge that likely comprises this trade. Moreover, such a low estimate for an elasticity of
this nature is not without precedent. Using different methodologies, recent work by Atalay
(2014) highlights strong complementarities between intermediate inputs, using industry-level
data for the United States.51
Any elasticity estimate is tied to the time-horizon to which it corresponds. Ruhl (2004)
emphasizes the difference between elasticities implied by responses to temporary vs perma-
nent shocks. Larger values are calculated for an elasticity following a permanent shock,
owing in part to firm responses along the extensive margin. In our context, we estimate the
elasticity subject to a short-lived shock where the structure of the supply chain is plausi-
bly fixed and extensive margin movements of supplier relationships would not apply. For
this reason the elasticity parameters (ω, ζ) should likely generalize to other contexts of this
horizon and for shocks of this general duration. Even for a long-lived shock, the estimated
elasticities would remain relevant while the firm makes changes to its network of suppliers.
Evaluating whether there is evidence for long-term supply-chain reorganization following the
To¯hoku event is an area of ongoing work.
51The point estimate for the elasticity of substitution among intermediate inputs from Atalay (2014) is
0.03.
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3.6 Conclusions
Using a novel firm-level dataset to analyze firm behavior surrounding a large exogenous
shock, this paper reveals the mechanisms underlying cross-country spillovers. We find com-
plementarities in the international production networks of Japanese affiliates, such that the
U.S. output of these firms declined dramatically following the To¯hoku earthquake, roughly
in line with an equally large decline in imported inputs. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween imported and domestic inputs that would best match this behavior is very low –
nearly that implied by a Leontief production function. The reliance on intra-firm imports by
multinational affiliates from their source country is the most plausible explanation for such
strong complementarities in production. Structural estimates of disaggregated elasticities
are similarly low, and imply spillovers to upstream and downstream firms in the U.S. and
abroad (non-Japan). The large impacts to Japanese affiliates together with the propagation
to other U.S. firms explains the large transmission of the shock to the U.S. economy in the
aggregate.
These elasticities play a critical role in the way international trade impacts both source
and destination economies. Such complementarities between domestic and foreign goods
have been shown to improve the ability of leading theoretical models to fit key moments
of the data. We emphasize here the distinction between substitutability between domestic
and foreign final goods (a “consumption” elasticity of substitution, or the so-called Arm-
ington elasticity) and substitutability between domestic and foreign intermediate goods (a
“production” elasticity of substitution). In a companion paper (Boehm et al. (2014)), we
document the behavior of a model with such complementarities in imported intermediates,
and discuss how these elasticity parameters interact. Calibrating this model to the share of
multinational affiliate trade in intermediates yields an increase in value-added comovement
of 11 p.p.
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Such rigid production networks will also play a substantial role in aggregate volatility,
productivity growth and dispersion, and the international ownership structure of production.
The novel datasets described in this paper may help to shed light on these and other areas
of research in the future.
125
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Imported Inputs and Inventories by Firm Type
Japanese Non
Multinationals Multinationals
Panel A: Avg. Monthly Supply of Inventories
Inputs 0.83 1.08
Output 0.31 0.45
Panel B: Cost Share Of Imported Inputs
from Japan 21.8 1.0
from all countries 35.0 17.5
Source: CM, LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text. The data
are for year 2007. This table reports the average monthly supply of in-
ventories [(usage/12)/beginning period inventory stock] for materials and
output, as well as the cost share of imported products.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Cost Share Of Imported Inputs
Japanese Non
Firms Multinationals
from Japan 21.8 1.0
from all countries 35.0 17.5
Panel B: Treatment Effects Sample Details
Japanese Other Balancing Tests % Reduct
Firms Multinationals t p > |t| |bias|
N.A. Exports 3,504,894 3,413,058 0.38 0.706 79.1
share intra-firm 72.0 52.2
Intermediate
Input
Imports
8,075,893 7,596,761 0.87 0.384 88
share from Japan 70.0 3.5
share intra-firm 86.0 21.7
Industry (Avg) – – 0.009 0.965 97.8
Source: LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
Panel A data are for year 2007. Panel B reports the baseline average values of N.A. exports and
intermediate input imports, as well as the characteristics of that trade, for the two groups of firms:
Japanese affiliates and other multinational firms. The statistics are calculated in the three months
prior to the To¯hoku earthquake: Dec. 2010, Jan. 2011, and Feb 2011. The control group of other
multinational firms has been re-weighted using the normalized propensity score, from a specification
including the level of N.A. exports, int imports, and industry dummies. The final three columns
report balancing tests of the equality of the means between the treated and control group.
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Table 3.3: Firm-Level Estimation: Results and Sample Details
Panel A: Calibration
Parameter Value
Rt 0.07
α 1/3
Panel B: Estimation Results
Japanese Non-Japanese Non- All
Multinationals Multinationals Multinationals Firms
ω 0.201 0.624 0.423 0.552
[0.02 0.43] [0.16 0.69] [0.26 0.58] [0.21 0.62 ]
ζ 0.032 0.038 0.032 0.037
[0.030 0.673] [0.035 0.508] [0.029 1.68] [0.034 0.038]
Sample Details
Weight on K/L
Aggregate (µ¯)
0.223 0.514 0.278 0.409
Weight on JPN
Materials (1− ν¯) 0.173 0.044 0.147 0.096
Number of Firms 105 304 141 550
Share of Total Trade
JPN int imports 0.60 0.23 0.03 0.86
Non-JPN int imports 0.02 0.66 0.01 0.69
N.A. exports 0.08 0.47 0.01 0.56
Source: CM, LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
This table reports the results from the firm-level estimation detailed in section 3.4. Panel A outlines the
parameters that are calibrated prior to estimation. The top two rows of Panel B reports the point estimates
of the elasticities, and the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals using a bootstrapping procedure.
(See Appendix C.3.3 for more details on the measurement of dispersion for these estimates.) Rows 3 and
4 report other estimates related to the calculated production functions. The final rows of Panel B describe
features of the estimation samples.
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Table 3.4: Firm-Level Estimation: Other Results
Panel A: Calibration
Parameter Value
Rt 0.07
α 1/3
Panel B: Estimation Results (Weighted)
Japanese Non-Japanese Non- All
Multinationals Multinationals Multinationals Firms
ω 0.157 0.611 0.543 0.606
[0.02 0.40] [0.30 1.23] [0.305 0.57] [0.28 0.70]
ζ 0.241 0.038 0.032 0.037
[0.03 0.884] [0.034 0.51] [0.029 0.55] [0.034 0.038 ]
Number of Firms 105 304 141 550
Panel C: Estimation Results: MV Sector
Japanese Mult. All Firms
Motor Non-Motor Motor Non-Motor
Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles
ω 0.311 0.094 0.414 0.574
[0.019 0.398] [0.016 0.59] [0.27 0.60] [0.16 0.66]
ζ 0.032 0.071 0.037 0.037
[0.030 0.48] [0.028 1.27] [0.031 0.64] [0.033 0.037]
Number of Firms 35 70 100 450
Source: CM, LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
This table reports additional estimation results. Panel B recalculates the results from Table 3.3 using a
vector of weights to assign larger firms a greater share in the estimation. Panel C divides the samples
based on the motor vehicle industry.
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Figure 3.1: Index of Japanese Industrial Production: Manufacturing Jul.2010 - Jan.2012
Source: Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI). The series are logged, HP-Filtered, after seasonally ad-
justing.
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Figure 3.2: U.S. Imports from Japan and Rest of World, Jul.2010 - Jan.2012
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (FT900: U.S. International Trade in
Goods and Services). The series are logged, HP-Filtered, after
seasonally adjusting.
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Figure 3.3: U.S. Industrial Production: Manufacturing and Durable Goods
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capac-
ity Utilization - G.17 Series . Series is Seasonally Adjusted.
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Figure 3.4: Geographic Distribution of Earthquake Intensity and Affiliate Locations
Source: USGS and DCA/Uniworld Directories
This figure plots the geographic distribution of the To¯hoku earthquake, based on recorded measure-
ments taken directly after the event. The “Modified Mercalli Intensity” (MMI) scale is constructed
based on a relation of survey response and measured peak acceleration and velocity amplitudes
from prior major seismic events. Each dot corresponds to a geocoded Japanese affiliate location
corresponding to a firm with U.S. operations. For more details, see Appendix C.2.3.2.
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Figure 3.5: Density of Firm-Level Exposure to Japanese Imported Inputs: By Firm Type
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text. The estimates correspond to year 2010. This figure
displays density estimates of the log exposure measure to Japanese imported inputs, separately for
Japanese affiliates and non-Japanese multinational firms. The measure is defined as the ratio of Japanese
imported inputs to total imported inputs plus U.S. salaries and wages. Estimates at either tail are
suppressed for confidentiality purposes.
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Figure 3.6: Dynamic Treatment Effects: Japanese Firms
A. Relative Intermediate Input Imports of Japanese Firms
B. Relative North American Exports of Japanese Firms
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the intermediate imports and North American exports of the U.S. affiliates of
Japanese firms relative to a control group of other multinational firms. The values are coefficient
estimates taken from an interaction of a Japanese-firm dummy with a monthly dummy – additional
baseline monthly dummies remove seasonal effects. See equation 3.5 in the text. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 3.7: Relative Imported Inputs and Output (Proxy) of Japanese Firms: Fraction of
Pre-Shock Level
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
This figure reports the intermediate imports and output proxy (North American exports) of the
U.S. affiliates of Japanese firms relative to a control group of other multinational firms. The values
are percent changes from the pre-shock level of each series, defined as the average of the months
December 2010, January 2011, and February 2011.
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Figure 3.8: Assessing the Output Proxy Using Monthly Automotive Production
Source: Ward’s Automotive Database
This figure reports the production levels of Japanese auto plants relative to a control group of
non-Japanese auto plants. The values are percent changes from a pre-shock level, defined as the
average of the months December 2010, January 2011, and February 2011. See equation C.14 in the
text. For purposes of comparison, we also include the equivalent measure corresponding to total
manufacturing of Japanese affiliates using the output proxy from Census data (from Figure 3.7).
The Japanese automakers are Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru. For the sake
of clarity, we suppress the standard errors for the automotive series, though there are 4 months
with below zero production based on a 95 percent confidence interval. See Appendix C.3.7 for more
details.
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Figure 3.9: Japanese Products: Average Distance from Benchmark Cost Shares: JPN Multi-
nationals
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explain in the text
Underlying this figure is the calculation of the average total (absolute) deviations
from a benchmark measure of a firm’s cost shares across input products from Japan.
See equation 3.17 in the text. The figure reports the mean across the Japanese
multinationals used in the section 3.4.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter 1 Appendices
A.1 Model appendix
A.1.1 Summary of equations
In this part of the Appendix I summarize the equations of the most general model with
adjustment costs and time-varying discount factor. qX,t and qZ,t denote the shadow values
of one unit of capital in the two sectors. To obtain the model in Section 1.2 set βt = β and
ζK = 0.
The household’s behavior is summarized the following equations:
λt = (1 + it)Et [βt+1λt+1] (A.1)
∂v (NZ,t, NX,t)
∂Nj,t
= λtWj,t, j ∈ {X,Z} (A.2)
∂u (Ct, DH,t)
∂Ct
= λtPZ,t (A.3)
qj,t = λtPZ,t
(
1 + ζK
(
Ij,t
Kj,t−1
− δK
))
, j ∈ {X,Z} (A.4)
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qj,t = Et
[
βt+1λt+1Rj,t+1 + βt+1λt+1Pj,t+1
ζK
2
((
Ij,t+1
Kj,t
)2
− (δK)2
)
+ βt+1 (1− δK) qj,t+1
]
, j ∈ {X,Z}
(A.5)
γt =
∂u (Ct, DH,t)
∂DH,t
+ (1− δD)Et [βt+1γt+1] . (A.6)
The accumulation equations (1.2) and equation (1.15) in the text continue to hold.
Firms’ reset their prices according to
p∗j,t =
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 (θj)
k λt+k
∏k
s=1 βt+s (Pj,t+k)
ε jt+kMCj,t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 (θj)
k λt+k
∏k
s=1 βt+s (Pj,t+k)
ε jt+k
, j ∈ {X,Z} (A.7)
and prices in both sectors evolve according to
Pj,t =
(
θj (Pj,t−1)
1−ε + (1− θj)
(
p∗j,t
)1−ε) 11−ε
, j ∈ {X,Z} . (A.8)
Nominal marginal costs in the two sectors are
MCX,t (s) =
(
PZ,t
1− χ
)1−χ(
RX,t
αχ
)χα(
WX,t
(1− α)χ
)χ(1−α)
, (A.9)
MCZ,t (s) =
(
RZ,t
α
)α(
WZ,t
1− α
)1−α
. (A.10)
The conditional factor demand functions are
MX,t =
(
PZ,t
1− χ
)−χ(
RX,t
αχ
)χα(
WX,t
(1− α)χ
)χ(1−α)
Xt, (A.11)
KX,t−1 =
(
PZ,t
1− χ
)1−χ(
RX,t
αχ
)χα−1(
WX,t
(1− α)χ
)χ(1−α)
Xt, (A.12)
NX,t =
(
PZ,t
1− χ
)1−χ(
RX,t
αχ
)χα(
WX,t
(1− α)χ
)χ(1−α)−1
Xt, (A.13)
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KZ,t−1 =
(
RZ,t
α
)α−1(
WZ,t
1− α
)1−α
Zt, (A.14)
NZ,t =
(
RZ,t
α
)α(
WZ,t
1− α
)−α
Zt. (A.15)
The market clearing condition in the Z sector with capital adjustment costs is
Zt = Ct+IX,t+IZ,t+MX,t+KX,t−1
ζK
2
(
IX,t
KX,t−1
− δK
)2
+KZ,t−1
ζK
2
(
IZ,t
KZ,t−1
− δK
)2
. (A.16)
Market clearing for the X sector, accounting, government spending, and the monetary policy
rule are as described in the text (equations 1.7 to 1.13).
A.1.2 Proofs of approximation results
In what follows the notation X˜t =
Xt−X
X
denotes the percentage deviation of variable
Xt from its steady state value. I prove the results for the case in which the fiscal policy
shock has no persistence, %X = 0, although they can be generalized to cases with mild
persistence. I assume that prior to the shock the economy is in the steady state. Notice that
the references in Appendix A.1.1 correspond to the baseline model in the text when there
are no adjustment costs, ζK = 0, and the discount factor β is constant.
A.1.2.1 Spending on durable goods
Approximation result 1. Suppose δK and δD are arbitrarily close to zero and β is arbi-
trarily close to 1. Then, for a short-lived increase in spending, it is approximately true that
(1) ∆XH,t ≈ −∆XG,t, (2) the price PX,t remains unchanged, (3) the sectoral multipliers for
gross output and value added are zero,
dGOX,t
dGX,t
≈ dV AX,t
dGX,t
≈ 0, and (4) the aggregate multiplier
is zero, dYt
dGX,t
≈ 0.
Proof I first show that these assumptions imply that the stocks KX,t, KZ,t and DH,t
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are approximately constant. The linear approximation of the accumulation equation for
durables (equation 1.2) is
D˜H,t = δDX˜H,t + (1− δD) D˜H,t−1
It then follows from the assumptions δD → 0 and D˜H,t−1 = 0 that D˜H,t ≈ 0. Similarly,
K˜X,t ≈ K˜Z,t ≈ 0.
The respective shadow values γt, qX,t, qZ,t are also approximately constant under these
assumptions. This can be seen using the linear approximation of equation (A.6),
γ˜t = −(1− (1− δD) β)
σD
D˜H,t +
(1− (1− δD) β)
σDC
C˜t + (1− δD) βEt [γ˜t+1]
Here, σD and σDC are constants. Clearly, under the assumptions δD → 0 and β → 1 it
follows that γ˜t ≈ Et [γ˜t+1]. Since this variable is stationary and returns to its steady state
value eventually it must be that γ˜t ≈ 0. Similarly, qX,t ≈ qZ,t ≈ 0.
I next guess that P˜X,t = 0. It then follows from equations (1.15) and (A.4) that λ˜t = 0
and P˜Z,t = 0. This guess, together with D˜H,t ≈ K˜X,t ≈ K˜Z,t ≈ 0 and the assumption that
%X = 0 implies that all state variables from period t + 1 onwards are zero. Hence all other
variables from period t+ 1 onwards are zero.
With these results in hand it is easy to show that
∆XH,t = −∆XG,t,
∆IX,t + ∆IZ,t = 0 and that no other variable at time t responds to the fiscal policy shock.
Notice that since neither of the prices adjust nor the quantities Xt, Zt or Yt change, the
monetary policy rule (1.13) implies that the nominal interest rate remains unchanged. The
claims on the multipliers now follow immediately.
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A.1.2.2 Spending on nondurable goods
Approximation result 2. Suppose δD = 1, δK is arbitrarily close to zero and β is arbitrarily
close to 1. Suppose further that θX = θZ = 0, that is, prices are fully flexible, and that
uCD = vXZ = 0. Lastly, assume that the government subsidizes monopolistic firms such that
PZMX
PXX
= 1− χ. Next, define
σD = − uD (C,DH)
DHuDD (C,DH)
and ηX =
vX (NZ , NX)
NXvXX (NZ , NX)
.
Then a short-lived increase in spending yields a gross output sectoral multiplier equal to
dGOX,t
dGX,t
≈
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1 − (α + η−1X )
σD
(
α + η−1X
)
XH
X
+
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1 − (α + η−1X )
and approximately equal sectoral value added and aggregate multipliers
dV AX,t
dGX,t
≈ dYt
dGX,t
≈ 1− α
σD
(
α + η−1X
)
XH
X
+
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1 − (α + η−1X ) .
The relative price PX,t/PZ,t rises in response to greater spending.
Proof Similar to the proof in A.1.2.1, the assumptions that β → 1 and δK → 0 implies
that K˜X,t ≈ K˜Z,t ≈ q˜Z,t ≈ q˜X,t ≈ 0. It then immediately follows from (A.4) that λ˜t = −P˜Z,t.
Additionally, equation (1.15) implies that γ˜t = P˜X,t − P˜Z,t, and (A.3) implies that C˜t = 0.
Using these relationships in the labor supply functions (A.2) yields
1
ηZ
N˜Z,t = W˜Z,t − P˜Z,t and 1
ηX
N˜X,t = W˜X,t − P˜Z,t.
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Additionally, the household’s demand for good X (equation A.6) becomes
P˜X,t − P˜Z,t = − 1
σD
X˜H,t (A.17)
With these results in hand, it is straightforward but tedious to show that Z˜t = 0 and
that
X˜t =
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1 − (α + η−1X )(
1− χα + (1− χ) η−1X
)
χ−1 +
(
α + η−1X
)
σD
XH
X
XG
X
X˜G,t
and
M˜X,t =
(
1 + η−1X
)
χ−1(
1− χα + (1− χ) η−1X
)
χ−1 +
(
α + η−1X
)
σD
XH
X
XG
X
X˜G,t
Recall the assumption that there is a subsidy that implies that PZMX
PXX
= 1 − χ. An ad-
valorem subsidy of 1
ε
on purchases of the intermediate is one way to ensure this relationship.
Using the definitions of gross output, value added, and GDP, and the fact that PZMX
PXX
= 1−χ
the results for the multipliers are now easily shown. Notice finally that P˜X,t − P˜Z,t rises as
X˜H,t falls (equation A.17).
A.1.3 Robustness of fiscal multipliers to alternative calibrations
In this part of the appendix I check the robustness of the fiscal multipliers to alternative
calibrations. The first three rows in Table A.1 illustrate the role of capital adjustment costs.
Whereas neither gross output nor value added sectoral multipliers change substantially with
adjustment costs, aggregate multipliers do. Higher adjustment costs imply less crowding
out of investment through purchases of intermediates. When adjustment costs are high,
aggregate multipliers are quite close to the gross output multipliers.
I next relax the assumption that labor is immobile across sectors. Specifically, I assume
that
v (NX,t, NZ,t) =
(
1 +
1
η
)−1 [(
φ (NZ,t)
η+µ
η + (1− φ) (NX,t)
η+µ
η
) η
η+µ
](1+ 1η )
,
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Here, η is the Frisch labor supply elasticity and µ parameterizes labor mobility across sectors.
If µ = 0, labor is perfectly mobile across sectors. If µ = 1, labor is completely immobile.
Intermediate values imply partial labor mobility.1
Since greater labor mobility raises the elasticity of both sectors’ supply curves, the sectoral
multipliers increase slightly. Of course, more workers in one sector imply fewer in the other
so the effect on the aggregate multiplier is small. In order to mimic severe slack in labor
markets in recessions, I also compute multipliers for a calibration with greater labor supply
elasticity (η = 2). This parameterization also implies more elastic sectoral supply curves but
now additional hires in one sector do not draw labor away from the other. As a result all
multipliers increase relative to the baseline.
An additional determinant of the short-run elasticity of supply curves are sticky prices.
If prices are sticky, as in the baseline calibration, a fraction of firms must serve increased
demand at fixed prices. When I assume that prices are flexible, the case θX = θZ = 0, it is
therefore unsurprising that multipliers fall. Naturally, this decline in multipliers relative to
the baseline calibration is larger in the more price sensitive durable goods sectors.
Next, I consider an alternative Taylor rule in which the monetary authority responds
stronger to both inflation and deviations of output from trend (φpi = 1.5, φY = 0.5/4).
As the open economy relative multiplier in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), sectoral multi-
pliers are less sensitive to alternative monetary policy rules than aggregate multipliers. Of
course, aggregate multipliers fall when the monetary authority “leans against the wind” with
increasing strength.
I next assume that the persistence of the government spending shock is higher and takes
a value of 0.90. This value corresponds to the persistence estimated in section 1.3.2.3 (
0.94·7 ≈ 0.05). Longer lived shocks raise the multipliers for durable goods and reduces those
for nondurables. Yet, the aggregate nondurables multiplier with a value of 0.70 remains more
1This specification is taken from Barsky et al. (2003).
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than twice the size of the durables multiplier which takes a value of 0.32. For the empirical
analysis in this paper, it is important that the industry-level multipliers also remain very
different.
Finally, I explore the impact on fiscal multipliers when DH and C are complements or
substitutes (the last two lines of Table A.1). The more complementary DH and C are, the
larger are the durable goods multipliers. However, the difference between nondurables and
durable’s multipliers remains large.
Across all calibrations, a good rule of thumb is that the aggregate multipliers lie between
sectoral value added and gross output multipliers. In the simple model presented here, this
rule suggests that the aggregate multiplier is between 0.1 and 0.35 for durable goods and
around 0.75 for nondurables goods.
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Table A.1: Multipliers for alternative calibrations
Small sector 15 year service life, δD = 0.017 Nondurable δD = 1
Sectoral multiplier Sectoral multiplier
Gross Value Aggregate Gross Value Aggregate
Calibration output added multiplier output added multiplier
Baseline
(baseline calibration) 0.22 0.08 0.21 0.88 0.30 0.76
High adjustment costs
ζK = 100 0.22 0.08 0.22 0.88 0.30 0.83
Low adjustment costs
ζK = 1 0.20 0.08 0.18 0.88 0.32 0.43
High labor mobility
µ = 0.5 0.25 0.10 0.23 0.90 0.35 0.75
High labor supply elasticity
η = 2 0.25 0.10 0.26 0.90 0.35 0.85
Flexible prices
θX = θZ = 0 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.75 0.26 0.60
More aggressive Taylor rule
φpi = 1.5, φY = 0.5/4 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.87 0.30 0.63
Greater shock persistence
%X = 0.90 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.86 0.30 0.70
DH and C complements
ρ = 0.5 0.33 0.11 0.29 0.93 0.32 0.76
DH and C substitutes
ρ = 2 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.79 0.27 0.75
Notes: The table reports the multipliers at a time horizon of one year after the shock as generated by the
model.
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A.1.4 Additional impulse response functions
Figure A.1: Impulse response functions for a government spending shock
Notes: The figure plots impulse response functions for various calibrations. The impulse is a 100
basis point increase of government spending in sector X relative to its steady state value.
A.2 Appendix for aggregate empirical analysis
A.2.1 Data used in aggregate analysis
The data are annual and come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP, the con-
sumption series and investment in current dollars are taken from Table 1.1.5 and the cor-
responding price indexes are taken from Table 1.1.4. For GX,t I use national defense gross
investment, and for GC,t I use national defense consumption expenditures. These series in
current dollars are obtained from Table 3.9.5 and the price indexes from Table 3.9.4. Note
that consumption expenditures include consumption of fixed capital. Additionally, roughly
5 to 10 percent of defense consumption expenditures are purchases of durable goods which
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cannot be separated out until 1972 because the Bureau of Economic Analysis begins to report
a detailed breakdown of military spending only in 1972, Table 3.11.5. Hence, a small compo-
nent of durable goods spending remains in the series GC,t. Valerie Ramey’s news series can be
downloaded from her website (http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~vramey/research.html#data).
I obtain the trend of GDP Y Tt using an HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 as
recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
A.2.2 Additional evidence from national accounts data
From 1972 onwards, the BEA provides a more detailed breakdown of military spending in
Table 3.11.5. This table contains time series of defense spending separately for services, non-
durable goods, durable goods, equipment, and structures, among others.2 I can use this data
to test whether spending on these five categories leads to crowding out in the corresponding
spending category for the private sector. To do so, I group services and nondurable goods
together into a nondurables group, denoted C, and durable goods, equipment and structures
into a durables group X. The data are now quarterly.
Let YP,i,t denote private sector spending on category i. I estimate the specification
YP,i,t − YP,i,t−1
Y TP,i,t−4
=
4∑
s=1
γX,s
GX,i,t−s+1 −GX,i,t−s
Y TP,i,t−4
+
4∑
s=1
γC,s
GC,i,t−s+1 −GC,i,t−s
Y TP,i,t−4
+ δt + ζi + εi,t.
(A.18)
This empirical model is closely related to equation (1.19), but adjusted for quarterly data.
Instead of Ramey’s news variable, I now include a time fixed effect, δt, which also soaks up
the common component of other shocks such as monetary and tax policy. ζi is a fixed effect
for each spending category. GX,i,t (GC,i,t) denotes defense spending on category i interacted
with a dummy variable that takes the value one if and only if industry i belongs to the
durables group (the nondurables group). The multipliers are simply
∑4
s=1 γj,s, j = C,X.
2The deflators are in Table 3.11.4.
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Table A.2: Estimates from disaggregated national accounts data
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Durable goods multiplier -1.12 -1.04 -1.17
(0.46) (0.47) (0.47)
Nondurable goods multiplier 3.99 4.34 4.32
(2.88) (2.86) (2.94)
Controls in addition to
those in equation (A.18)
none interest rate
interacted with
category dummy
Ramey news variable
interacted with
category dummy
Observations 845 845 845
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A.2 shows the results. In the baseline specification, column (1), the point esti-
mate is -1.12, suggesting that one dollar of spending in a durables category (durable goods,
equipment, and structures) crowds out 1.12 dollars of private sector spending. The estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. In contrast, the estimate for non-
durable goods is positive and insignificantly different from zero. Unfortunately, the standard
errors are fairly large.
In columns (2) and (3) of the table I report two estimates from specifications that include
additional control variables. Column (2) reports the estimates when I include the real interest
rate interacted with a category dummy. This control variable would allow monetary policy
to affect the spending categories differently. The results in column (3) are obtained when I
additionally control for Ramey’s news variable interacted with category dummies. As can be
seen from the table, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these additional controls.
Although I do not report the estimates here, the findings are also robust to the inclusion of
additional lags in specification (A.18) so that the time horizon over which the multipliers
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are computed is greater than four quarters.
A.3 Appendix for industry-level empirical analysis
A.3.1 Industry-level data
A.3.1.1 Original data sources for sectoral analysis
The NBER-CES manufacturing database can be downloaded from http://www.nber.
org/nberces/. This page also provides summary statistics of the dataset and a documenta-
tion. As noted in the text, a detailed description of the database is provided by Bartelsman
and Gray (1996) and Becker et al. (2013).
The military prime contract files were downloaded from the U.S. National Archives,
https://research.archives.gov/. After entering the website, search for the key words
“military prime contracts” and “defense contract action data system”. There is a separate
set of files, i.e. the dataset and documentation, for each fiscal year from 1966 to 2003. There
is also a separate file for the 3-month period between the old and the new fiscal year in 1975.
The remaining data on military spending were obtained from www.usaspending.gov.
More precisely, the data can be downloaded from https://www.usaspending.gov/DownloadCenter/
Pages/DataDownload.aspx for the years from 2000 onwards. When downloading the data
be sure to select “prime award” as type of data and “contracts” as spending type. The
agency is the Department of Defense.
A.3.1.2 Product Service Codes and Federal Supply Codes
U.S. military procurement is categorized according to Product Service Codes (PSCs)
and Federal Supply Codes (FSCs). Several examples are given in table A.3. Individual
categories can be looked up here: http://support.outreachsystems.com/resources/
tables/pscs/. A summary of all FSC and PSC codes as used after 1979 is available
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here: https://www.fpds.gov/downloads/psc_data_Oct012011.xls. Both websites were
last accessed on 06/16/2015.
Table A.3: Selected examples of PSC and FSC codes
PSC/FSC Description
1010 Guns, over 30mm up to 75mm
1560 Airframe structural components
1615 Helicopter rotor blades, drive mechanisms and components
3820 Mining, rock drilling, earth boring, and related equipment
AR32 R&D-Space: Flight (applied research/exploratory development)
M1GC Operation of fuel storage buildings
R702 Data collection services
A.3.1.3 Concordance between FSC/PSC and SIC codes
The military prime contract files contain both FSC/PSC codes and 4-digit SIC codes
for the period from 1989 to 2000. I use these 12 years to construct a concordance and then
apply the concordance to spending on FSC/PSC categories which are available over the
entire sample from 1979 to 2009.
The concordance is a matrix that describes for each FSC and PSC code what fraction of
a dollar spend on the FSC/PSC code is purchased from each SIC industry. For instance, if
one dollar is spent on the FSC code 1010 (Guns, over 30mm up to 75mm) about 45 cents are
purchased from SIC industry 3484 (Small Arms). The next most important SIC industry
is 3489 (Ordnance and Accessories, NEC) with 25 cents. Table A.4 provides a summary
of all SIC industries that receive more than 1 cent when one dollar is spent on FSC code
1010. A second example is given in Table A.5 for the FSC code 1560 (Airframe Structural
Components).
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Table A.4: Spending shares for FSC code 1010 (Guns, over 30mm up to 75mm)
SIC code Description Spending share
3484 Small Arms 0.448
3489 Ordnance and Accessories, NEC 0.254
3499 Fabricated Metal Products, NEC 0.166
8711 Engineering Services 0.086
3728 Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment, NEC 0.021
Table A.5: Spending shares for FSC code 1560 (Airframe Structural Components)
SIC code Description Spending share
3728 Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment, NEC 0.815
3721 Aircraft 0.069
8711 Engineering Services 0.033
3724 Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts 0.023
8731 Commercial Physical and Biological Research 0.022
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A.3.2 Sample description
Table A.6: Industries and basic summary statistics
SIC
code
Durable
Avg. def.
spending
share (in %)
Description
2032 no 1.8 Canned Specialties
2086 no 2.0 Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated Water
2097 no 1.0 Manufactured Ice
2099 no 1.2 Food Preparations, NEC
2231 no 5.7 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Wool
2254 no 3.1 Knit Underwear and Nightwear Mills
2298 no 2.2 Cordage and Twine
2299 no 2.7 Textile Goods, NEC
2311 no 9.0 Mens and Boys Suits, Coats, and Overcoats
2321 no 1.9 Mens and Boys Shirts, Except Work Shirts
2322 no 10.9 Mens and Boys Underwear and Nightwear
2325 no 7.3 Mens and Boys Separate Trousers and Slacks
2326 no 3.8 Mens and Boys Work Clothing
2329 no 6.8 Mens and Boys Clothing, NEC
2353 no 6.1 Hats, Caps, and Millinery
2371 no 2.8 Fur Goods
2381 no 17.6 Dress and Work Gloves, Except Knit and All-Leather
2385 no 32.2 Waterproof Outerwear
2387 no 1.5 Apparel Belts
2389 no 2.6 Apparel and Accessories, NEC
2393 no 5.9 Textile Bags
2394 no 8.7 Canvas and Related Products
2399 no 8.7 Fabricated Textile Products, NEC
2519 yes 1.1 Household Furniture, NEC
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
SIC
code
Durable
Avg. def.
spending
share (in %)
Description
2521 yes 2.4 Wood Office Furniture
2522 yes 2.0 Office Furniture, Except Wood
2599 yes 1.5 Furniture and Fixtures, NEC
2741 no 2.1 Miscellaneous Publishing
2813 no 2.4 Industrial Gases
2836 no 1.4 Biological Products, Except Diagnostic Substances
2892 no 22.2 Explosives
2911 no 1.6 Petroleum Refining
2992 no 1.7 Lubricating Oils and Greases
3021 no 2.5 Rubber and Plastics Footwear
3053 no 1.3 Gaskets, Packing, and Sealing Devices
3069 no 1.4 Fabricated Rubber Products, NEC
3143 no 6.9 Mens Footwear, Except Athletic
3149 no 5.5 Footwear, Except Rubber, NEC
3151 no 12.1 Leather Gloves and Mittens
3261 yes 2.3
Vitreous China Plumbing Fixtures and China and
Earthenware Fittings and Bathroom Accessories
3295 yes 5.3 Minerals and Earths, Ground or Otherwise Treated
3299 yes 1.1 Nonmetallic Mineral Products, NEC
3315 yes 1.1 Steel Wiredrawing and Steel Nails and Spikes
3399 yes 1.4 Primary Metal Products, NEC
3412 yes 1.6 Metal Shipping Barrels, Drums, Kegs, and Pails
3429 yes 6.2 Hardware, NEC
3443 yes 6.1 Fabricated Plate Work
3448 yes 1.9 Prefabricated Metal Buildings and Components
3452 yes 1.6 Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Rivets, and Washers
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
SIC
code
Durable
Avg. def.
spending
share (in %)
Description
3484 yes 16.3 Small Arms
3494 yes 6.4 Valves and Pipe Fittings, NEC
3499 yes 4.3 Fabricated Metal Products, NEC
3511 yes 8.6
Steam, Gas, and Hydraulic Turbines, and
Turbine Generator Set Units
3519 yes 1.6 Internal Combustion Engines, NEC
3536 yes 3.8 Overhead Traveling Cranes, Hoists, and Monorail Systems
3537 yes 5.7 Industrial Trucks, Tractors, Trailers, and Stackers
3541 yes 1.6 Machine Tools, Metal Cutting Types
3542 yes 1.2 Machine Tools, Metal Forming Type
3559 yes 4.8 Special Industry Machinery, NEC
3561 yes 1.6 Pumps and Pumping Equipment
3562 yes 1.7 Ball and Roller Bearings
3564 yes 1.2
Industrial and Commercial Fans and Blowers and
Air Purification Equipment
3566 yes 6.5 Speed Changers, Industrial High-Speed Drives, and Gears
3568 yes 2.9 Mechanical Power Transmission Equipment, NEC
3569 yes 2.7 General Industrial Machinery and Equipment, NEC
3571 yes 4.2 Electronic Computers
3572 yes 1.3 Computer Storage Devices
3575 yes 11.2 Computer Terminals
3577 yes 3.1 Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC
3578 yes 1.1 Calculating and Accounting Machinery, Except Electronic Computers
3579 yes 2.1 Office Machines, NEC
3582 yes 1.5 Commercial Laundry, Drycleaning, and Pressing Machines
3586 yes 1.3 Measuring and Dispensing Pumps
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
SIC
code
Durable
Avg. def.
spending
share (in %)
Description
3589 yes 1.2 Service Industry Machinery, NEC
3612 yes 3.7 Power, Distribution, and Specialty Transformers
3613 yes 1.0 Switchgear and Switchboard Apparatus
3621 yes 3.5 Motors and Generators
3629 yes 1.8 Electrical Industrial Apparatus, NEC
3643 yes 1.6 Current-Carrying Wiring Devices
3644 yes 1.7 Noncurrent-Carrying Wiring Devices
3647 yes 1.7 Vehicular Lighting Equipment
3648 yes 1.3 Lighting Equipment, NEC
3661 yes 2.0 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus
3663 yes 11.6 Radio and Television Broadcasting and Communications Equipment
3671 yes 23.1 Electron Tubes
3672 yes 2.7 Printed Circuit Boards
3676 yes 3.0 Electronic Resistors
3677 yes 1.5 Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Other Inductors
3679 yes 6.6 Electronic Components, NEC
3691 yes 1.5 Storage Batteries
3692 yes 4.4 Primary Batteries, Dry and Wet
3695 yes 2.8 Magnetic and Optical Recording Media
3699 yes 10.8 Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies, NEC
3715 yes 4.3 Truck Trailers
3721 yes 29.4 Aircraft
3724 yes 27.6 Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts
3732 yes 1.2 Boat Building and Repairing
3764 yes 12.5
Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Propulsion Units
and Propulsion Unit Parts
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
SIC
code
Durable
Avg. def.
spending
share (in %)
Description
3799 yes 1.5 Transportation Equipment, NEC
3812 yes 15.1
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical,
and Nautical Systems and Instruments
3821 yes 1.9 Laboratory Apparatus and Furniture
3823 yes 1.2
Industrial Instruments for Measurement, Display, and Control of
Process Variables; and Related Products
3825 yes 4.2
Instruments for Measuring and Testing of Electricity
and Electrical Signals
3826 yes 1.6 Laboratory Analytical Instruments
3827 yes 10.0 Optical Instruments and Lenses
3829 yes 7.2 Measuring and Controlling Devices, NEC
3841 yes 1.3 Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatus
3842 yes 2.1 Orthopedic, Prosthetic, and Surgical Appliances and Supplies
3843 yes 2.1 Dental Equipment and Supplies
3844 yes 1.3 X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes and Related Irradiation Apparatus
3999 yes 2.1 Manufacturing Industries, NEC
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A.3.3 Additional results
Figure A.2: Spending response for durable and nondurable goods
Notes: The figure plots impulse response functions of military spending for the baseline
sample estimated using specification (1.20). Shaded regions mark 80 percent confidence
bands based on standard errors that are clustered at the industry level.
160
A.3.4 Robustness
Table A.7: Sectoral multipliers when controlling for Ramey’s news variable
Durable goods Nondurable goods
Years after shock 1 2 3 1 2 3
Gross output 0.26 0.23 0.73 2.83 2.49 2.83
Value added 0.44 0.38 0.71 0.97 0.83 1.13
Cost of materials 0.05 0.01 0.10 1.82 1.31 1.49
Energy expenditures 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.064 0.066 0.047
Employment 2.04 3.47 7.42 17.73 18.16 21.78
(employees per year per $1m)
Notes: See notes of Table 1.4. The estimates are based on specification (1.20),
augmented by Ramey’s news variable interacted with industry indicators.
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Table A.8: Sectoral multipliers when allowing for industry-specific effects of monetary policy
Durable goods Nondurable goods
Years after shock 1 2 3 1 2 3
Gross output 0.34 0.21 0.45 2.58 2.67 3.24
Value added 0.40 0.35 0.55 0.97 0.94 1.29
Cost of materials 0.00 -0.10 -0.08 1.61 1.52 1.92
Energy expenditures 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.056 0.063 0.050
Employment 2.29 3.29 5.75 15.56 15.25 17.66
(employees per year per $1m)
Notes: See notes of Table 1.4. The estimates are based on specification (1.20),
augmented by interactions of the real interest rate with industry indicators.
Table A.9: Sectoral multipliers for a smoothing parameter of 400
Durable goods Nondurable goods
Years after shock 1 2 3 1 2 3
Gross output -0.05 -0.05 0.19 2.24 2.27 2.86
Value added 0.17 0.19 0.40 0.81 0.76 1.15
Cost of materials -0.14 -0.20 -0.21 1.15 1.04 1.45
Energy expenditures 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.066 0.073 0.060
Employment 1.39 3.23 6.37 15.96 15.32 18.45
(employees per year per $1m)
Notes: See notes of Table 1.4. The results in this table are obtained when the
trends for all variables are extracted with a smoothing parameter of 400.
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Table A.10: Sectoral multipliers for a smoothing parameter of 6000
Durable goods Nondurable goods
Years after shock 1 2 3 1 2 3
Gross output 0.52 0.50 0.78 2.82 2.94 3.38
Value added 0.52 0.51 0.73 1.07 1.07 1.35
Cost of materials 0.11 0.08 0.13 1.88 1.86 2.18
Energy expenditures 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.050 0.051 0.038
Employment 2.25 3.34 5.65 15.19 14.77 16.40
(employees per year per $1m)
Notes: See notes of Table 1.4. The results in this table are obtained when the
trends for all variables are extracted with a smoothing parameter of 6000.
Table A.11: Sectoral multipliers estimated from 3-digit SIC industries
Durable goods
Years after shock 1 2 3
Gross output -0.24 -0.23 0.02
Value added -0.12 -0.06 0.01
Cost of materials 0.17 0.17 0.31
Energy expenditures 0.002 0.002 0.003
Employment -2.67 -0.95 0.20
(employees per year per $1m)
Notes: See notes of Table 1.4.
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A.3.5 Impulse response functions of prices
I estimate the specification
Pi,t+h − P Ti,t−1
P Ti,t−1
= αh
Gi,t −GTi,t−1
V ATi,t−1
+
2∑
k=1
βkh
Pi,t−k − P Ti,t−k−1
P Ti,t−k−1
+
2∑
k=1
γkh
Gi,t−k −GTi,t−k−1
V ATi,t−k−1
+ δi,h + ζt,h + εi,t+h, (A.19)
where Pi,t denotes the industry’s consumption wage, price, or product wage. The co-
efficients {αh}4h=0 are now akin to semi-elasticities and interpreted as follows. When the
difference between government spending and its trend, normalized by the sector’s value
added, rises by one, the government engages, on average, in further spending in subsequent
periods as shown in Panel A of Figure 1.3. This spending path is associated with a price
response, expressed as a percentage deviation from trend, given by {αh}4h=0. As before, the
spending variables on the right-hand side of equation (A.19) is instrumented with (1.21) and
its two lags. The first stage Angrist-Pischke F-statistics are essentially identical to those
reported in Table 1.3.
Figure A.3 displays the results. All prices, consumption wages (Panel A), product prices
(Panel B), and product wages (Panel C) respond little in response to a fiscal shock. These
effects are at odds with standard theory but not uncommon in the fiscal policy literature
(see e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014).
There are a number of candidate explanations for the weak prices responses. First, due
to their high price sensitivity, fluctuations of durable goods prices should generally be small
and hard to detect.3 Second, there may be composition effects. The military likely purchases
a different basket of goods from a particular sector than the private sector. If the basket
purchased by the military has a lower price than that purchased by the private sector, then
3See, for example, House and Shapiro (2008).
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Figure A.3: Impulse response functions of prices
Notes: The figure plots impulse response functions estimated from specification (A.19) for the baseline
sample as described in the text. The shock is a unit increase of government spending above trend, nor-
malized by the sector’s value added. Shaded regions mark 80 percent confidence bands based on standard
errors that are clustered at the industry level.
no price response may be registred. Another possible explanation is that the government
purchases goods in bulk and receives greater discounts than the private sector. Given that
many nondurable goods sectors in the sample produce food, this explanation seems plausible.
Yet, the weak responses of prices after fiscal shocks remain puzzling.
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A.3.6 State dependence
Table A.12: First stages of the state-dependent specification
First stage dep. Variable Horizon h 0 1 2 3 4
AP F-statistic 132.8 116.1 125.3 115.8 38.2
Fi,t−1
Gi,t−GTi,t−1
V ATi,t−1
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.51
AP F-statistic 93.0 143.7 257.62 237.6 168.7
(1− Fi,t−1) Gi,t−G
T
i,t−1
V ATi,t−1
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.43 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.59
AP F-statistic 95.9 92.2 80.1 47.1 18.2
Fi,t−1
Gi,t−1−GTi,t−2
V ATi,t−2
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.53
AP F-statistic 205.3 244.4 204.6 161.4 96.5
(1− Fi,t−1) Gi,t−1−G
T
i,t−2
V ATi,t−2
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.60
AP F-statistic 171.4 186.9 198.1 103.6 59.5
Fi,t−1
Gi,t−2−GTi,t−3
V ATi,t−3
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.51
AP F-statistic 166.3 196.5 306.6 259.4 189.7
(1− Fi,t−1) Gi,t−2−G
T
i,t−3
V ATi,t−3
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61
Observations 2115 2039 1963 1887 1811
Notes: The table shows the first stages of the 2SLS estimator of specification (1.22) when the
dependent variable is value added. For all other dependent variables, the F-statistics are virtually
identical. The instruments are (1.21) and its two lags, interacted with Fi,t−1 and 1−Fi,t−1. AP
F-statistic stands for Angrist-Pischke F-statistic and the subsequent lines show the associated
p-values.
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APPENDIX B
Chapter 2 Appendices
B.1 Appendix: Proofs of the Propositions
Lemma 1 Under the assumptions in Section 2.2, the unique competitive equilibrium of the
model is characterized by equations (2.9) and (2.10), where Φj = σ (1− %j) (1− β%j)− κ%j
for j = {r, u,my,mpi} are constants that are independent of monetary policy.
Proof : Consider the system (2.1), (2.2) and (TR1) with the exogenous processes (2.3) to
(2.6). Using (TR1) to eliminate it in (2.2) gives the system
pit = κyt + βEt [pit+1] + ut, (B1)
yt = Et [yt+1]− 1
σ
(φpi (pit +m
pi
t ) + φy (yt +m
y
t )− ret − Et [pit+1]) . (B2)
We conjecture an equilibrium solution
pit = spirr
e
t + spimpim
pi
t + spimym
y
t + spiuut
167
yt = syrr
e
t + sympim
pi
t + symym
y
t + syuut
and solve for the eight unknown coefficients sh,j for h = pi, y and j = r, u,my,mpi. Substi-
tuting the conjectured relationships into (B1) and (B2) and using (2.3) to (2.6) to evaluate
the expectations gives
0 = (spir − κsyr − βspir%r) ret + (spimpi − κsympi − βspimpi%mpi)mpit
+ (spimy − κsymy − βspimy%my)myt + (spiu − κsyu − 1− βspiu%u)ut
and
0 = [(%r − 1)σsyr − φpispir + 1− φysyr + spir%r] ret
+ [(%mpi − 1)σsympi − φpispimpi − φpi − φysympi + spimpi%mpi ]mpit
+ [(%my − 1)σsymy − φpispimy − φy − φysymy + spimy%my ]myt
+ [(%u − 1)σsyu − φpispiu − φysyu + spiu%u]ut.
Each coefficient in these expressions must be zero. This gives a system of eight equations in
eight unknowns. Solving for these unknowns gives the coefficients in (2.9) and (2.10). (By
collecting terms for each of the shocks ret , m
pi
t , m
y
t , and ut one can split the system into four
sub-systems, each with two equations and two unknowns. The four subsystems can then be
solved separately.)
Uniqueness follows from the determinacy condition (2.7). 
Proposition 1
(i) If the only shocks to the model are cost-push shocks, then the optimal policy requires that
the Taylor rule coefficients lie on the affine manifold (2.11).
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(ii) For any φ∗pi and φ
∗
y satisfying (2.11), the equilibrium is
pit =
1− β%u
κ2 + α (1− β%u)2
ut, yt = − ακ
ακ2 + (1− β%u)2
ut. (B3)
Proof : Substituting (2.9) and (2.10) (and using ret = m
y
t = m
pi
t = 0 ) into (2.8) gives
V [ut]
(
α
(
φy + (1− %u)σ
Φu + φy (1− β%u) + κφpi
)2
+
(
%u − φpi
Φu + φy (1− β%u) + κφpi
)2)
The first order condition for φpi requires
0 = ακ (φy + (1− %u)σ) + (%u − φpi) (1− β%u)
which implies (??). The first order condition for φy requires
0 = ακφy (φpi − %u) + ακσ (1− %u) (φpi − %u)− (%u − φpi)2 (1− β%u) .
This condition can be satisfied either by setting φpi = %u or by (2.11). This establishes (i).
To establish (ii), use Φu = (1− %u) (1− β%u)σ− κ%u to write the equilibrium conditions
as
pit =
φy + (1− %u)σ
(1− %u) (1− β%u)σ + κ (φpi − %u) + φy (1− β%u)ut,
yt =
%u − φpi
(1− %u) (1− β%u)σ + κ (φpi − %u) + φy (1− β%u)ut.
Substituting (2.11) gives (B3). This establishes (ii). 
Proposition 2 Suppose ret and ut are i.i.d. over time and have covariance Cov [r
e
t , ut]. The
Taylor rule coefficients satisfying (2.11’) and φy →∞ are optimal.
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Proof: When ret and ut are i.i.d. equations (2.9) and (2.10) simplify to
pit =
κ
σ + φy + κφpi
ret +
φy + σ
σ + φy + κφpi
ut
yt =
1
σ + φy + κφpi
ret −
φpi
σ + φy + κφpi
ut
Plugging them into objective (2.8), and simplifying, shows that the optimal φy and φpi
minimize
(σ + φy + κφpi)
−2 [(1 + ακ2)V [re] + (α (φy + σ)2 + (φpi)2)V [u] + 2 (ακ (φy + σ)− φpi)Cov [ret , ut]]
First we fix the overall strength of the policy response by setting σ + φy + κφpi = A and
minimizing
A−2
{(
1 + ακ2
)
V [re] +
(
α (φy + σ)
2 + (φpi)
2)V [u] + 2 (ακ (φy + σ)− φpi)Cov [ret , ut]}
subject to σ + φy + κφpi = A.
The Lagrangian is
L = A−2 {(1 + ακ2)V [re] + (α (φy + σ)2 + (φpi)2)V [u] + 2 (ακ (φy + σ)− φpi)Cov [ret , ut]}+
λ [A− σ − φy − κφpi]
and the first order conditions w.r.t. φy and φpi, respectively, are
A−2 {2α (φy + σ)V [u] + 2ακCov [ret , ut]} = λ
A−2 {2 (φpi)V [u]− 2Cov [ret , ut]} = κλ
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Combining them yields (2.11’).
Since the objective is decreasing in A, it is optimal to let φy approach infinity. 
Proposition 3 Suppose all shocks are white noise, that is, %r = %u = %my = %mpi = 0.
Then the minimization of (2.8) subject to (2.9) and (2.10) yields the optimal Taylor rule
coefficients given by (2.12) and (2.13).
Proof : Setting %r = %u = %my = %mpi = 0 in (2.9) and (2.10) and substituting into the
objective (2.8) and using the fact that the shocks are (by assumption) uncorrelated implies
that the central bank wants to choose parameters φy and φpi to minimize
(σ + φy + κφpi)
−2
([
ακ2 + 1
]
V [rnt ] +
[
ακ2 + 1
]
(φpi)
2 V [mpit ] +
[
ακ2 + 1
]
(φy)
2 V [myt ] +
[
α (φy + σ)
2 + (φpi)
2]V [ut])
The first order condition for φy is
{[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [myt ]φy + α (φy + σ)V [ut]
}
(σ + φy + κφpi) (B.1)
=
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [rnt ] +
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [mpit ] (φpi)
2 +
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [myt ] (φy)
2 +
[
α (φy + σ)
2 + (φpi)
2]V [ut]
The first order condition w.r.t. φpi is
φpi
κ
{[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [mpit ] + V [ut]
}
(σ + φy + κφpi) (B.2)
=
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [rnt ] +
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [mpit ] (φpi)
2 +
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [myt ] (φy)
2 +
[
α (φy + σ)
2 + (φpi)
2]V [ut]
It is immediate to see that this implies
φpi = κ
[ακ2 + 1]V [myt ] + αV [ut]
[ακ2 + 1]V [mpit ] + V [ut]
φy +
ακσV [ut]
[ακ2 + 1]V [mpit ] + V [ut]
(B6)
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We can rewrite equation (B.2) as
κ
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [rnt ] + κ
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [myt ] (φy)
2
= φpi
[
ακ2 + 1
]
(σ + φy + κφpi)V [m
pi
t ]− κ
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [mpit ] (φpi)
2 +
φpi (σ + φy + κφpi)V [ut]− κ
[
α (φy + σ)
2 + (φpi)
2]V [ut]
Cancelling like terms and simplifying gives
κ
σ + φy
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [rnt ] +
κ
σ + φy
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [myt ] (φy)
2
= φpi
{[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [mpit ] + V [ut]
}− καφyV [ut]− κασV [ut]
Using condition (B6) we have
φpi
([
ακ2 + 1
]
V [mpit ] + V [ut]
)− ακσV [ut] = κ ([ακ2 + 1]V [myt ] + αV [ut])φy
Eliminating this term gives
κ
σ + φy
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [rnt ] +
κ
σ + φy
[
ακ2 + 1
]
V [myt ] (φy)
2
= κ
([
ακ2 + 1
]
V [myt ] + αV [ut]
)
φy − καφyV [ut] .
Finally, we cancel terms to get (2.12). To find (2.13) use condition (B6) and rearrange terms.

Model with signal extraction To solve the model with signal extraction, we closely
follow the setup in Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004). The proofs of the results use the
following notation and calculations.
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The model can be written as Xt+1
E˜Et [xt+1]
 = A
 Xt
xt
+B (it − ρ) +
 st+1
0
 (B7)
where Xt = (r
e
t , ut,m
y
t ,m
pi
t )
′ ; st+1 =
(
εrt+1, ε
u
t+1, ε
y
t+1, ε
pi
t+1
)′
; xt = (yt, pit)
′ ; and E˜ = 0 1
σ 1
. Partition the matrices A and B as follows
A =
 A1
A2
 =
 A11 A12
A21 A22
 , B =
 B1
B2

and let
A11 =

%r 0 0 0
0 %u 0 0
0 0 %my 0
0 0 0 %mpi

, A12 =

0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

, B1 =

0
0
0
0

A21 =
 0 − 1β 0 0
−1 0 0 0
 , A22 =
 −κβ 1β
σ 0
 B2 =
 0
1

The flow objective is
y2t + αpi
2
t = x
′
tWxt, W =
 1 0
0 α
 (B8)
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and the observation equations are
Zt =
 ymt
pimt
 = D
 Xt
xt
 , with D = (D1, D2) , D1 =
 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 and D2 =
 1 0
0 1

(B9)
Notice that the measurement errors are included in Xt. This allows for arbitrary persistence
of both types of measurement error.
The central bank’s information set is ICBt =
{
Θ, ymt−j, pi
m
t−j : j ≥ 0
}
where Θ is a vector
of all model parameters.
We write the Taylor rule as
it − ρ = Fxt|t (B10)
where F = (ψy, ψpi). Notice the difference to Svensson and Woodford who write the policy
as a linear function of the estimates of the state variables Xt.
Next, we conjecture that
xt|t = GXt|t (B11)
Then the upper block of (B7) gives
Xt+1 = A11Xt + st+1
and taking expectations (based on ICBt ) yields
Xt+1|t = A11Xt|t.
Taking expectations of the lower block of (B7) gives
E˜xt+1|t = A21Xt|t + A22xt|t +B2 (it − ρ) .
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Combining these equations with (B10) and (B11), we arrive at
xt|t = [A22]
−1
(
−A21 + E˜GA11 −B2FG
)
Xt|t.
Hence, G must satisfy
G = [A22]
−1
(
−A21 + E˜GA11 −B2FG
)
. (B12)
Next we conjecture that
xt = G
1Xt +
(
G−G1)Xt|t (B13)
and rewrite the observation equation (B9) as
Zt = D1Xt +D2xt
=
(
D1 +D2G
1
)
Xt +D2
(
G−G1)Xt|t
Following Svensson and Woodford,
Zt = LXt +MXt|t (B14)
where
L =
(
D1 +D2G
1
)
(B15)
and
M = D2
(
G−G1) .
The state equation of the Kalman filter is
Xt+1 = A11Xt + st+1
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and the observation equation is (B14). Svensson and Woodford (2004) show that the Kalman
filter updating equation takes the form
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 +KL
(
Xt −Xt|t−1
)
(B16)
(their equation 26 with vt = 0) and that it is possible to write
Xt+1|t+1 = (I +KM)
−1 [(I −KL)A11Xt|t +KZt+1] (B17)
(their equation 30) where
K = PL′ (LPL′)−1 . (B18)
Furthermore,
P = E
[(
Xt −Xt|t−1
) (
Xt −Xt|t−1
)′]
= A11
[
P − PL′ (LPL′)−1 LP
]
A′11 + Σs (B19)
where Σs is the covariance matrix of the errors st+1.
Finally, one needs to find G1. Again, following Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004) we
obtain
G1 = [A22]
−1
(
−A21 + E˜GKLA11 + E˜G1 (I −KL)A11
)
. (B20)
Lemma 2 The central bank’s estimates of inflation and the output gap satisfy (2.14) and
(2.15) where Φr and Φu are defined as in Lemma 1.
Proof: Take conditional expectations based on the central bank’s information set ICBt of
equations (2.1) to (2.4) to obtain
pit = κyt + βpit+1|t + ut|t
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yt = yt+1|t − 1
σ
(
it − ρ− ret|t − pit+1|t
)
ret+1|t = %rr
e
t|t , and ut+1|t = %uut|t
Imposing the Taylor rule (TR2) and repeating steps in the proof of Lemma 1 yields the
desired result. 
Lemma A1 The welfare objective (2.8) can be decomposed as follows
(1− β)E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
y2t + αpi
2
t
)]
=
(
αE
[
pi2t|t
]
+ E
[
y2t|t
])
+
(
αE
[(
pit − pit|t
)2]
+ E
[(
yt − yt|t
)2])
Proof: See Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004). 
Lemma A2 αE
[(
pit − pit|t
)2]
+E
[(
yt − yt|t
)2]
= tr
[
P (G1 (I −KL))′WG1 (I −KL)] where
I is the identiy matrix .
Proof: Define T = αE
[(
pit − pit|t
)2]
+E
[(
yt − yt|t
)2]
and notice that T = E
[(
xt − xt|t
)′
W
(
xt − xt|t
)]
where W is defined in (B8) above. Equation (B13) implies that
xt − xt|t = G1Xt +
(
G−G1)Xt|t −GXt|t = G1 (Xt −Xt|t)
so we obtain
T = E
[(
Xt −Xt|t
)′ (
G1
)′
WG1
(
Xt −Xt|t
)]
.
Next subtract Xt|t from Xt and use (B16) to get
Xt −Xt|t = Xt −
(
Xt|t−1 +KL
(
Xt −Xt|t−1
))
= (I −KL) (Xt −Xt|t−1)
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Then
T = E
[(
Xt −Xt|t−1
)′
(I −KL)′ (G1)′WG1 (I −KL) (Xt −Xt|t−1)]
= E
[
tr
[(
Xt −Xt|t−1
) (
Xt −Xt|t−1
)′
(I −KL)′ (G1)′WG1 (I −KL)]]
= tr
[
E
[(
Xt −Xt|t−1
) (
Xt −Xt|t−1
)′] (
G1 (I −KL))′WG1 (I −KL)]
where tr (·) is the trace operator. Using (B19) yields the desired result. 
Lemma A3 Suppose all shocks are contemporaneously uncorrelated with each other and i.i.d
over time. Then the term αE
[(
pit − pit|t
)2]
+ E
[(
yt − yt|t
)2]
is independent of the Taylor
rule coefficients.
Proof: Given Lemma A2, it is sufficient to show that T is independent of the Taylor rule
coefficients. If all shocks are i.i.d. over time then A11 = 04×4 and G1 as defined in (B20)
reduces to
G1 = − [A22]−1A21
which is independent of policy. Furthermore, P = Σs (see B19) and because G
1 is indepen-
dent of policy, so is L (defined in B15). Then K = PL′ (LPL′)−1is independent of policy
(equation B18). As a result, T is independent of policy. 
Lemma A4 Suppose all shocks are contemporaneously uncorrelated with each other and i.i.d
over time. Then ret|t and ut|t are independent of the Taylor rule coefficients.
Proof: In the iid case with A11 = 04×4, equation (B17) reduces to
Xt+1|t+1 = (I +KM)
−1KZt+1
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Combining this with (B14) gives
Xt|t = (I +KM)
−1KZt = (I +KM)
−1K
(
LXt +MXt|t
)
.
Rearranging yields
Xt|t = KLXt.
In the proof of Lemma A3 we showed that K and L are independent of policy when shocks
are i.i.d. Hence ret|t and ut|t are independent of the Taylor rule coefficients. 
Proposition 4 Suppose all shocks are contemporaneously uncorrelated with each other and
i.i.d over time. Then the coefficients
{
ψ∗y, ψ
∗
pi
}
satisfying (11”) and ψy →∞ are optimal.
Proof: Lemmas A1 and A3 imply that minimizing objective (2.8) is equivalent to minimizing
αE
[
pi2t|t
]
+ E
[
y2t|t
]
. Furthermore, equations (2.14) and (2.15) simplify to
pit|t =
κ
σ + ψy + κψpi
ret|t +
ψy + σ
σ + ψy + κψpi
ut|t
yt|t =
1
σ + ψy + κψpi
ret|t −
ψpi
σ + ψy + κψpi
ut|t
in the i.i.d. case. Lemma A4 shows that ret|t and ut|t are independent of the Taylor rule
coefficients, but importantly, their covariance need not to be zero. The remainder of the
proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 2. 
Proposition 5 Suppose the model is given by equations (2.1) to (2.6), (TR2), and the
observation equations pimt = pit + m
pi
t and y
m
t = yt + m
y
t . The central bank uses the Kalman
filter with information set ICBt to estimate the true state of the economy. Suppose further
that V [ut] = 0 and that %my = %mpi = 0. Then, for any Taylor rule (TR2), with coefficients
ψy and ψpi, there exist coefficients
{
φ˜y, φ˜pi, ν˜
}
such that the policy rule (TR3) generates the
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same equilibrium paths for all variables.
Proof: Under the assumption that V [ut] = 0 and %my = %mpi = 0, it is possible to write the
model as follows
Xt = r
e
t , st+1 = ε
r
t+1, xt =
 yt
pit
 , E˜ =
 0 1
σ 1
 , A =
 A11 A12
A21 A22
 , B =
 B1
B2

A11 = %r, A12 =
(
0 0
)
, B1 = 0, A21 =
 0
−1
 , A22 =
 −κβ 1β
σ 0
 B2 =
 0
1

The observation equations are
Zt =
 ymt
pimt
+ vt = D
 Xt
xt
+ vt, D =
 0 1 0
0 0 1

with vt = (m
y
t ,m
pi
t )
′. Furthermore, D1 = (0, 0)
′ and D2 = I2 Notice that A11 is a scalar.
Because vt is nonzero, the equations (and matrices) associated with the Kalman filter change
somewhat (see Svensson and Woodford 2004) though (B17) continues to hold. Since A11 is
a scalar, KL and KM are also scalars.
Using (B10) and (B11), write the interest rate as
it − ρ = (ψy, ψpi)
(
yt|t, pit|t
)′
= Fxt|t = FGXt|t.
Using (B17) and substituting backwards yields
it =
∞∑
j=0
FG (I +KM)−1
[
(I −KL)A11 (I +KM)−1
]j
KZt−j
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Since KL, and KM are scalars, set ν˜ = (I −KL)A11 (I +KM)−1. Then write
it =
∞∑
j=0
FG (I +KM)−1 ν˜jKZt−j = FG (I +KM)
−1KZt + ν˜it−1 = φ˜yymt + φ˜pipi
m
t + ν˜it−1
where
(
φ˜y, φ˜pi
)
= FG (I +KM)−1K. 
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APPENDIX C
Chapter 3 Appendices
C.1 Chapter 2: Basic Theory Appendix
C.1.1 Proof of Result 1
Suppose that the firm solves
max pxx− pDFD − pMIM
subject to
x =
[
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
and
px =
(
Y
x
) 1
ε
The first order conditions are
(
1− 1
ε
)
(Y )
1
ε (x)
1
ψ
− 1
ε (1− µ) 1ψ [FD]−
1
ψ = pD
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(
1− 1
ε
)
(Y )
1
ε (x)
1
ψ
− 1
ε µ
1
ψ [IM ]−
1
ψ = pM
Dividing one by the other gives
F ∗D
IM∗
=
1− µ
µ
(
pM
pD
)ψ
.
The same equation can be obtained under perfect competition.
Now take the production function and multiply it by px
pxx = px
[
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + (pM)
−ψ−1
ψ µ
1
ψ [pMIM ]
ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
Taking logs gives
ln (pxx) =
ψ
ψ − 1 ln
(
px
[
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + (pM)
−ψ−1
ψ µ
1
ψ [pMIM ]
ψ−1
ψ
])
(C.1)
=
ψ
ψ − 1 ln
(
px
[
(1− µ) 1ψ exp
(
ψ − 1
ψ
ln [FD]
)
+ (pM)
−ψ−1
ψ µ
1
ψ exp
(
ψ − 1
ψ
ln [pMIM ]
)])
(C.2)
Before differentiating, recall the assumption that the firm takes prices pM as given and
that it cannot change px after learning about the shock. Then
∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pMM
=
ψ
ψ − 1
px (PM)
−ψ−1
ψ µ
1
ψ exp
(
ψ−1
ψ
ln [pMIM ]
)
ψ−1
ψ
px
[
(1− µ) 1ψ exp
(
ψ−1
ψ
ln [FD]
)
+ (pM)
−ψ−1
ψ µ
1
ψ exp
(
ψ−1
ψ
ln [pMIM ]
)]
(C.3)
=
1
1 +
(
1−µ
µ
) 1
ψ [ FD
IM
]ψ−1
ψ
(C.4)
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We evaluate this elasticity at
F ∗D
IM
=
IM∗
IM
1− µ
µ
(
pM
pD
)ψ
so that
∂ ln pxx
∂ ln pMIM
=
1
1 +
(
IM∗
IM
)ψ−1
ψ 1−µ
µ
(
pM
pD
)ψ−1
C.1.2 On Flexibility in Domestic Inputs
Under the assumption of perfect competition, the first order conditions are:
x (1− µ) = (pD)ψ FD
xµ = (pM)
ψ IM
If the firm takes prices px, pM , and pD as given, the following elasticities are immediate:
∂ ln (pxx)
∂ ln (pDFD)
=
∂ ln (pxx)
∂ ln (pMM)
=
∂ ln (pDFD)
∂ ln (pMM)
= 1.
The above equations demonstrate that a constant returns to scale production function com-
bined with these assumptions on market structure imply that the output elasticity will equal
one for all values of the elasticity of substitution. For this reason, we require some assump-
tions limiting the flexibility of domestic inputs following the import disruption.
Below we show an alternative way of understanding the interaction of competitive factor
markets, changes in domestic inputs, and the mapping of the output elasticity into parameter
values for the elasticity of substitution. Consider the total derivative of ln(x):
d lnx =
∂ lnx
∂IM
d ln IM +
∂ lnx
∂F
d lnF (C.5)
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d lnx =
µ
1
ψ (IM)
ψ−1
ψ d ln IM
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
+
(1− µ) 1ψ (FD)
ψ−1
ψ d lnFD
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
(C.6)
Dividing by d ln IM yields:
d lnx
d ln IM
=
µ
1
ψ (IM)
ψ−1
ψ
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
+
(1− µ) 1ψ (FD)
ψ−1
ψ
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
d lnFD
d ln IM
Now, as before, combining the first order conditions from the profit maximization prob-
lem, we have:
FD(·)
IM
=
1− µ
µ
(
pD
pM
)−ψ
(C.7)
Log-differentiating this expression:
d ln
(
FD
IM
)
= −ψd ln
(
pD
pM
)
d lnFD − d ln IM = −ψd ln
(
pD
pM
)
d lnFD
d ln IM
= 1− ψ
d ln
(
pD
pM
)
d ln IM
(C.8)
Finally, we have:
d lnx
d ln IM
=
µ
1
ψ (IM)
ψ−1
ψ
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
+
(1− µ) 1ψ (FD)
ψ−1
ψ
[
1− ψ d ln
(
pD
pM
)
d ln IM
]
(1− µ) 1ψ [FD]
ψ−1
ψ + µ
1
ψ [IM ]
ψ−1
ψ
(C.9)
Thus, if there is no change in the relative input price following the disruption in IM of the
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firm:
d ln
(
pM
pD
)
d ln IM
= 0, then the output elasticity will be equal to one regardless of the value of
ψ. On the other hand, any assumptions that yield a non-zero change in the relative input
prices will then yield the result that d lnx
d ln IM
= 1 provided ψ → 0.
C.2 Chapter 3: Data Appendix
C.2.1 Matching Corporate Directories to the Business Register
The discussion below is an abbreviated form of the full technical note (see Flaaen (2013c))
documenting the bridge between the DCA and the Business Register.
C.2.1.1 Directories of International Corporate Structure
The LexisNexis Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) is the primary source of in-
formation on the ownership and locations of U.S. and foreign affiliates. The DCA describes
the organization and hierarchy of public and private firms, and consists of three separate
databases: U.S. Public Companies, U.S. Private Companies, and International – those parent
companies with headquarters located outside the United States. The U.S. Public database
contains all firms traded on the major U.S. exchanges, as well as major firms traded on
smaller U.S. exchanges. To be included in the U.S. Private database, a firm must demon-
strate revenues in excess of $1 million, 300 or more employees, or substantial assets. Those
firms included in the International database, which include both public and private compa-
nies, generally have revenues greater than $10 million. Each database contains information
on all parent company subsidiaries, regardless of the location of the subsidiary in relation to
the parent.
The second source used to identify multinational firms comes from Uniworld Business
Publications (UBP). This company has produced periodic volumes documenting the loca-
tions and international scope of i) American firms operating in foreign countries; and ii)
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foreign firms with operations in the United States. Although only published biennially,
these directories benefit from a focus on multinational firms, and from no sales threshold for
inclusion.
Because there exist no common identifiers between these directories and Census Bureau
data infrastructure, we rely on probabilistic name and address matching — so-called “fuzzy
merging” — to link the directories to the Census data infrastructure.
C.2.1.2 Background on Name and Address Matching
Matching two data records based on name and address information is necessarily an im-
perfect exercise. Issues such as abbreviations, misspellings, alternate spellings, and alternate
name conventions rule out an exact merging procedure, leaving the researcher with prob-
abilistic string matching algorithms that evaluate the “closeness” of match — given by a
score or rank — between the two character strings in question. Due to the large computing
requirements of these algorithms, it is common to use so-called “blocker” variables to restrict
the search samples within each dataset. A “blocker” variable must match exactly, and as a
result this implies the need for a high degree of conformity between these variables in the
two datasets. In the context of name and address matching, the most common “blocker”
variables are the state and city of the establishment.
The matching procedure uses a set of record linking utilities described in Wasi and Flaaen
(2014). This program uses a bigram string comparator algorithm on multiple variables with
differing user-specified weights.1 This way the researcher can apply, for example, a larger
weight on a near name match than on a perfect zip code match. Hence, the “match score”
for this program can be interpreted as a weighted average of each variable’s percentage of
1The term bigram refers to two consecutive characters within a string (the word bigram contains 5
possible bigrams: “bi”, “ig”, “gr”, “ra”, and “am”). The program is a modified version of Blasnik (2010),
and assigns a score for each variable between the two datasets based on the percentage of matching bigrams.
See Flaaen (2013c) or Wasi and Flaaen (2014) for more information.
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bigram character matches.
C.2.1.3 The Unit of Matching
The primary unit of observation in the DCA, UBP, and BR datasets is the business
establishment. Hence, the primary unit of matching is the establishment, and not the firm.
However, there are a number of important challenges with an establishment-to-establishment
link. First, the DCA (UBP) and BR may occasionally have differing definitions of the
establishment. One dataset may separate out several operating groups within the same firm
address (i.e. JP Morgan – Derivatives, and JP Morgan - Emerging Markets), while another
may group these activities together by their common address. Second, the name associated
with a particular establishment can at times reflect the subsidiary name, location, or activity
(i.e. Alabama plant, processing division, etc), and at times reflect the parent company name.
Recognizing these challenges, the primary goal of the matching will be to assign each DCA
(UBP) establishment to the most appropriate business location of the parent firm identified
in the BR. As such, the primary matching variables will be the establishment name, along
with geographic indicators of street, city, zip code, and state.
C.2.1.4 The Matching Process: An Overview
The danger associated with probabilistic name and address procedures is the potential
for false-positive matches. Thus, there is an inherent tension for the researcher between a
broad search criteria that seeks to maximize the number of true matches and a narrow and
exacting criteria that eliminates false-positive matches. The matching approach used here is
conservative in the sense that the methodology will favor criteria that limit the potential for
false positives at the potential expense of slightly higher match rates. As such, the procedure
generally requires a match score exceeding 95 percent, except in those cases where ancillary
188
evidence provides increased confidence in the match.2
This matching proceeds in an iterative fashion, in which a series of matching procedures
are applied with decreasingly restrictive sets of matching requirements. In other words,
the initial matching attempt uses the most stringent standards possible, after which the
non-matching records proceed to a further matching iteration, often with less stringent stan-
dards. In each iteration, the matching records are assigned a flag that indicates the standard
associated with the match.
See Table C.1 for a summary of the establishment-level match rate statistics by year and
type of firm. Table C.2 lists the corresponding information for the Uniworld data.
C.2.1.5 Construction of Multinational Indicators
The DCA data allows for the construction of variables indicating the multinational status
of the U.S.-based establishment. If the parent firm contains addresses outside of the United
States, but is headquartered within the U.S., we designate this establishment as part of a
U.S. multinational firm. If the parent firm is headquartered outside of the United States,
we designate this establishment as part of a Foreign multinational firm. We also retain the
nationality of parent firm.3
There can be a number of issues when translating the DCA-based indicators through
the DCA-BR bridge for use within the Census Bureau data architecture. First, there may
be disagreements between the DCA and Census on what constitutes a firm, such that an
establishment matches may report differing multinational indicators for the same Census-
identified firm. Second, such an issue might also arise due to joint-ventures. Finally, incorrect
matches may also affect the degree to which establishment matches agree when aggregated
to a firm definition. To address these issues, we apply the following rules when using the
2The primary sources of such ancillary evidence are clerical review of the matches, and additional parent
identifier matching evidence.
3The multinational status of firms from the UBP directories are more straightforward.
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DCA-based multinational indicators and aggregating to the (Census-based) firm level. There
are three potential cases:4
Potential 1: A Census-identified firm in which two or more establishments match to dif-
ferent foreign-country parent firms
1. Collapse the Census-identified firm employment based on the establishment-parent firm
link by country of foreign ownership
2. Calculate the firm employment share of each establishment match
3. If one particular link of country of foreign ownership yields an employment share above
0.75, apply that link to all establishments within the firm.
4. If one particular link of country of foreign ownership yields an employment share
above 0.5 and total firm employment is below 10,000, then apply that link to all
establishments within the firm.
5. All other cases require manual review.
Potential 2: A Census-identified firm in which one establishment is matched to a foreign-
country parent firm, and another establishment is matched to a U.S. multinational firm.
1. Collapse the Census-identified firm employment based on the establishment-parent firm
link by type of DCA link (Foreign vs U.S. Multinational)
2. Calculate the firm employment share of each establishment match
3. If one particular type of link yields an employment share above 0.75, apply that link
to all establishments within the firm.
4Some of these cases also apply to the UBP-BR bridge.
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4. If one particular type of link yields an employment share above 0.5 and total firm
employment is below 10,000, then apply that link to all establishments within the
firm.
5. All other cases require manual review.
Potential 3: A Census-identified firm in which one establishment is matched to a non-
multinational firm, and another establishment is matched to a foreign-country parent firm
(or U.S. multinational firm).
Apply same steps as in Potential 2.
C.2.2 Classifying Firm-Level Trade
The firm-level data on imports available in the LFTTD does not contain information
on the intended use of the goods.5 Disentangling whether an imported product is used as
an intermediate input for further processing — rather than for final sale in the U.S. — has
important implications for the nature of FDI, and the role of imported goods in the trans-
mission of shocks. Fortunately, the Census Bureau data contains other information that can
be used to distinguish intermediate input imports from final goods imports. Creating lists
of the principal products produced by firms in a given detailed industry in the United States
should indicate the types of products that, when imported, should be classified as a “final”
good – that is, intended for final sale without further processing. The products imported
outside of this set, then, would be classified as intermediate goods.6 Such product-level
production data exists as part of the “Products” trailer file of the Census of Manufactur-
ers. As detailed in Pierce and Schott (2012) (see page 11), combining import, export, and
5This is one advantage of the survey data on multinational firms available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. There are, however, a number of critical disadvantages of this data source, as outlined in Flaaen
(2013a).
6To be more precise, this set will include a combination of intermediate and capital goods.
191
production information at a product-level is useful for just such a purpose.
C.2.2.1 Creating a NAICS-Based set of Final/Intermediate Products
As part of the quinquennial Census of Manufacturers (CM), the Census Bureau surveys
establishments on their total shipments broken down into a set of NAICS-based (6 digit)
product categories. Each establishment is given a form particular to its industry with a
list of pre-specified products, with additional space to record other product shipments not
included in the form. The resulting product trailer file to the CM allows the researcher to
understand the principal products produced at each manufacturing establishment during a
census year.
There are several data issues that must be addressed before using the CM-Products
file to infer information about the relative value of product-level shipments by a particular
firm. First, the trailer file contains product-codes that are used to “balance” the aggregated
product-level value of shipments with the total value of shipments reported on the base CM
survey form. We drop these product codes from the dataset. Second, there are often codes
that do not correspond to any official 7-digit product code identified by Census. (These
are typically products that are self-identified by the firm but do not match any of the pre-
specified products identified for that industry by Census.) Rather than ignoring the value
of shipments corresponding to these codes, we attempt to match at a more aggregated level.
Specifically, we iteratively try to find a product code match at the 6, 5, and 4 digit product
code level, and use the existing set of 7-digit matches as weights to allocate the product
value among the 7-digit product codes encompassing the more aggregated level.
We now discuss how this file can be used to assemble a set of NAICS product codes that
are the predominant output (final goods) for a given NAICS industry. Let xpij denote the
shipments of product p by establishment i in industry j during a census year. Then the total
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output of product p in industry j can be written as:
Xpj =
Ij∑
i=1
xpij,
where Ij is the number of firms in industry j. Total output of industry j is then:
Xj =
Pj∑
p=1
Xpj.
The share of industry output accounted for by a given product p is therefore:
Spj =
Xpj
Xj
.
One might argue that the set of final goods products for a given industry should be defined
as the set of products where Spj > 0. That is, a product is designated as a “final good” for
that industry if any establishment recorded positive shipments of the product. The obvious
disadvantage of employing such a zero threshold is that small degrees of within-industry
heterogeneity will have oversized effects on the classification.
Acknowledging this concern, we set an exogenous threshold level W such that any p
in a given j with Spj > W is classified as a final good product for that industry. The
upper portion of Table C.3 documents the number of final goods products and the share of
intermediate input imports based on several candidate threshold levels. The issues of a zero
threshold are quite clear in the table; a small but positive threshold value (0.1) will have a
large effect on the number of products designated as final goods. This shows indirectly that
there are a large number of products produced by establishments in a given industry, but a
much smaller number that comprise the bulk of total value.
There are several advantages to using the CM-Products file rather than using an input-
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output table.7 First, within a given CM year, the classification can be done at the firm or
establishment level rather than aggregating to a particular industry. This reflects the fact
that the same imported product may be used as an input by one firm and sold to consumers as
a final product by another. Second, the CM-Products file is one of the principal data inputs
into making the input-output tables, and thus represents more finely detailed information.
Related to this point, the input-output tables are produced with a significant delay – the
most recent available for the U.S. is for year 2002. Third, the input-output tables for the
U.S. are based on BEA industry classifications, which imply an additional concordance (see
below) to map into the NAICS-based industries present in the Census data.
We now turn to the procedure to map firm-level trade into intermediate and final goods
using the industry-level product classifications calculated above.
C.2.2.2 Mapping HS Trade Transactions to the Product Classification
The LFTTD classifies products according to the U.S. Harmonized Codes (HS), which
must be concorded to the NAICS-based product system in order to utilize the classification
scheme from the CM-Products file. Thankfully, a recent concordance created by Pierce and
Schott (2012) can be used to map the firm-HS codes present in the LFTTD data with the
firm-NAICS product codes present in the CM-Products data.
A challenge of this strategy is that the LFTTD exists at a firm-level, while the most
natural construction of the industry-level classification scheme is by establishment. More
concretely, for multi-unit, multi-industry firms, the LFTTD is unable to decompose an im-
port shipment into the precise establishment-industry of its U.S. destination. 8 While
7Another option is to use the CM-Materials file, the flip side of the CM-Products file. Unfortunately,
the CM-Materials file contains significantly more problematic product codes than the Products file, and so
concording to the trade data is considerably more difficult.
8It is worth pointing out that the most obvious way that this would materialize is by vertical integration
of the firm in its U.S. operations. Provided that the industry designation of the firm pertains to its most
downstream operations, then this is would not serve to bias the firms’ classification of imported goods, as
the upstream products are not actually “final” goods for that firm.
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recognizing the caution that should be used in this regard, we adopt the approach that is
commonly used in such circumstances: the industry of the firm is defined as that industry
encompassing the largest employment share.
Once the firm-level trade data is in the same product classification as the industry-level
filter created from the CM-Products file, all that is left is to match the trade data with the
filter by NAICS industry. Thus, letting Mij denote total imports from a firm i (firm i is
classified as being in industry j), we can then categorize the firm’s trade according to:
M intij =
∑
p/∈Pj
Mipj
Mfinij =
∑
p∈Pj
Mipj

where Pj = {p | Spj ≥ W} . (C.10)
The bottom section of Table C.3 shows some summary statistics of the intermediate share
of trade according to this classification system, by several values of the product-threshold
W . There are at least two important takeaways from these numbers. First, the share
of intermediates in total imports is roughly what is reported in the literature using IO
Tables. Second, the share of total trade occupied by intermediate products is not particularly
sensitive to the exogenous threshold level. While there is a small increase in the share when
raising the threshold from 0 to 0.1 (about 3 percentage points), the number is essentially
unchanged when raising it further to 0.2.
C.2.3 Sample Selection
C.2.3.1 Constructing the Baseline Dataset
This section will discuss the steps taken to construct the sample used in section 3.3.1.
Beginning with the raw files of the LFTTD export/import data, we drop any transactions
with missing firm identifiers, and those pertaining to trade with U.S. territories. Next, we
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merge the LFTTD files with the HS-NAICS6 product concordance from Pierce and Schott
(2012); if there is no corresponding NAICS6 code for a particular HS code, then we set
NAICS6 equal to XXXXXX. We then aggregate up to the level of Firm-Country-Month-
NAICS6, and then create extracts according to three sets of destinations/sources: Japan,
Non-Japan, and North America (Canada and Mexico). Then, assigning each firm to an
LBD-based industry (see below), we run the NAICS-based trade codes through the inter-
mediate/final goods filter discussed in Appendix C.2.2. The firms’ monthly trade can then
be split into intermediate and final goods components. We repeat this step for years 2009,
2010, and 2011.
Using the Longitudinal Business Database, we drop inactive, ghost/deleted establish-
ments, and establishments that are not in-scope for the Economic Census. To create the
sample of manufacturing firms in the U.S., we first create a firm industry code defined
as the industry encompassing the largest share of firm employment. We then drop non-
manufacturing firms. Next, we merge the LBD for each year with the DCA-Bridge (see
section C.2.1) containing multinational indicators. We then apply the rules specified above
for clarifying disagreements with the DCA-based multinational indicators. After creating
monthly copies of each firm, we merge by firm-month to the trade data. Missing information
of trade data is altered to represent zeros. We repeat these steps for years 2009-2011, and
then append the files together. Firms that do not exist in all three years are dropped from
the sample.
C.2.3.2 GIS Mapping of Earthquake Intensity Measures to Affiliate Locations
As part of the Earthquake Hazards Program, the U.S. Geological Survey produces data
and map products of the ground motion and shaking intensity following major earthquakes.
The preferred measure to reflect the perceived shaking and damage distribution is the esti-
mated “Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)” which is based on a relation of survey response
196
and measured peak acceleration and velocity amplitudes. The USGS extends the raw data
from geologic measurement stations and predicts values on a much finer grid using standard
seismological inferences and interpolation methods. The result is a dense grid of MMI val-
ues covering the broad region affected by the seismic event. For more information on this
methodology, see Wald et al. (2006).
To utilize this information, we take all Japanese addresses from the DCA/Uniworld di-
rectories that correspond to any U.S. operation via an ownership link. We geocode these
addresses into latitude/longitude coordinates using the Google Geocoding API, and then
compute the inverse distance-weighted mean of the relevant seismic intensity measure based
on a 10km radius surrounding a given establishment. The firm identifiers within the cor-
porate directories allow us to create firm-specific measures (average and maximum values,
by manufacturing/non-manufacturing), which can then be brought into the baseline Census
dataset via the bridges discussed in appendix C.2.1.
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Table C.1: DCA Match Statistics: 2007-2011
# of DCA Matched Percent
Establishments to B.R. Matched
Total
2007 112,346 81,656 0.73
2008 111,935 81,535 0.73
2009 111,953 81,112 0.72
2010 111,998 79,661 0.71
2011 113,334 79,516 0.70
U.S. Multinationals
2007 22,500 16,396 0.73
2008 23,090 16,910 0.73
2009 22,076 16,085 0.73
2010 21,667 15,785 0.73
2011 21,721 15,557 0.72
Foreign Multinationals
2007 10,331 7,555 0.73
2008 9,351 6,880 0.74
2009 11,142 8,193 0.74
2010 11,308 8,181 0.72
2011 11,619 8,357 0.72
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Table C.2: Uniworld Match Statistics: 2006-2011
# of Uniworld Matched Percent
Establishments to B.R. Matched
Foreign Multinationals
2006 3,495 2,590 0.74
2008 3,683 2,818 0.76
2011 6,188 4,017 0.65
U.S. Multinationals1
2007 4,043 3,236 0.80
2009 4,293 3,422 0.80
1U.S. multinationals include only the establishment identified as
the U.S. headquarters.
Table C.3: Appendix Table Comparing the Results from Threshold Values W
Threshold Values
W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2
Number of Final Good Products per Industry
Median 19 1 1
Mean 25 1.52 1.14
Min 1 1 0
Max 154 6 3
Implied Share of Intermediate Inputs
Imports 60.9 63.90 63.97
Exports 52.0 54.96 55.04
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C.3 Appendix: Other Results
C.3.1 Alternate Specifications for Treatment Effects Regressions
Our results from section 3.3.2 are based on a sample including all Japanese multinationals
in manufacturing, and therefore uses a levels specification to allow for zeros in the firm-
month observations. Because larger firms exhibit greater absolute deviations from trend,
this roughly amounts to weighting firms based on size, such that the results correspond to a
representative firm based on the aggregate effect of the group.
To see this, and to explore how the levels specification influences our interpretation, we
repeat the analysis on a subset of the firms for which we can view the percentage changes
directly. Specifically, we drop any firms with zeros in any month for intermediate imports
or N.A. exports during the sample, and then take logs and HP-filter each series to obtain
percentage deviations from trend for each firm.9 The results of this exercise are shown in
Panel A of Figure C.1. We suppress standard errors for the sake of clarity; the drops are
significant at the 95% level for between 2-4 months following the shock. If we rerun these
regressions while also weighting according to the pre-shock size of firms, we obtain a picture
that looks much closer to Figure 3.7, see Panel B of Figure C.1.
These results indicate that the larger firms appear to be affected the most from this
shock. This could be partly a result of our proxy being less effective for smaller firms that
may not engage in consistent exports to North America.
C.3.2 Probit Model of Import/Output Disruptions
We specify a simple probit model to understand the relative importance of various firm-
level characteristics in the import and output declines following the tsunami. The model
is
9We re-weight the control group as described in section 3.3.1.
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Pr(XDik = 1) = Φ [β1JPNik + β2Exposedik + β3MMIik + β4Portik + γk] (C.11)
where the dependent variable (XDik) is an indicator equal to one if the N.A. exports of
firm i in industry k are on average 20% below trend during the five months following the
To¯hoku event. The independent variables are also indicators: JPNik, for affiliates of Japanese
multinationals; Exposedik, for firms with an exposure to Japanese inputs above 0.05 of
total material; MMIik for firms with an elevated MMI value pertaining to their average
Japanese manufacturing locations; and Portik for firms that typically rely on imports via
ports damaged by the tsunami.10 The γk term allows for industry-specific intercepts. To
evaluate the determinants of an input disruption from Japan, we replace the dependent
variable with JDik , an indicator for a drop in Japanese imported inputs of 20% relative to
trend.
Panel A of Table C.4 evaluates firm characteristics predicting a drop in U.S. output (XDik),
as measured by our proxy. The columns (1)-(4) show the results from different specifications
with various combinations of the covariates in equation (C.11). Both Japanese ownership
and high exposure to Japanese inputs significantly increase the probability of an output
disruption, as expected. In columns (3) and (4), we demonstrate that Japanese ownership
is substantially more indicative of an output decline than high input exposure alone. In
Panel B, we replace the dependent variable with the binary measure of a drop in Japanese
intermediate inputs (JDi ). The results from these regressions indicate, unsurprisingly, that
high exposure to Japanese imports are highly predictive of a subsequent disruption following
the To¯hoku event. Apart from their exposure to imports from Japan, the Japanese affiliates
10Specifically, the MMIik = 1 if the average Japanese manufacturing establishment corresponding to a
U.S. firm is above the median (roughly an MMI of 5.2) of all firms with Japanese manufacturing locations.
The affected ports are: Onahama, Hitachi, Kashima, Haramachi, Shiogama, Sendai, Shimizu, Ishinomaki,
Hashinohe, Miya Ko, Kamaishi, Ofunato, and Kessennuma.
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are no more likely to suffer a disruption to these imports (see column 8).11 While the results
from Table C.4 are somewhat inconclusive, they nevertheless point to unique features of the
production function of Japanese affiliates that yields direct pass-through of Japanese shocks
to the U.S. economy. Our estimation procedure that follows should help to clarify this point
further.
C.3.3 Bootstrapping Standard Errors
We use bootstrapping methods to compute measures of the dispersion of our point esti-
mates. Using random sampling with replacement within each group of firms, we create 5000
new artificial samples and re-run the estimation procedure. The standard deviation of the
point estimates across these bootstrap samples is shown in Table 3.3. To gain a more com-
plete picture of the dispersion, we create density estimates for each sample of firms across
the parameter space for the elasticities. These densities are shown in Figure C.3.
C.3.4 Effects on U.S. Exports to Japan
Another dimension of the transmission of the To¯hoku shock to the United States is U.S.
exports back to Japan. To the extent that firms in the U.S. receive inputs from Japan
for processing and re-shipment back to Japan, one might expect the U.S. exports to Japan
may fall following the To¯hoku event. On the other hand, U.S. firms may have increased
shipments to Japan following the shock in order to offsett what were large production and
supply shortages within Japan. To evaluate this, we re-run the specification in equation
(3.5) but replace V Mi,t , the value of intermediate imports of firm i in month t, with V
JEXP
i,t ,
the value of Japanese exports of firm i in month t. The results are shown in Figure C.2. As
is clear from the figure, we do not see strong evidence to support either hypothesis regarding
this particular trade flow, at least as it pertains to Japanese multinationals in particular.
11The combined effect of the coefficients on Japan and JPN*Exp is -0.16, and not significant.
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C.3.5 Effects on Employment and Payroll
The Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) contains quarterly employment and
payroll information for all employers (with some small exceptions) in the U.S. economy.
This list is held separately as a single-unit(SSEL-SU) and multi-unit (SSEL-MU) file. The
Report of Organization Survey (ROS) asks firms to list the establishments which report
under a particular EIN, and this information is then recorded to the firm identifier on the
Multi-Unit File. To build a quarterly employment series at the firm-level, we link the EIN
variables on the SU file with the firm-identifier linked with each EIN on the MU file. In
principle, the four quarters of payroll listed on the SSEL is combined by Census to create
an annual payroll figure for each establishment, which is the value recorded in the LBD.
Similarly, the employment variable corresponding to the 1st quarter (week of March 12)
from the SSEL is that used by the LBD.
Once we merge the SSEL-based data with quarterly employment and payroll to the LBD
for a particular year, we conduct a series of reviews to ensure that the annual payroll (and
1st quarter employment) roughly align. Any establishments with disagreements between the
SSEL-based payroll and LBD-based payroll such that the ratio was greater than 2 or less
than 0.6 were dropped.
After these modifications were made, the remainder of the data construction was similar
to that in section C.2.3. We merge multinational indicators from the DCA, drop non-
manufacturing firms, append the 2009, 2010, and 2011 files together, and keep only those
firms that exist in each year. Using the same set of firms as a control group as specified in
section 3.3.1, we run the following regression:
∆empj,t =
3∑
i=−3
γiEi +
3∑
i=−3
βiEiDj,i + uj,t (C.12)
where ∆empj,t ≡ ln(empj,t/empj,t−4), where empj,t indicates employment at firm j in
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quarter t. We also re-run the equation specified in equation C.12 using payroll payj,t as the
dependent variable (where ∆payj,t ≡ ln(payj,t/payj,t−4). The qualitative results are shown
in table C.5.
C.3.6 Effects on Unit Values (Prices) of Trade
The LFTTD contains information on quantities as well as values for each trade transac-
tion, recorded at a highly disaggregated product definition (HS 10 digit). This allows for the
construction of unit values (prices) for each firm-product-month observation, which allows
for an analysis of price movements surrounding the To¯hoku event.
The majority of the data construction is identical to that in section C.2.3, however there
are a number of modifications. First, we drop all transactions with missing or imputed quan-
tities in the LFTTD, and then aggregate to the Firm-HS10-month frequency, separately for
each type of trade transaction: 1) Related-Party imports from Japan; 2) Non Related-Party
imports from Japan; 3) Related-Party exports to Canada/Mexico; and 4) Non Related-Party
exports to Canada/Mexico. Next, we select only those firms identified as manufacturing in
the LBD. We keep the related-party and arms-length transactions separate as one may expect
these prices to behave differently following a shock. As above, we keep only manufactur-
ing firms, append the annual files together, and then select only those firms identified as a
multinational in either 2009, 2010, or 2011.
At the product level, there is little reason to suspect trends or seasonal variation over
this short of a time period. Moreover, there is no concern here about accounting for zeros
in the data. As such we take a firm j’s imports (exports) of product p in month t, and run
the following specification in logs (mp,j,t = log(Mp,j,t):
mp,j,t = αpj +
9∑
i=−19
γiEi +
9∑
i=−19
βiEiDj,i + uj,t (C.13)
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where αpj are firmXproduct fixed-effects, γi are monthly fixed effects (with the dummy
variable E ′is corresponding to each calendar month), and uj,t are random effects. The vari-
ables Dj,t are dummy variables equal to one if the firm is owned by a Japanese parent
company.
A qualitative version of the results is shown in Table C.6.
C.3.7 Ward’s Automotive Data
Ward’s electronic databank offers a variety of data products for the global automotive
industry at a monthly frequency. We obtain Japanese production (by model), North Ameri-
can production (by plant and model), U.S. inventory (by model), and North American sales
(by model) all for the period January 2000 to December 2012. The inventory and sales
data also contain the country of origin, so one can separate out these variables based on
whether a particular model was imported vs domestically-produced. The series cover the
universe of the assembly operations of finished cars and light trucks. Unfortunately, there is
no information on input shipments.
For the plant-level analysis of production, the base sample consists of 167 plants active
at some point during 2000-2012. We remove plants that were not continuously in operation
during the period 2009-2012, and combine several plants that are recorded separately in the
data, but are in effect the same plant. After these modifications, the sample reduces to 62
plants, 22 of which are owned by a Japanese parent. The average monthly production in the
three months preceding the shock is 12,904 for Japanese plants, and 14,903 for Non-Japanese
plants. The specification is identical to that in section 3.3.1:
Qi,t = α0 + αi +
9∑
p=−14
γpEp +
9∑
p=−14
βpEpJPNi,p + ui,t (C.14)
where here the variable Qi,t is auto production by plant i in month t, after removing
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a plant-specific trend though March 2011. Because these plants can be tracked with some
confidence back in time, it is reasonable here to remove seasonality directly, rather than
assume a shared seasonal component between the treated and control groups as in section
3.3.2. We use the X12-ARIMA model, provided by the National Bank of Belgium, and apply
it to each series before correcting for trend. The results for the Japanese plants are mostly
similar, as shown in table C.7.
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Figure C.1: Relative Inputs and Output (Proxy) of Japanese Firms (Reduced Sample)
Logged, HP-Filtered
A. No Size-Weighting
B. Size-Weighted
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the relative percentage deviations from trend of Japanese affiliates relative
to a control group of other multinational firms. The values are coefficient estimates taken from
an interaction of a Japanese-firm dummy with a monthly dummy – additional baseline monthly
dummies remove seasonal effects. These results reflect a reduced sample with no firm-month zeros
in imported inputs or N.A. exports. The data is logged, and HP-filtered using a monthly smoothing
parameter.
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Figure C.2: Dynamic Treatment Effects: Relative Japanese Exports of Japanese Firms
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
These figures report the Japanese exports of the U.S. affiliates of Japanese firms relative to a control
group of other multinational firms. The values are coefficient estimates taken from an interaction
of a Japanese-firm dummy with a monthly dummy – additional baseline monthly dummies remove
seasonal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table C.4: Predicting Japanese Import and U.S. Output Disruption by Firm Characteristics
Panel A: Disruption to U.S. Output (proxy) Panel B: Disruption to Japanese Imports
XDi = 1 J
D
i = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Japan 0.443*** 0.352*** 0.347** 0.707*** 0.310*** 0.686***
(0.0921) (0.117) (0.152) (0.0917) (0.115) (0.150)
Exposed 0.351*** 0.145 0.140 0.814*** 0.636*** 0.991***
(0.0886) (0.112) (0.149) (0.0880) (0.110) (0.144)
JPN*Exp -0.00771 -0.848***
(0.228) (0.222)
MMI -0.176*** -0.121* -0.178*** -0.178*** 0.346*** 0.389*** 0.341*** 0.306***
(0.0676) (0.0646) (0.0676) (0.0683) (0.0691) (0.0667) (0.0694) (0.0704)
Ports -0.174 -0.144 -0.197 0.248 0.217 0.168 0.174
(0.224) (0.225) (0.226) (0.211) (0.212) (0.213) (0.213)
Constant -0.674 -0.674 -0.674 -0.674 -4.672 -4.672 -4.672 -4.668
(0.681) (0.681) (0.681) (0.681) (85.78) (85.78) (85.78) (85.00)
Industry
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451 2451
*** p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Source: LFTTD, DCA, UBP, and USGS as explained in the text. This table reports the results of a probit model prediction of
JPN import and N.A. exports (output) disruption based on firm characteristics. See section 3.3.1 for a definition of the variables.
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Figure C.3: Density Estimates of Elasticities Across Bootstrap Samples
A. Japanese vs non-Japanese Multinationals: Materials Elasticity (ω)
B. Japanese vs non-Japanese Multinationals: Materials-Capital/Labor Elasticity (ζ)
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Figure C.3: Density Estimates of Elasticities Across Bootstrap Samples
C. Non-multinationals and All Firms: Materials Elasticity (ω)
D. Non-multinationals and All Firms: Materials-Capital/Labor Elasticity (ζ)
Source: LFTTD-DCA-UBP as explained in text.
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Table C.5: Dynamic Treatment Effects: Quarterly Employment/Payroll Surrounding
To¯hoku Event
Log 4-Quarter Difference
Employment Payroll
Independent Variables (1) (2)
Q2 2010 (t=-3) pos*** pos***
Q3 2010 (t=-2) pos*** pos***
Q4 2010 (t=-1) pos*** pos***
Q1 2011 (t=0) pos*** pos***
Q2 2011 (t=1) pos*** pos***
Q3 2011 (t=2) pos*** pos***
Q4 2011 (t=3) pos*** pos***
JPNxQ2 2010 (t=-3) neg neg
JPNxQ3 2010 (t=-2) neg neg
JPNxQ4 2010 (t=-1) neg neg
JPNxQ1 2011 (t=0) neg neg
JPNxQ2 2011 (t=1) neg neg
JPNxQ3 2011 (t=2) neg neg
JPNxQ4 2011 (t=3) neg pos
constant neg*** neg***
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations
R-squared
Source: SSEL and DCA as explained in the text.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the firmXProduct level) per-
taining to each sign coefficient are indicated by: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
This table reports qualitative features of firm employment and firm
payroll in the quarters surrounding the To¯hoku earthquake and
tsunami. The first set of coefficients correspond to quarter dum-
mies, whereas the second set (JPNx) correspond to the interaction
of a Japanese firm dummy with quarter dummies. See equation
C.12 in the text. The dependent variable is the four-quarter log
difference of employment (payroll).
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Table C.6: Dynamic Treatment Effects: Unit Values of Trade Surrounding To¯hoku Event
Log Unit-Value of:
JPN Imports: JPN Imports: N.A. Exports N.A. Exports
Related Party Non-Related Party Related Party Non-Related Party
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sep 2010 (t=-6) neg** pos pos* pos
Oct 2010 (t=-5) pos neg pos** pos
Nov 2010 (t=-4) pos pos pos** pos
Dec 2010 (t=-3) pos neg pos pos
Jan 2011 (t=-2) neg pos neg pos
Feb 2011 (t=-1) pos neg pos** pos
Mar 2011 (t=0) neg pos pos pos
Apr 2011 (t=1) pos pos pos pos
May 2011 (t=2) neg pos neg pos**
Jun 2011 (t=3) pos** neg pos** neg
Jul 2011 (t=4) neg neg pos neg
Aug 2011 (t=5) pos pos neg pos
Sep 2011 (t=6) pos pos pos pos**
Oct 2011 (t=7) neg neg pos pos
Nov 2011 (t=8) pos neg pos neg
Dec 2011 (t=9) neg pos pos** pos
JPNxSep 2010 (t=-6) pos** neg* neg** neg
JPNxOct 2010 (t=-5) neg* pos pos pos
JPNxNov 2010 (t=-4) neg pos neg neg
JPNxDec 2010 (t=-3) neg neg* pos pos
JPNxJan 2011 (t=-2) pos neg neg neg
JPNxFeb 2011 (t=-1) neg pos pos pos**
JPNxMar 2011 (t=0) pos pos neg neg
JPNxApr 2011 (t=1) neg pos neg neg
JPNxMay 2011 (t=2) pos neg pos neg
JPNxJun 2011 (t=3) neg pos* neg neg
JPNxJul 2011 (t=4) pos neg pos neg
JPNxAug 2011 (t=5) neg* neg* neg pos
JPNxSep 2011 (t=6) neg neg neg neg
JPNxOct 2011 (t=7) pos neg neg neg
JPNxNov 2011 (t=8) neg neg neg pos
JPNxDec 2011 (t=9) neg neg pos neg
constant pos neg neg neg
FirmXProduct Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations
R-Squared
Source: LFTTD, DCA, and UBP as explained in the text.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the firmXProduct level) pertaining to each sign coefficient are indicated
by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
This table reports qualitative features of the unit values of trade surrounding the 2011 To¯hoku earthquake
and tsunami. The first set of coefficients correspond to monthly dummies, whereas the second set (JPNx)
correspond to the interaction of a Japanese firm dummy with monthly dummies. See equation C.13 in the
text.
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Figure C.4: Automotive Production, Inventory, Sales by Firm Type, Distributed Lag Model
Source: Ward’s Automotive Database
This figure reports North American production, and U.S. sales and inventory data according to firm
type: Japanese and non-Japanese firms. The values are coefficient estimates taken from a distributed
lag model, exploiting time-series variation only. The underlying series have been seasonally adjusted,
logged, and HP-Filtered Standard errors are suppressed in the interests of clarity. The Japanese
automakers are Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru.
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Table C.7: Dynamic Treatment Effects: N.A. Automotive Production
(1) (2) (1) (2)
VARIABLES Prod Prod VARIABLES (cont’d) Prod (cont’d) Prod (cont’d)
Nov 2010 (t=-4) 91.06 17.78 JPN x Nov 2010 (t=-4) -195.8 -341.7
(649.9) (608.8) (841.9) (799.2)
Dec 2010 (t=-3) -1,973*** 310.3 JPN x Dec 2010 (t=-3) -385.0 -408.3
(467.5) (497.5) (736.5) (706.4)
Jan 2011 (t=-2) -611.5 1,083* JPN x Jan 2011 (t=-2) 781.0 -1,092
(637.3) (618.7) (792.1) (804.6)
Feb 2011 (t=-1) 694.9* 756.3* JPN x Feb 2011 (t=-1) -1,142 -1,210*
(401.9) (394.7) (696.2) (666.8)
Mar 2011 (t=0) 4,356*** 1,483*** JPN x Mar 2011 (t=0) -3,515*** -2,592***
(524.9) (389.1) (812.0) (842.7)
Apr 2011 (t=1) -216.2 305.5 JPN x Apr 2011 (t=1) -6,239*** -6,099***
(707.7) (620.4) (1,303) (1,282)
May 2011 (t=2) 1,584*** 799.1 JPN x May 2011 (t=2) -7,244*** -6,625***
(525.4) (511.3) (1,651) (1,740)
Jun 2011 (t=3) 1,366** -499.3 JPN x Jun 2011 (t=3) -4,564*** -3,423**
(623.6) (594.9) (1,248) (1,320)
Jul 2011 (t=4) -4,512*** 123.3 JPN x Jul 2011 (t=4) -2,143 -3,723***
(878.4) (606.2) (1,430) (1,045)
Aug 2011 (t=5) 685.6 -1,323** JPN x Aug 2011 (t=5) -1,275 -1,108
(744.0) (648.1) (970.8) (1,012)
Sep 2011 (t=6) -836.5 -1,895*** JPN x Sep 2011 (t=6) -359.4 40.37
(663.7) (641.5) (930.7) (959.8)
Oct 2011 (t=7) -338.0 -1,434** JPN x Oct 2011 (t=7) 93.27 -265.4
(662.3) (632.4) (885.6) (785.8)
Nov 2011 (t=8) -1,393** -1,443** JPN x Nov 2011 (t=8) -1,318 -2,059*
(582.8) (601.2) (1,159) (1,183)
Dec 2011 (t=9) -4,511*** -1,619** JPN x Dec 2011 (t=9) 759.1 24.95
(774.4) (655.5) (1,105) (803.9)
Constant -1,535*** -1,683***
(89.30) (91.95)
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Remove Plant-Specific Pre-Shock Trend Yes Yes
Remove Seasonal Component No Yes
Observations 2,976 2,976
R-squared 0.260 0.272
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook
Robust standard errors (clustered at the plant level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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